tural and unperverted dictates of confci

ence.

That we are capable of governing ourfelves by thefe rules, and, from a proper regard to motives, can voluntarily chuse and pursue that courfe of life which the will of God, a regard to our own happinefs, to the good of fociety, and the dictates of our confciences, uniformly recommend to us, is fometimes expreffed by faying that we are the proper fubjects of moral government. Unless we fuppose

that men have this voluntary power over their actions, whereby they can, at pleafure, either obey or difobey the proper rule of life; that is, unless they be fo constituted, that the proper motives to right conduct can have a fufficient influence upon their minds, all religion is in vain. To what purpose can it be to give men a law, which it is not in their power to obferve; or what propriety can there be either in rewarding them for actions to which they could not contribute, or in

punishing

punishing them for offences which they could not help. We may, therefore, take it for granted, as the firft, and most fundamental principle of all religion; as neceffary to our being the proper fubjects of moral government, that we are equally capable of intending and doing both good and evil; and therefore that is not in vain that laws are propofed to us, and motives are laid before us, both to per fuade us to what is right, and to diffuade us from what is wrong, fince it depends upon ourselves, whether we will be influenced by them or not.

If we obferve the proper rules of conduct, or the law of our natures, we fhall fecure to ourselves many folid advantages; and if we do not obferve them, we entail upon ourfelves many evils. Thefe are, therefore, called the punishments of vice, and the former the rewards of virtue, and fince they are difpenfed by the providence of God, and take place according to his appointment, in the conftitution

D 2

ftitution of the courfe of nature; he is properly confidered as our moral governor, and judge, and we are faid to be accountable to him for our conduct.

From a regard to the four rules of right and wrong, explained above, I fhall now endeavour to analize the fentiments, the paffions, and affections of mankind, and lay down particular rules for our conduct in life.

SECTION II.

Of the different objects of purfuit, and the different paffions and affections of men correfponding to them.

IN

as

N order to form a proper judgment concerning the conduct of man, as an individual, and a member of fociety, according to the rules above laid down, it will be neceffary to have a juft idea of, and to keep in view, the different objects

of

of our purfuit, and the different passions and affections of our nature correfponding

to them.

We find ourselves placed in a world, in which we are furrounded by a variety. of objects, which are capable of giving us pleasure and pain; and finding by our own experience, and the information of others, in what manner each of them is adapted to affect us, we learn to defire fome of them, and feel an averfion to others. To thefe defires and averfions we give the name of pafions or affections, and we generally clafs them according to the objects to which they correfpond. These paffions and affections are the springs of all our actions, and by their means we are engaged in a variety of interesting pursuits through the whole courfe of our lives. When we fucceed in our pursuits, or are in hopes of fucceeding, we are happy; and when we are disappointed in our fchemes, or in fear of being fo, we are unhappy.

1. The first and lowest class of our defires is that by which we are prompted to feek after corporeal or fenfual pleasure, and confequently to avoid bodily pain. These appetites, as they are usually called, to diftinguish them from paffions of a more refined nature, are common with us and the brutes; and to all appearance they are poffeffed of them in as high a degree as we are, and are capable of receiving as much pleasure from them as we are. Indeed, the final caufe, or the object of these appetites is the very fame with respect to both, namely, the continuance of life, and the propagation of the fpecies. It was neceffary, therefore, that all animals, which have equally their own fubfiftence, and the continuance of their fpecies to provide for, fhould be equally furnished with them.

2. It happens, from a variety of causes, that pleasurable ideas are transferred, by affociation, upon objects which have not, originally, and in themselves, the power

of