lent being, but what is founded upon benevolence. If, therefore, fome creatures enjoy more happiness than others, it must be because the happiness of the creation in general requires that they should have that preference, and because a lefs fum of good would have been produced upon any other difpofition of things. Thus it is probable that a variety in the ranks of creatures, whereby fome have a much greater capacity of happiness than others, and are therefore more favoured by divine providence than others, makes a better fyftem, and one more favourable to general happiness, than any other, in which there should have been a perfect equality in all advantages and enjoyments. We are not, therefore, to say that God is partial to men, because they have greater powers, and enjoy more happiness than worms; but muft fuppofe, that the fyftem in which there was provision for the greatest fum of happiness requir ed ed that there fhould be fome creatures in the rank of men, and others in the rank of worms; and that each has reason to rejoice in the divine goodness, though they partake of it in different degrees. Indeed, it were abfurd to fuppofe, that, properly speaking, there was any thing like preference in the divine being chufing to make this a man, and the other a worm; because they had no being before they were created; and therefore it could not be any thing like affection to the one more than the other that determined his conduct. In reality, it is improper to say that God chose to make this a man, and that a worm; for the proper expreffion is, that he chose to make a man, and a worm. Among creatures of the fame general class or rank, there may be differences in advantages and in happinefs; but they must be founded on the fame confiderations with the differences in the ranks themfelves; that is, it must be favourable to the happiness of the whole that there being was malevolent. For fince all the tendencies and iffues of things were, from the first, perfectly known to him, he would, fuppofing him to be benevolent, have produced no fyftem at all, rather: than one in which misery might prevail. No scheme, therefore, which fuppofes the greater number of the creatures of God to be miferable upon the whole, can be consistent with the fuppofition of the divine benevolence. The means, or the manner by which the creatures of God are involved in mifery makes no difference in this cafe; for if it arife even from themfelves, it arifes from the nature that God has given them; and if he had forefeen that the constitution which he gave them would, in the circumftances in which he placed them, iffue in their final ruin, he would not have given them that constitution, or have difpofed of them in that manner; unless he had intended that they should be finally miferable; that is, unless he himself had taken pleasure in mifery, in confequence of his being of a malevolent difpofition. It It must be impoffible, for the fame reason, that the divine being fhould be capable of facrificing the interests of a greater number, to that of a few of his creatures; though it may, perhaps, be necessary, that the interefts of a few give place to that of a greater number. For if he had a defire to produce happiness at all, it seems to be an evident confequence, that he must prefer a greater degree of happiness to a lefs; and a greater sum of happiness can exift in a greater number, than in a fmaller. For the fame reafon, alfo, the goodness of God must be impartial. Since the fupreme being stands in an equal relation to all his creatures and offspring, he must be incapable of that kind of partiality, by which we often give the preference to one person above another. There muft be a good reafon for every thing that looks like preference in the conduct and government of God; and no reason can be a good one, with refpect to a benevo lent lent being, but what is founded upon benevolence. If, therefore, fome creatures enjoy more happiness than others, it must be because the happiness of the creation in general requires that they should have that preference, and because a lefs fum of good would have been produced upon any other difpofition of things. Thus it is probable that a variety in the ranks of creatures, whereby fome have a much greater capacity of happiness than others, and are therefore more favoured by divine providence than others, makes a better fyftem, and one more favourable to general happiness, than any other, in which there should have been a perfect equality in all advantages and enjoyments. We are not, therefore, to say that God is partial to men, because they have greater powers, and enjoy more happiness than worms; but must suppose, that the fyftem in which there was provifion for the greatest fum of happiness requir ed |