goodness, he can receive him into favour, without apprehending any inconvenience whatever. Such cases as these, how dangerous foever the precedent might be in human governments, are not liable to be abused in the perfect administration of the divine being. Juftice and mercy, therefore, are equally attributes of the divine being, and equally deducible from his goodness or benevolence; both, in their places, being neceffary to promote the happiness of his creation.

3. As perfect benevolence is the rule of the divine conduct, and leads him to be both just and merciful, fo we cannot but conceive that he must govern his conduct by every other rule that we find to be equally neceffary to the well-being of fociety, particularly that of truth, or veraAll human confidence would ceafe if we could not depend upon one another's word; and, in thofe circumftances, every advantage of fociety would be loft. There can be no doubt, therefore, but that the divine

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divine being, if he should think proper to have any intercourse with his creatures, must be equally removed from a poffibility of attempting to impose upon them.

4. As to thofe vices which arife from the irregular indulgence of our appetites and paffions, we can have no idea of the poffibility of their having any place in the divine being. We therefore conclude that he is, in all refpects, holy, as well as just and good.

There are, alfo, fome evidences of the justice and mercy of God in the course of providence. The constitution of human nature and of the world is fuch, that men cannot long perfift in any species of wickedness without being fufferers in confequence of it. Intemperance lays the foundation for many painful and dangerous diseases. Every fpecies of malevolence and inhumanity confifts of uneafy fenfations, and exposes the person in whom they are predominant to the hatred and ill

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offices of his fellow creatures. veracity destroys a man's credit in society; and all vices, in general, make men subject to contempt, or dislike; whereas the habitual practice of the contrary virtues promotes health of body and peace of mind; and in general, they infure to him the esteem and good offices of all those with whom he is connected.

Now, fince these evils which attend upon vice, and this happiness which results from virtue are the divine appointment (fince they take place in confequence of his conftitution of the course of nature) they may be confidered as the natural punishments of vice, and the natural rewards of virtue, diftributed according to the rules of justice and equity, and intended to inculcate the most useful moral leffons on all his intelligent offspring, the fubjects of his moral government.

We, alfo, fee fomething like the exercife of mercy in the conduct of the divine

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providence; fince the natural punishments of vice feldom take place immediately, but leave a man room to recollect, and recover himself; and, if, after a man has been addicted to vice, he become truly reformed, the inconveniences he has brought upon himself are, in general, either removed, or mitigated; fo that he finds his condition the better for it.

It may, alfo, according to the reasoning applied in a former case, 'be confidered as an argument for all the perfections of God, that we are so formed, that we cannot but approve of, and esteem every branch of virtue, For it cannot be fuppofed that our maker would have formed us in fuch a manner, as that he himself fhould be the object of our dislike and abhorrence. Our natural love of goodness and virtue, therefore, is a proof that every branch of it enters into the character of the divine being, and confequently that thofe qualities are the objects of his favour and approbation.

Since, however, all the moral perfections of God are derived from his benevolence; fo that holiness, justice, mercy, and truth, are in him only modifications, as it were, of simple goodness; we should endeavour to conceive of him, as much as poffible, according to his real nature; confidering benevolence as his fole ruling principle, and the proper fpring of all his actions. This is, alfo, the most bonourable and the most amiable light in which we can view him, remembering that goodness neceffarily implies what we call justice, though its more natural form be that of mercy,

Upon the whole, it must be acknowledged, that it is but a very imperfect idea that we can form of the moral perfections of God from the light of nature. It hardly amounts to what may be called an idea of his character. We know nothing of God by the light of nature, but through the medium of his works; and these are such as we cannot fully compre

hend;