the author of it has not given them, it is of confequence that their unjust claims be exposed and refifted.

In order to give the most distinct view of the principles of religion, I fhall first explain what it is that we learn from nature, and then what farther lights we receive from revelation. But it must be obferved, that, in giving a delineation of ́natural religion, I shall deliver what I suppofe might have been known concerning God, our duty, and our future expectations by the light of nature, and not what was actually known of them by any of the human race; for these are very different things. Many things are, in their own nature, attainable, which, in fact, are never attained; fo that though we find but little of the knowledge of God, and of his providence, in many nations, which never enjoyed the light of revelation, it does not follow that nature did not contain and teach thofe leffons, and that men had not the means of learning them, provided they

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they had made the most of the light they had, and of the powers that were given them.

I fhall, therefore, include under the head of natural religion, all that can be demonftrated, or proved to be true by natural reason, though it was never, in fact, discovered by it; and even though it be probable that mankind would never have known it without the affiftance of revelation. Thus the doctrine of a future ftate may be called a doctrine of natural religion, if when we have had the first knowledge of it from divine revelation, we can afterwards fhow that the expectation of it was probable from the light of nature, and that prefent appearances are, upon the whole, favourable to the fuppofition of it.

SECTION

SECTION I

Of the existence of God, and thofe attributes which are deduced from his being confidered as uncaufed himself, and the caufe of every thing else.

W

HEN we say there is a GOD, we mean that there is an intelligent defigning caufe of what we see in the world around us, and a being who was himself uncaused. Unless we have re-course to this fuppofition, we cannot account for prefent appearances; for there is an evident incapacity in every thing we fee of being the cause of its own existence, or of the existence of other things. Though, in one fenfe, fome things are the causes of others, yet they are only so in part; and when we give fufficient attention to their nature, we shall fee, that it is very improperly that they are termed caufes at all: for when we have allowed all that we can to their influence and operation,

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ration, there is ftill fomething that muft be referred to a prior and fuperior cause. Thus we fay that a proper foil, together with the influences of the fun and the rain, are the causes of the growth of plants; but, in fact, all that we mean, and all that, in ftrictness, we ought to fay, is, that according to the prefent conftitution of things, plants could not grow but in those circumstances; for, if there had not been a body previously organized like a plant, and if there had not exifted what we call a constitution of nature, in confequence of which plants are difpofed to thrive by the influence of the foil, the fun, and the rain, thofe circumstances would have fignified nothing; and the fitnefs of the organs of a plant to receive nourishment from the foil, the rain, and the fun, is a proof of fuch wisdom and design, as those bodies are evidently deftitute of. If the fitting of a fuit of cloaths to the body of a man be an argument of contrivance, and confequently prove the existence of an intelligent agent, much more is the fitness

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of a thousand things to a thousand other things in the fyftem of nature a proof of an intelligent defigning caufe; and this: intelligent caufe we call GOD.

If, for argument's fake, we should admit that the immediate author of this world was not himself the first cause, but that he derived his being and powers from fome other being, fuperior to him; ftill in tracing the caufe of this being, and the cause of his caufe, &c. we fhall at length, be conftrained to acknowledge a first caufe, one who is himself uncaufed, and who, derives his being and caufe from no fupe

rior whatever.

It must be acknowledged, however, that our faculties are unequal to the comprehenfion of this fubject. Being used to pafs from effects to causes, and being used to look for a caufe adequate to the thing caused, and confequently to expect a greater caufe for a greater effect, it is natural to suppose, that, if the things we

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fee,