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§ 4. Of the paffions which arife from our focial nature.

The paffions and affections which I have hitherto confidered are those which belong to us as individuals, and do not neceffarily suppose any relation to other beings, I fhall now proceed to treat of those which are of this latter class, and first of the pleasure that we take in the good opinion of others concerning us, which gives rife to that paffion which we call the love of fame.

This is a paffion that difcovers itself pretty early in life, and arifes principally from our experience and obfervation of the many advantages that refult from the good opinion of others. In the early part of life this principle is of fignal use to us, as a powerful incentive to thofe actions which procure us the esteem of our fellow creatures; which are, in general, the fame that are dictated by the princi

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ples of benevolence and the moral sense, and alfo by a regard to the will of God.

But though, by this account, the love of fame is an ufeful ally to virtue, the gratification of it ought by no means to be made our primary pursuit; because, if it were known that fame was the fole end of a man's actions, he would be fo far from gaining this end, that he would be despised by mankind in general; and efpecially if he were advanced in life, when it is commonly expected that men should be governed by higher and better principles. For no actions are looked upon by the bulk of mankind as properly praise worthy, but those which proceed from a principle of difinterested benevolence, obedience to God, or a regard to conscience.

2. Befides, humility is a principal fubject of praife; and, indeed, without this, no other virtue is held in much esteem. Now this humility supposes fuch a diffidence of ones felf, fuch a readiness to acknowledge

knowledge the fuperiority of others, and also so small a degree of complacence in the contemplation of our own excellencies, as must be inconfiftent with our making this pleasure our chief pursuit, and the fource of our greatest happiness.

3. In another refpect, alfo, the love of fame, as a primary object of pursuit, tends to defeat itself. We are not pleased with praise, except it come from perfons of whofe judgment, as well as fincerity we have a good opinion; but the love of fame, as our fupreme good, tends to beget fuch a degree of felf fufficiency, and conceit, as makes us defpife the rest of mankind, that is, it makes their praise of little value to us; fo that the fprightly pleasures of vanity naturally give place in time to all the fullennefs and moroseness of pride.

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4. If a man have no other object than reputation or popularity, he will be led to dwell frequently upon the subject of

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his own merit, of which he will, confequently, entertain an over weening and unreasonable opinion; and this can hardly fail to produce, befides a moft ridiculous degree of conceit, fo much envy and jealoufy, as will make him insufferable in society, and fubject him to the most cutting mortifications.

5. If a man's principal object be those qualifications and actions which ufually distinguish men, and make them much talked of, both in their own and future ages, fuch as eminence with refpect to genius, excellence in the polite arts, difcoveries in science, or great achivements in the arts of peace or war, his chance of fucceeding is very fmall; for it is not poffible that more than a few perfons, in comparifon, can draw the attention of the reft of mankind upon them. And befides that the qualifications which are the foundation of this eminence are very rare among mankind, fuccefs depends upon the concurrence of many circumstances, independent

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independent on a man's felf. therefore, that very few perfons can reafonably hope to diftinguish themselves in this manner, and it would certainly be very wrong to propose that as a principal object of pursuit to all mankind, which the bulk of thein cannot poffibly obtain, or enjoy.

The proper use of this love of fame, as of the principle of self intereft, is to be a means of bringing us within the influence of better and truly virtuous principles, in confequence of begetting a habit of doing the fame things which better principles would prompt to. If, for instance, a man should, first of all, perform acts of charity and beneficence from oftentation only, the joy that he actually communicates to others, and the praises he receives for his generofity, from those who are ftrangers to his real motive, cannot but give him an idea of the purer pleafures of genuine benevolence, from which, and not from a defire of applause only, he will for the future act,

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