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manner, concerning any thing that is infinite, or even to express ourselves concerning them without falling into seeming abfurdities. If we fay that it is impoffible that the works of God fhould have been from eternity, we may fay the fame concerning any particular thought in the divine mind, or even concerning any particular moment of time in, the eternity that has preceded us; for thefe are all of the nature of particular events, which must have taken place at fome definite time, or at some precife given distance from the prefent moment. But as we are fure that the divine being himself, and duration itself, must have been without beginning, notwithstanding this argument; the works of God may also have been without beginning, notwithstanding the fame argument. It may make this difficulty the easier to us, to confider that thinking and acting, or creating, may be the fame thing with God.

So

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So little are our minds equal to these fpeculations, that though we all agree, that an infinite duration must have preceded the present moment, and that another infinite duration must neceffarily follow it; and though the former of these is continually receiving additions, which is, in our idea, the fame thing as its growing continually larger; and the latter is constantly suffering as great diminutions, which, in our idea, is the fame thing as its growing continually lefs; yet we are - forced to acknowledge that they both ever have been, and always must be exactly equal; neither of them being at any time conceivably greater, or less than the other. Nay we cannot conceive how both thefe eternities, added together, can be greater than either of them separately taken.

Having demonftrated the existence of God, as the first cause, the creator, and difpofer of all things; we are naturally led to inquire, in the next place, what properties or attributes he is poffeffed of.

Now

Now these naturally divide themfelves into two claffes; being either fuch as flow from his being confidered as the original cause of all things, or fuch as the particular nature of the works of which he is the author lead us to ascribe to him.

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Of thofe attributes of the deity which are deduced from the confideration of his being the original caufe of all things.

INCE matter is a fubftance inca

SIN

pable of moving itself; fince it can only be acted upon, and we cannot connect with it the idea of action, or an original power of acting upon other things, we cannot but conclude that God is an immaterial being, or a Spirit. But, we must acknowledge ourselves to be altogether ignorant of the nature or effence of God, and, indeed, of matter too; fince, to the properties of length, breadth, and

thickness

thickness, we cannot be certain but that other properties, of very different natures, fuch as even perception and intelligence, may be fuperadded. But should this be poffible, we still cannot conceive that a thing which, of itself, is so sluggish and inert, fhould be the original cause and fountain of life, action, and motion to all other beings. Notwithstanding ourignorance, therefore, concerning the nature of matter, and of the properties which may, or may not be compatible with it, there feems to be fufficient reason to conclude, that the effence of God cannot be matter, but fomething very different from it, which we therefore call immaterial, or fpiritual.

Secondly, the original caufe of all things must have been eternal; for, fince nothing can begin to exist without a cause, if there ever had been a time when nothing existed, nothing could have existed at present.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, this original cause must likewife be immutable, or not fubject to change. We feem to require no other proof of this, than the impoffibility of conceiving whence a change could arise in a being uncaused. If there was no caufe of his existence itfelf, it seems to follow, that there could be no caufe of a change in the manner of his existence; fo that whatever he was originally, he must for ever continue to be. Befides, a capacity of producing a change in any being or thing, implies fomething prior and fuperior, fomething that can control, and that is incapable of being refifted; which can only be true of the fupreme cause itself.

The immutability of the divine being, or his being incapable of being acted upon, or controlled by any other, is what we mean when we fay that he is an independent being, if by this term we mean any thing more than his being uncaused.

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