wrong, is what kind of conduct the divine being most approves.

Now the divine being, whofe own object, as has been fhewn, is the happiness of his creatures, will certainly most approve of those fentiments, and of that conduct of ours, by which that happiness is best provided for; and this conduct must deserve to be called right and proper in the ftrictest sense of the words. If we examine the workmanship of any artist, our only rule of judging of what is right or wrong, with refpect to it, is its fitness to answer his defign in making it. Whatever, in its ftructure, is adapted to gain that end, we immediately pronounce to be as it should be, and whatever obftructs its defign, tendency, and operation, we pronounce to be wrong, and to want correction. The fame method of judging may be transferred to the works of God; fo that whatever it be, in the fentiments or conduct of men, that concurs with, and promotes the defign of our

maker,

maker, we must pronounce to be, therefore, right; and whatever tends to thwart and obstruct his end, we ought to call wrong: because, when the former prevails, the great object of the whole system is gained; whereas, when the latter takes place, that end and design is defeated.

2. On the other hand, if we were to form a rule for our conduct independent of any regard to the divine being, we fhould certainly conclude that it is the part of wisdom, to provide for our greateft happiness; and, confequently, that we fhould cherish those fentiments, and adopt that conduct, by which it will be beft fecured. But this rule muft coincide with the former; because our happiness is an object with the divine being no less than it is with ourselves; for it has been shewn, that benevolence is the fpring of all his actions, and that he made us to be happy.

3. Since,

3. Since, however, the divine goodness is general, and impartial; and he must, confequently, prefer the happiness of the whole, to that of any individuals, it cannot be his pleasure, that we should confult our own intereft, at the expence of that of others. Confidering, ourselves, therefore, not as feparate individuals, but as members of fociety, another object that we ought to have in view is the welfare of our fellow creatures, and of mankind at large. But ftill there is no real disagreement among these different rules of conduct, because we are fo made, as focial beings, that every man provides the most effectually for his own happiness, when he cultivates thofe fentiments, and purfues that conduct, which, at the fame time, most eminently conduce to the welfare of those with whom he is connected. Such is the wisdom of this admirable constitution, that every individual of the fyftem gains his own ends, and thofe of his maker, by the same means.

The

on.

The last rule is confcience, which is the refult of a great variety of impreffions, the conclufions of our own minds, and the opinions of others, refpecting what is right and fit in our conduct, forming a fet of maxims which are ready to be applied upon every emergency, where there would be no time for reafon or reflectiConfcience, being a principle thus formed, is properly confidered as a fubftitute for the three other rules, viz. a regard to the will of God, to our own greatest happiness, and the good of others, and it is, in fact, improved and corrected from time to time by having recourse to these rules. This principle of confcience, therefore, being, as it were, the result of all the other principles of our conduct united, must deserve to be confidered as the guide of life, together with them; and its dictates, though they vary, in some measure, with education, and will be found to be, in some respects, different among different nations of the world, yet, in general, evidently concur in giving

their fanction to the fame rules of conduct, that are fuggefted by the three before mentioned confiderations. For, if we confider what kind of fentiments and conduct mankind in general will, without much reflection, and without hesitation, pronounce to be right; if we confider what are the actions that we must esteem and admire in others, and that we reflect upon with the most fatisfaction in ourfelves, they will appear to be the same with those which tend to make ourfelves and others the most truly happy.

Following these four guides, we fhall find that temperance, or the due government of our paffions, with refpect to ourfelves; juftice, benevolence, and veracity with refpect to others; together with gratitude, obedience, and refignation to God, ought to be most affiduoufly cultivated by us; as what are, at the fame time, the moft pleafing to our maker, the most conducive to our own happinefs, and that of others, and the moft agreeable to the natural

D