"The sum of the argument is this: No man is, by nature, the property of another. The defendant, therefore, is free by nature. The rights of nature must be someway forfeited before they can be justly taken away."

There are, in our language, but few words of which we make such loose and indefinite use as we do of the word "nature," and its variously modified forms. It would elucidate what we wish to bring to mind concerning the use of this word, to select some verbose author, of a fanatical habit of thought, or enough so to favour a negligence as to the clearness of the ideas expressed by the terms at his command, and compare the varied meanings which his application of the word will most clearly indicate. We do not accuse Dr. Johnson of any want of astute learning, but we wish to present an excuse for explaining that, by his use of the phrases, "men by nature"-"by nature free"-" the rights of nature," he means, the rights established by the laws of God. He uses those phrases as synonyms of the Creator, of his providence influencing the condition of man, or the adaptations bestowed on him. The laws of nature are the laws of God. And we are bold to say, no discreet writer uses the words differently. As a sample of its legitimate use, we quote "Milton to Hortlib on Education:"

"Not to mention the learned correspondence which you hold in foreign parts, and the extraordinary pains and diligence which you have used in this matter, both here and beyond the seas; either by the definite will of God so ruling, or the peculiar sway of nature, which also is God's working," &c.

We all agree that God has made the world, and all things therein, and that he established laws for its government, and also for the government of every thing in it. Now we must all agree that it was an act of great condescension, love, and mercy, if God did come down from his throne in heaven, and, from his own mouth instruct a few of the lost men then in the world, his chosen people, what were some of his laws, such as were necessary for them to know and to be governed by, that they might, to the greatest possible extent, live happily in this world, and enjoy eternal life hereafter. Do you believe he did so? believe he did so? You either believe he did, or you believe the Bible is a fable. If you believe he did, then we refer you to Ex. xx. and xxi., and to Lev. xxv., for what he did then reveal, as his law, on the subject of slavery; not that other important revelations were not made concerning this subject, which we shall have occasion to notice in the course of these studies.

If we believe the Bible to be a true book, then we must believe that God did make these revelations to Moses. Among them, one law permitted the Israelites to buy, and inherit, and to hold slaves. And Dr. Wayland, the author of "The Elements of Moral Science," agrees that what was the law of God must ever remain to be so.

It will follow then, if the laws of God authorize slavery, that a man by nature may be the property of another, because, whatever you may think the laws of nature to be, yet they can have no validity in opposition to the laws of God. If it shall be said that Jesus Christ repealed the law as delivered to Moses, then we answer: He says he came not to destroy, but to fulfil the law; and that he fully completed his mission. He had no commission to repeal the law: therefore he had no power to do so.

This portion of Dr. Johnson's argument is consonant with the notions of the advocates of the "higher law" doctrine, who persist that slavery is a sin, because they think it is.

But if the law permitted slavery, then to hold, cannot be a sin, because God "frameth not mischief by a law." See Ps. xciv. 20. "Wo unto them that decree unrighteous decrees." Isa. x. 1. If the law authorizing the Jews to hold slaves was unrighteous, then God pronounces the wo upon himself, which is gross contradiction.

But the law is "pure, holy, and just;" therefore a law permitting sin must be against itself-which cannot be; for, in such case, the law recoils against itself, and destroys its own end and character.

But again: "The end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and faith unfeigned." 1 Tim. i. 5. Now it is not charity to permit that which cannot be done with a pure heart, because then conscience and faith are both deceived.

Again: The law "beareth not the sword in vain, but to be a terror to evil works, for he (the instrument executing the law) is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil."

If slavery, or to hold slaves, be sin, then also the law granting the license to do so destroys the very object which it was enacted to sustain. But again: If the law allows sin, then it is in covenant with sin; and the law itself, therefore, must be sin.

In short, the doctrine is pure infidelity. It is destructive to the object of law, and blasphemous to God. What are we to think of him who holds that God descended in the majesty of his power

upon Sinai, and there, from the bottomless treasures of his wisdom and purity, commanding man to wash his garment of every pollution, opened to him-what? Why, an unclean system of morals, stained by a most unholy impurity; but which he is nevertheless to practise to the damning of his soul! Atheism, thou art indeed

a maniac!

In the course of these studies, we shall attempt to show that man is not free in the unlimited sense with which the word is here used. Absolute freedom is incompatible with a state of accountability. Say, if you choose, Adam was free in paradise to eat the apple, to commit sin, yet we find his freedom was bounded by an accountability beyond his power to give satisfactory answer: hence the consequent, a change of state, a circumscribing of what you may call his freedom. This, in common parlance, we call punishment; yet our idea of punishment is inadequate to express the full idea: because God cannot be supposed to delight in punishment, or to be satisfied with punishment, in accordance with our narrow views. Such would be inconsistent with the combination of his attributes -a Being so constituted of all power, that each power is predominant, even love and mercy. Thus the law of God clothes the effect in mercy and positive good, inversely to the virulence of the cause, or in direct proportion to its propriety. Thus, righteousness, as a cause, exalteth a nation; but sin is a reproach to any people. Thus the law of God places the sinner under the government of shame, infamy, contempt, as schoolmasters to lead him back to virtue; and it may be observed that the schoolmaster is more forcing in his government in proportion to the virulence of vice, down to the various grades of subjection and slavery, and until the poison becomes so great that even death is a blessing.

But if the mind cannot perceive that the chastenings of the Lord are blessings, let it regard them as lessons. The parent, from the waywardness of the child, perceives that it will fall from a precipice, and binds it with a cord to circumscribe its walk. True, such are poor figures to outline a higher Providence! The Being who created, surely had power to appoint the governCan the thing created remain in the condition in which it is placed, except by obedience to the law established for its government? Disobedience must change the condition of the thing and bring it under new restraints-a lessening of the boundaries of freedom. The whole providence of God to man is upon this plan, and is abundantly illustrated, in the holy books, by precept

ment.

and example. These restraints follow quick on the footsteps of disobedience, until the law-the Spirit shall no longer strive for reformation, but say, "Cut it down; why cumbereth it the ground?"

Is this a too melancholy view? Let us, then, look at obedience and its consequents, and turn the eye from this downward path of mental and physical degradation, pain, misery, want, slavery, and death, to the bright prospect of a more elevated state of progressive improvement, secured to us as a consequent, a reward of obedience; the physical powers improving, the mental elevating, and all our faculties becoming instruments of greater truthfulness, until our condition shall be so elevated that the Creator shall say, "Come ye and sit at my right hand!"

The assertion, that "no man is by nature the property of another," flatters our vanity and tumefies our pride, but is, nevertheless, untrue. We are all absolutely the property of Him who made, and who sustains his right to dispose of us; and does so in conformity to his law. Thus, qualifiedly, we are the property of the great family of man, and are under obligations of duty to all; more pressingly to the national community of which we compose a part, and so on down to the distinct family of which we are a member. It is upon this principle that Fleta says, (book i, chap. 17,)" He that has a companion has a master." See also the same in Bracton, book i. chap. 16.

If, by the laws of God, other men could have no property in us, the laws of civil government could have no right to control us. But if the civil government, by the laws of God, has the right to govern and control us, so far as is for the benefit of ourselves and the community, then it will follow, that when our benefit will be enhanced, and that of the community, by our subjection to slavery, either temporary or perpetual, the laws of God, in mercy, will authorize such subjection. Or, if the state of our degradation be such that our continuance upon the earth be an evil past all remedy, then the laws of God will authorize the civil law to decree our exit.

The providence of God to man is practical. He never deals in the silly abstractions of foolish philosophers. He spends no time in experimenting by eristic syllogisms. He deals alone in his own power, which nowhere ever ceases to act, although wholly beyond our comprehension. Man may long for a full view of the Almighty, yet we are destined here to perceive but the "hinder parts" of his presence-the effect of his power, not Him! Let

us worship; and, for our guidance, be content with the pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night!

In conclusion: Should the author of "The Elements of Moral Science" examine this argument of the great dialectician of the past century, with his acknowledged logical acumen, free from the prejudices of his locality, now so abundantly displayed in that portion of his work to which we object, we would suggest the propriety of his applying the discoveries he may make to emendations in his succeeding thousands.