fome revelation on that fubject, communicated by God to the first parents of mankind. Upon the whole I cannot help thinking, that there is fomething in the arguments above recited, which fhew that a future life is very agreeable to the appearances of this, though I do not think them fo ftriking, as to have been fufficient, of themselves, to have fuggefted the first idea of it. And though, if we had never heard of a future life, we might not have expected it; yet now that we have heard of it, we may be fenfible that we should do violence to nature, if we should ceafe to hope for, and believe it. Admitting that there is another life, taking place either at death, or at fome future period, it must be acknowledged, that our condition in it is, at prefent, in a great measure unknown to us; but fince the principal arguments in favour of it are drawn from the confideration of the moral moral government of God, we may depend upon it, that virtue will find an adequate reward in it, and vice its proper punishment. But of what kind, it is impoffible for us to fay. We feem, however, to have fufficient reafon to conclude that, fince both the happiness and misery of a future life will be proportioned to the degrees of virtue and vice in this, they must both be finite; that is, there must be a continuance of virtue, to fecure a continuance of reward, and a continuance in vice to deferve a continuance of punishment. Although the goodness of God should give a preheminence to virtue and the re wards of it, in a future ftate, yet we do not fee that even his juftice, in any sense of the word, can require him to do the fame with refpect to vice. Indeed, we muft give up all our ideas of proportion between crimes and punishment, that is all our ideas of justice and equity, if we fay that a punishment strictly speaking infinite, either either in duration or degree, can be incurred by the fin of a finite creature, in a finite time, especially confidering the frailty of human nature, the multiplicity of temptations with which fome poor unhappy wretches are befet, and the great difadvantages they labour under through life. There is, indeed, a sense, and a very alarming one too, in which future punishments, though not ftrictly speaking infinite, may, nevertheless, be without end, and yet be confiftent with the perfect rectitude and goodness of God. For the wicked, though confined to a fituation which, after fome time at leaft, may not be abfolutely, and in itself, painful, may be for ever excluded from a happier fituation, to which they fee the virtuous advanced. And having this continually in profpect, and knowing that there is an utter impoffibility of their ever regaining the rank they have loft by their vices, they may never ceafe to blame and reproach themselves for their folly, which cannot cannot be recalled, and the effects of which are irreversible. If we argue from the analogy of nature, we fhall rather conceive, that, fince pain, and evils of every kind, are falutary in this life, that they will have the same tendency and operation in a future, and, confequently, that they will be employed to correct, meliorate, and reform thofe who are exposed to them; fo that, after a fufficient time of purification, those who are not made virtuous by the fufferings and difcipline of this life, will be recovered to virtue and happiness by the long continuance of unfpeakably greater fufferings, and of a much feverer difcipline in the life to come. Since, however, the longer we live in this life, the more fixed are our habits, and difpofitions of mind, fo that there is an aftonishing difference between the flexibility, as we may call it, of a child, and that of a grown man, our conftitution af ter ter death may be fuch, as that any change in the temper of our minds will be brought about with much more difficulty, so that a space of time almoft incredible to us at prefent, may be neceffary, in order that the fufferings of a future life may have their proper effect, in reforming a perfon who dies a flave to vicious habits. The motives to virtue by no means lofe any of their real force from the confideration of the non eternity of future punishments, especially upon the fuppofition that they will be very intenfe, and lafting, though not abfolutely without end. For, in the first place, what is loft with refpect to the motive of terror and aftonishment, is gained by that of love, and the perfuafion of the greater regard, in the divine being, both to juftice and mercy, in not. retaining anger for ever, on account of the finite offences of his imperfect creatures. Secondly, If the mind of any man be fo hardened, that he will not be influenced by the expectation of a very long continu ance |