works of God, appear to him at all times very good, happiness greatly abounding upon the whole. And fince the works of God are infinite, he contemplates an infinity of happiness, of his own production, and, in his eye, happiness unmixed with evil.

of

This conclufion, however, is hardly confiftent with the fuppofition that any the creatures of God are neceffarily miserable in the whole of their existence. In the ideas of fuch creatures, even when they have arrived at the most perfect com. prehenfion of mind, their being must seem a curfe to them, and the author of it will be confidered as malevolent with refpect to them, though not so to others.

It seems, likewife, to be a reflection upon the wisdom of God, that he should not be able to produce the happiness of fome, without the final mifery of others; and fo incapable are we of conceiving how the latter of these can be neceffary

to

to the former; that, if we retain the idea of the divine benevolence, together with his power and wisdom in any high degree, we cannot but reject the supposition. That any of the creatures of God should be finally, and upon the whole, miserable, cannot be a pleasing circumstance to their benevolent author; nay it muft, in its own nature, be the last means that he would have recourfe to, to gain his end; because, as far as it prevails, it is directly opposed to his end. We may, therefore reft fatisfied, that there is no fuch blot in the creation as this; but that all the creatures of God are intended by him to be happy upon the whole. He ftands in an equal relation to them all, a relation in which they must all have reason to rejoice. He is their common father, protector, and friend.

C 4

SECTION

SECTION VI.

Of the moral perfections of God deduced from his goodness.

TH

HE power and wisdom of God, together with those attributes which are derived from them, and also those which are deduced from his being confidered as an uncaused being, may be termed his natural perfections; whereas his benevolence, and those other attributes which are deduced from it, are more properly termed his moral perfections; because they lead to fuch conduct as determines what we commonly call moral character in men.

The fource of all the moral perfections of God feems to be his benevolence; and indeed there is no occafion to fuppofe him

to

to be influenced by any other principle, in order to account for all that we fee. Every other truly venerable or amiable attribute can be nothing but a modification of this. A perfectly good, or benevolent being, muft be, in every other respect, whatever can be the object of our reverence, or our love. Indeed the connection of all the moral virtues, and the derivation of them from the fingle principle of benevolence are eafily traced, even in human characters.

1. If a magiftrate be benevolent, that is, if he really confult the happiness of his fubjects, he must be just, or take notice of crimes, and punish the criminals. Otherwise, he would be cruel to the whole, and especially to the innocent, who would be continually liable to oppreffion, if there were no reftraint of this kind.

2. But whenever an offence can be. overlooked, and no injury accrue from it, C 5 either

either to the offender himself, or to others, the benevolence of God, as well as that of a human magiftrate, will require him to be merciful; fo that implacability, or a defire of revenging an affront, without any regard to the prevention of farther evil, must be carefully excluded from the character of the divine being. He must delight in mercy because he wishes to promote happiness, though he may be under a neceffity of punishing obftinate offenders, in order to reftrain vice and mifery..

There is more room for the difplay of mercy in the divine government than in that of men; because men, not being able to distinguish true repentance from the appearances of it, and pretences to it, must make but few deviations from general rules, left they should increase crimes and hypocrify; whereas the fecrets of all hearts being open to God, he cannot be imposed upon by any pretences; so that if an offender be truly penitent, and it is known to him that he will not abuse his

goodness,