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ed that there fhould be fome creatures in the rank of men, and others in the rank of worms; and that each has reason to rejoice in the divine goodness, though they partake of it in different degrees. Indeed, it were abfurd to fuppofe, that, properly speaking, there was any thing like preference in the divine being chufing to make this a man, and the other a worm; because they had no being before they were created; and therefore it could not be any thing like affection to the one more than the other that determined his conduct. In reality, it is improper to fay that God chofe to make this a man, and that a worm; for the proper expreffion is, that he chofe to make a man, and a worm.

Among creatures of the fame general clafs or rank, there may be differences in advantages and in happiness; but they must be founded on the fame confiderations with the differences in the ranks themfelves; that is, it must be favourable to the happiness of the whole that there fhould

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fhould be thofe differences; and it cannot arise from any arbitrary or partial preference of one to another, independent of a regard to the happiness of the whole;' which is what we mean by an arbitrary and partial affection.

There is a variety of cafes in which we may plainly fee, that the happiness of one has a reference to, and is productive of the happiness of others; as in the principle of benevolence, whereby we are naturally disposed to rejoice in the happinefs of others. For we cannot procure ourselves these fympathetic pleasures, at least, in any confiderable degree, without contributing to the happiness of those around us. This, being a fource of pleafure to ourselves, is a conftant motive to benevolent actions.

Laftly, if God be benevolent at all, he must be infinitely so; at least we can see no reason why he should wish to make his creation happy at all, and not wish to make

make it as happy as poffible. If this be the cafe, the reason why all his creatures are not, at all times, as happy as their natures can bear, must be because variety and a gradual advance are, in the nature of things, neceffary to their complete and final happiness.

Befides, as there is reafon to believe that the other perfections of God, his wifdom, power, &c. are infinite, it seems to follow, by analogy, that his goodness must be fo too, though we may not be able to prove it demonftrably and confequentially.

It must be owned to be impoffible completely to answer every objection that may be made to the fuppofition of the infinite benevolence of God; for, fuppofing all his creatures to be conftantly happy, ftill, as there are degrees of happiness, it may be afked, why, if their maker be infinitely benevolent, do not his creatures enjoy a higher degree of it. But this question

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may always be asked, fo long as the happiness of any creature is only finite, that is less than infinite, or less than the hap. piness of God himself, which, in its own nature, it must neceffarily be. It must be confiftent, therefore, even with the infinite benevolence of God, that his creatures, which are neceffarily finite, be finitely, that is imperfectly happy. And when all the circumstances relating to any being are confidered at once, as they are by the divine mind, pofitive evils have only the fame effect as a diminution of pofitive good, being balanced, as it were, against a degree of good to which it was equivalent; fo that the overplus of happiness which falls to the fhare of any being, after allowance has been made for the evils which he fuffers, is to be confidered as his fhare of unmixed happiness.

It is only owing to our imperfection, or the want of comprehenfion of mind, in which, however, we advance every day, that we are not able to make all our plea

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fures and pains perfectly to coalefce, fo as that we shall be affected by the difference only. And whenever we fhall be arrived at this ftate; whenever, by long experience, we shall be able to connect in our minds the ideas of all the things which are causes and effects to one another, all partial evils will abfolutely vanish in the contemplation of the greater good with which they are connected. This will be perfectly the cafe with respect to all intellectual pleasures and pains, and even painful fenfations, will be much moderated, and more tolerable under the lively perfuafion of their contributing to our happiness on the whole. However, in the light in which the divine being, who has this perfect comprehenfion, views his works, (and this must be the true light in which they ought to be confidered) there is this perfect coincidence of all things that are connected with, and fubfervient to one a nother; so that, fince all evils are neceffarily connected with fome good, and generally are directly productive of it, all the works

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