require of them. This great truth, which we ought ever to bear in mind, is clearly expreffed in my text, What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God; i. e. to entertain just sentiments, and obferve a right conduct, with refpect to God and man: and every thing that God has fhewed us, whether by the light of nature, or by occasional interpofitions, has no other object than this. He hath fhewed thee, O man, what is good, what tends to make him virtuous and happy.

Let no perfon, therefore, value himself on his religion, as fuch, be the principles of it ever so true, his knowledge of it ever fo exact, and his faith in it ever fo firm. He is thereby only poffeffed of a means to a certain end; and if that end be not attained, he is fo far from being a gainer by being poffeffed of the means, that he is highly culpable for having fuch an inftrument, and making no proper use of it. For better, as the apostle fays (2 Peter ii. 21), would it be never to have known the way of righteousness than, after having known it, to depart from it, i. e. by living a vicious life. Alfo, according to

our

our Saviour's most folemn declarations, whatever may have been a man's relation to himfelf, even though he may have worked miracles in his name, if he be a worker of iniquity, he will at the last day disclaim all knowledge of him, and order him to depart from him.

As the improvement of the human character in virtuous principles and habits is the end of all religion, we must judge of the preferableness of natural, or revealed religion, by their fuperior tendency to effect this great end. But, indeed, fo little of religion, properly fo called, have men ever derived from the light of nature, and fo little are those who reject revelation really influenced by any religious principle, that the true state of the queftion, in fact, is, whether it be better for man to have the religion that is taught in the scriptures, or none at all. They who reject revelation may not abfolutely, and in words reject the belief of a God, and of a providence (though we fee, in the example of the French philofophers, and many others, that this is generally the cafe) they are not influenced by that belief. Nor can we wonder at this, when they certainly have not, in fact, any expectation

expectation of a future ftate, which, as I fhall fhew, was never taught to any useful purpose but by revelation.

Religion implies the belief of the being and providence of God, and fuch a refpect for the will of God, as will effectually control a man's natural inclinations, and direct his conduct, restraining him from irregularities to which he is naturally prone, and exciting him to actions to which he is naturally averfe. But as men in general are governed either by ftrong natural appetites, or a view to their intereft, it cannot be expected that virtue alone, without any hope of future reward or punishment, can have fuch charms for them, that they will abandon their pleasure, their ease, or their advantage, for the pure love of it. Suppofing that men might arrive at a knowledge of the will of God, with refpect to their conduct in life, they would not feel any fufficient obligation to conform to it, without the great fanction of future rewards and punishments. Mere authority, as that of a parent, or of a magiftrate, is little or nothing without the power of rewarding and punishing. Nothing, therefore, but a firm belief in a future state of retribution, can be ex

pected

pected to restrain men from giving into those indulgences to which they have a strong propenfity.

1. With respect to every article of religion, the light of nature is far from being fufficiently clear and diftinct, fo as to be inferred with certainty by the most intelligent of men.

With respect to what is most effential to human happinefs, the wifeft of men do not appear to have been, in fact, fuperior to the bulk, having, in a variety of respects, laid down the moft erroneous rules for the conduct of men. Plain as the most important maxims of morality are, there is not one of them but what the most enlightened, not only of the ancient philofophers, but of modern unbelievers, have controverted. What we call confcience, and which we might expect to be a better guide in this respect than even reafon, is by no means the fame uniform principle in all men. It is formed by various affociations of ideas, depending on the circumstances of our education; fo that things which absolutely fhock fome perfons, are not felt as at all improper by others. There is, therefore, fomething wanted fuperior to the dictates of reafon, or natural confcience, and

this can only be revealed religion, or the authority of our Maker, which must be obeyed without reasoning. Man will, no doubt, dispute even about the will of God, when it is most clearly revealed, as they do concerning the moft exprefs laws that are ever made by men; but if this be done with refpect to the articulate voice of God, it will be done to a much greater extent, and with much more plausibility, to the inarticulate voice of nature, which every perfon will interpret as he is previously inclined.

If when men are hurried on by paffion, or fwayed by intereft, they will tranfgrefs fuch pofitive and acknowledged commands as thou fhalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not fteal, &c. as we fee that, in fact, they do, it will not, however, be without reluctance and remorfe; and therefore tranfgreffions will be lefs frequent, and lefs flagrant, and repentance and amendment may be more reasonably expected to follow. But where no such pofitive command is acknowledged to exift, and the voice of nature alone is to be confulted about the proper conduct of life, most men will mistake their own inclination for the voice of nature, and confequently fin without reluctance