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of gratifying any of our fenses; as those which give us the ideas that we call beautiful or sublime, particularly those that occur in works of genius, strokes of wit, and in the polite arts of music, painting,
Our capacity for enjoying pleasures of this kind, depending upon the association of our ideas, and requiring such advances in intellectual life as brutes are incapable of, they are, therefore, classed under the general denomination of intelleEtual pleasures (a name which we give to all our pleasures, except
those of sense) and more particularly under the head of pleasures of imagination ; because the greater part of them are founded on those resemblances of things, which are perceived and recollected by that modification of our intellectual powers which we call fancy.
3. Another class of our passions may be termed the social, because they arise from our connections with our fellow creatures of mankind; and these are of two
kinds, consisting either in our desire of their good opinion, or in our wishing their happiness or misery. In this latter species of the class, we also comprize gratitude for the favours, and a resentment of the wrongs we receive from them.
Those affections of the mind which respect the divine being belong to this class, the object of them being one with whom we have the most intimate connection, to whom we are under the greatest obligation, and whose approbation is of the greatest importance to us. All the difference there is between our affections, confidered as having God or man for their object, arises from the difference of their situation with respect to us.
The divine being, standing in no need of our services, is, therefore, no object of our benevolence, properly so called; but the fentiments of reverence, love, and confidence, with respect to God, are of the same nature with those which we exercise towards pur fellow creatures, only infinitely ex
ceeding them in degree, as the divine
power, wisdom, and goodness, infinitely exceed every thing of the same kind in man.
Some of the brutes, living in a kind of imperfect fociety, and particularly domestick animals, are capable of several of the passions belonging to this class, as grati-, tude, love, hatred, &c. but having only a small degree of intellect, they are hardly capable of those which have for their object the esteem or good opinion of others; which seem to require a confiderable degree of refinement. We fee, however, in horses, and some other animals, the strongest emulation, by which they will exert themselves to the utmost in their endeavours to surpass, and overcome others.
4: A fourth set of passions is that which has for its object our own interest in general, and is called self love. This seems to require a considerable degree of refinement, and therefore it is probable that
brute animals have no idea of it. Their chief object is the gratification of their
appetites or passions, without reflecting upon their happiness in general, or having any such thing in view in their actions.
There is a lower kind of self interest, or rather selfishness, the object of which is the means of procuring thofe gratifications to which money can be subfervient; and from loving money as a means of
procuring a variety of pleasures and conveniences, a man may at length come to purfue it as an end, and without any regard to the proper use of it. It then becomes a new kind of passion, quite distinct from any other; infomuch, that, in order to indulge it, many persons will deprive themselves of every natural gratification,
5. Lastly, as soon as we begin to distinguish among our actions, and are sensible that there are reasons for fome of them, and against others, we get a notion of some of them as what ought to be per
formed, and of others of them as what are, or ought to be refrained from. In this manner we get the abstract ideas of right and wrong in human actions, and a variety of pleasing circumstances attending the former, and disagreeable ones accompanying the latter, we come in time to love some kinds of actions, and to abhor others, without regard to any other confideration. For the same reason certain tempers, or dispositions of mind, as leading to certain kinds of conduct, become the objects of this moral approbation, or disapprobation; and from the whole, arises what we call a moral fenfe, or a love of virtue and a hatred of vice in the abstract. This is the greatest refinement of which we are capable, and in the due exercise and gratification of it consists the highest perfection and happiness of