The pleasures that accrue to us from the pursuit of fame, like those of self interest, are best gained by persons who have them not directly in view. The man who is truly benevolent, pious, and confcientious, will, in general, fecure the most folid and permanent reputation with mankind; and if he be fo fituated that the practice of any real virtue fhall be deemed unfashionable, and fubject him to contempt and insult, he will have acquired that fuperiority of mind, which will fet him above it; fo that he will not feel any pain from the want of fuch esteem, as must have been purchased by the violation, or neglect of his duty. But he will rather applaud himself, and rejoice that he is not esteemed by perfons of certain characters, be they ever so numerous, and distinguished on certain accounts; finding more than an equivalent recompence in the approbation of his own mind, in the esteem of the wife and good, though they be ever fo few, and especially in the favour of God, who is the fearcher of hearts, hearts, the best judge, and most munificient rewarder of real worth. $5. Of the fympathetic affections. A paffion for fame, though it be founded on the relation that men stand in to one another, and therefore fuppofes fociety, is of a very different nature from the focial principle, properly fo called; or a difpofition to love, and to do kind offices to our fellow creatures. 1. That it is with the greatest juftice that this is ranked among our highest purfuits has been fhewn already. That the study to do good to others, is placed in this rank must be perfectly agreeable to the will of God, who cannot but intend the happiness of all his offspring, and who is himself actuated by the principle of universal benevolence. If we confult the natural dictates of our confcience, we shall find that it gives the strongest approbation to difinterested benevolence nevolence in ourselves or others; and if we examine how our own highest interest is affected by it; we fhall find that, in general, the more exalted is our benevolence, and the more we lay ourselves out to promote the good of others, the more perfect enjoyment we have of ourselves, and the more we are in the way of receiving good offices from others in return; and, upon the whole, the happier we are likely to be. 2. A man of a truly benevolent difpofition, and who makes the good of others the object of his purfuit, will never want opportunities of employing and gratifying himself: for we are fo connected with and dependent upon one another, the fmall upon the great, and the great upon the fmall, that, whatever be a man's ftation in life, if he be of a benevolent difpofition, it will always be in his power to oblige others, and thereby indulge himfelf. 3. A person fo benevolent may, in general, depend upon fuccefs in his schemes, because mankind are previously disposed to approve, recommend, and countenance benevolent undertakings; and though fuch a perfon will fee much mifery and distress, which he cannot relieve, and which will, confequently, give him fome pain; yet, upon the whole, his pleasures will he far fuperior to it; and the pains of fympathy do not, in general, agitate the mind beyond the limits of pleasure. We have even a kind of fatisfaction with ourselves in contemplating scenes of distress, though we can only wish to relieve the unhappy fufferers. For this reafon it is that tragic scenes, and tragical ftories are so engaging. This kind of fatisfaction has even more charms for mankind in general than the view of many pleafing scenes of life. 4. Besides if to the principle of benevolence be added a strict regard to confcience, and confidence in divine providence, all the pains of fympathy will almost wholly wholly vanish. If we are conscious that we do all we can to affift and relieve others, we may have perfect fatisfaction in ourselves, and may habitually rejoice in the belief of the wisdom and goodnefs of God; being convinced that all the evils, which we ineffectually strive to remove, are appointed for wife and good purposes; and that, being of a temporary nature, they will finally be abforbed in that infinity of happinefs, to which, though in ways unknown to us, we believe them to be fubfervient. Every argument by which benevolence is recommended to us condemns malevolence, or a difpofition to rejoice in the misery, and to grieve at the happiness of others. This baleful difpofition may be generated by frequently confidering our own interest as in oppofition to that of o thers. For, in this cafe, at the fame time that we receive pleasure from our own gain, we receive pleasure alfo from their lofs, which is connected with it; and for the fame reason, when we grieve for our own |