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N o T E s.
“ So Man, who here fęems principal alone,
« 'Tis but a part we see, and not a whole.” But without any regard to the evidence of this illustration, M. de Croufaz exclaims : “ See the general conclusion, All " that is, is right. So that at the fight of Charles the first « losing his head on the scaffold, we must have said, this is “ right; at the sight too of his judges condemning him, we “ must have said, this is right; at the fight of some of thefe “ judges, taken and condemned for the action which he had “ owned to be right, we must have cried out, this is doubly “ right.” Never was any thing more amazing than that the absurdities arising from the sense in which this critic takes the great principle, of whatever is, is right, did not shew him his mistake: For could any one in his fenfes employ a proposition in a meaning from whence fuch evident absurdities immediately arise? I have observed, that this conclufion, whatever is, is right, is a consequence of these premises, that partial evil tends to universal Good; which the Author employs as a principle to humble the pride of Man, who would impiously make God accountable for his creation. What then does common sense teach us to understand by whatever is, is right? Did the Poet mean right with regard to Man, or right with regard to God; right with regard to itself, or right with regard to its ultimate tendency? Surely, WITH REGARD TO GOD; for he tells us his design is to vindicate the ways of God to Man. Surely, with regard to its ULTIMATE TENDENCY ; for he tells us again, all partial ill is universal Good, Ver. 291. Now is this any encouragement to Vice? Or does it take off from the crime of him who commits it, that God providentially produces Good out of Evil ? Had Mr. Pope abruptly faid in his conclusion, the result of all is, that whatever is, is right, the objector had even then been inexcufable for putting so absurd a sense upon the words, when he might have feen that it was a conclufion from the general principle abovementioned ; and therefore must necessarily have another meaning. But what must we think of him, when the Poet, to prevent mistakes, had delivered, in this very place, the prin NOTES. ciple itself, together with this conclusion as the consequence of it?
“ All Discord, Harmony not understood;
He could not have told his Reader plainer that his conclusion was the consequence of that principle, unless he had written THEREFORE in great Church letters.
E P I S T L E II.
Of the Nature and State of Man with respeet to
Himself, as an Individual.
I. THE business of Man not to pry into God, but to study himself. His Middle Nature ; bis Powers and Frailties, Ver. I to 19. The Limits of bis Capacity, Ver. 19, &c. II. The two Principles of Man, Selflove and Reason, both necessary, Ver. 53, &c. Selflove the stronger, and wby, Ver. 67, &c. Their end the same, Ver. 81, &c. III. The Passions, and their ufe, Ver. 93 to 130.
The Predominant Passion, and ils force, Ver. 132 to 160. Its Necessity, in directing Men to different purposes, Ver. 165, &c. Its providential Use, in fixing our Principle, and ascertaining our Virtue, Ver. 177. IV. Virtue and Vice joined in our mixed Nature, the limits near, yet the things separate and evident: What is the Office of Reason, Ver. 202 to 216. V. How odious Vice in itself, and bow we deceive ourselves into it, Ver. 217. VI. That, however, the Ends of Providence and general Good are answered in our Passions and ImperfeElions, Ver. 238, &c. How usefully these are distributed to all Orders of Men, Ver. 241. How useful they are to Society, Ver. 251. And to Individuals, Ver. 263. In every state, and every age of life, Ver. 273, &c.