being as the former of it, and prefiding over it. It was only the mixture of evil in the world that was the reason why some of the heathens fuppofed that there are two principles in nature, the one the source of good, and the other of evil, the one benevolent, and the other malevolent.

These two principles, they fuppofed to be at present continually ftruggling against one another, though it was their opinion that the good would finally prevail. But we have seen that all the evil that there is in the world is a neceffary part of the whole scheme, and infeparable from it; fo that the good and the evil must have had the fame author. Befides, they both confpire to the fame end, the happiness of the creation.

> Upon the whole, we may remain perfectly fatisfied, that there is but one God, poffeffed of all the perfections, that have been described; and were our minds equal to this fubject, I doubt not but that we

fhould

fhould be able to fee, that there could have been but one, and that two Gods would have been impoffible; as much fo, as that there fhould be in nature two univerfal infinite spaces, or two eternities, both before and after the prefent moment. But because we are incapable of judging what must have been in this case, we are content to argue from what is; and upon this ground we have reason enough to conclude that God is one.

Since the divine power and wisdom are fo amazingly great, that we cannot conceive any effect to which they are not equal; nay fince we are able to comprehend but a very small part of the actual effects of the power and wifdom of God, and new views are continally opening to us, which are continually exciting greater admiration, there can be no danger of our exceeding the truth, if we endeavour to conceive of these perfections of God as infinite. Indeed we have fufficient reason to believe that, strictly speaking, they

are

are fo; though we are not able directly to demonftrate it because we, being finite, cannot comprehend any thing that is infinite; and not being able to comprehend an infinite effect, we cannot fully demonftrate infinity in the caufe. The extent, and other properties of the divine goodness, I shall confider more at large.

SECTION V.

Of the properties of the divine goodness.

I

of his creatures

F goodness, or benevolence, be the great governing principle, or spring of action in the divine being, happiness must prevail amongst those that are capable of it. ble that there should be, more mifery than happiness in the creation, it would be an argument that the fupreme

If it were poffiupon the whole,

being

being was malevolent. For fince all the tendencies and iffues of things were, from the first, perfectly known to him, he would, supposing him to be benevolent, have produced no fyftem at all, rather than one in which mifery might prevail. No scheme, therefore, which fuppofes the greater number of the creatures of God to be miferable upon the whole, can be confiftent with the fuppofition of the divine benevolence. The means, or the manner by which the creatures of God are involved in mifery makes no difference in this cafe; for if it arife even from themfelves, it arifes from the nature that God has given them; and if he had forefeen that the constitution which he gave them would, in the circumftances in which he placed them, iffue in their final ruin, he would not have given them that conftitution, or have difpofed of them in that manner; unless he had intended that they should be finally miserable; that is, unlefs he himself had taken pleasure in mifery, in confequence of his being of a malevolent difpofition.

It

For

It must be impoffible, for the fame reason, that the divine being should be capable of facrificing the interefts of a greater number, to that of a few of his creatures; though it may, perhaps, be neceffary, that the interefts of a few give place to that of a greater number. if he had a defire to produce happiness at all, it seems to be an evident confequence, that he must prefer a greater degree of happiness to a lefs; and a greater fum of happiness can exift in a greater number, than in a fmaller.

For the fame reason, alfo, the goodness of God must be impartial. Since the fupreme being stands in an equal relation to all his creatures and offspring, he must be incapable of that kind of partiality, by which we often give the preference to one person above another. There must be a good reason for every thing that looks like preference in the conduct and government of God; and no reason can be a good one, with refpect to a benevo

lent