3. Danger of revolt-safeguards. 4. Power and wealth of the Satraps. 5. Institution of Royal Judges. 6. Fixity of the Royal Revenue. 7. The border Satraps. 8. Extra-satrapial dependencies. 9. Satrapies not always geographically continuous. 10. Modes by which the subjection of the conquered races was maintained-(i.) Disarming-(ii.) Transplantation-(iii.) Maintenance of a standing army. 11. Position and power of the Monarch. 12. Privileges of the Persians. 13. Gradations of rank among them.

1. THE ancient Persian monarchy, both in its origin and in its internal administration, closely resembled the modern Persian and Turkish Governments. Since the fall of the Assyrian and Babylonian kingdoms, the empires of the East have uniformly arisen from the sudden triumph of conquering nomadic hordes over more settled and civilized communities. A Cyrus, a Genghis Khan, a Timour, an Othman, a Nadir Shah, has led the hardy inhabitants of the steppes, or of the mountain tracts, against effete races, long established in softer regions, and abandoned to sloth and sensuality. Slow conquests, long struggles of race against race, amalgamations, insensible growth and development of political systems, to which we are habituated in the records of the West, are unknown to the countries lying eastward of the Hellespont. In every case a conqueror rapidly overruns an enormous tract of territory, inhabited by many and diverse nations, overpowers their resistance or receives their submission, and imposes on them a system of government, rude and inartificial indeed, but sufficient ordinarily to maintain their subjection, till the time comes when a fresh irruption and a fresh conqueror repeat the process, which seems to be the only renovation whereof Oriental realms are capable. The imposed system itself is in its general features, for the most part, one and the same. The rapid conquest causes no assimilation. The nations retain their languages, habits, manners, religion, laws, and sometimes even their native princes. The empire is thus of necessity broken up into provinces. In each province a royal officer representing the monarch-a Satrap, a Khan, or a Pasha-bears absolute

556

OFFICE OF SATRAP.

APP. BOOK III.

sway, responsible to the crown for the tranquillity of his district, and bound to furnish periodically, or at call, the supplies of men and money, which constitute the chief value of their conquests to the conquerors. Through these officers the unity of the whole kingdom is maintained, and in their connection with the persons under their charge, and with the central government, the entire character of the system, and its special aspect in the kingdom under consideration, may for the most part be traced.

2. In the Persian empire, as in other Asiatic governments, the monarch was all in all. Regarded as the absolute proprietor, not only of the entire territory, but of the persons and properties of its inhabitants, all power necessarily emanated from him, and was only exercised by others as his substitutes, and so long as he chose to delegate to them a portion of his authority. The satraps were nominated by the king at his pleasure, from any class of his subjects; they held office while the king chose, and were liable to deprivation or death at any moment, without other formality than the presentation of the royal firman. Originally they were charged with the civil administration only of their provinces, their special business being to collect the tribute (a fixed sum, at least from the time of Darius 3) from the inhabitants, and remit it to the treasury. They had besides to pay the troops maintained in their satrapy, to see to the administration of justice, and to exercise a general supervision, alike over the external safety and the internal tranquillity of the district under them. Their office was distinct from that of the commanders of the troops, who like them received their ap

No doubt they were ordinarily Persians, and Persians of the tribe of the Pasargadæ; but this was not necessary. The king's favour could make up for all deficiencies. We may see by the examples of Daniel under Cyrus (Dan. vi. 28), and Mordecai under Xerxes (Esth. ix. 4), the power and dignity to which even members of the subject nations might attain. Compare the cases of Pactyas, the Lydian (Herod. i. 153), and Xenagoras, the Halicarnassian Greek (ibid. ix. 107).

Difficulties would occur in the execution of the king's orders, in ancient as in modern times. Chardin speaks of several instances of gover.

nors in Persia who maintained them. selves in their governments for a long time against the will of the Shah, by robbing the messenger of his despatches, or murdering him (vol. ii. p. 310). And the famous Ali Pasha is known to have baffled in this way for several years the designs of the Porte against him. That such cases were not unknown in ancient Persia, we may gather from the history of Orotes (Herod. iii. 126).

3 Herod. iii. 89.

4 Xen. Cyrop. VIII. vi. § 3. Although the Cyropædia is a romance, we may learn from it a good deal concerning the internal administration of the Persian empire in Xenophon's time.

ESSAY III.

SAFEGUARDS AGAINST REVOLT.

6

557 pointment from the monarch, and were answerable for the defence of the territory from foreign or domestic foes; 5 and distinct likewise from that of the commandants of garrisons, who were charged with the maintenance of the strongholds. It sometimes happened that the office of commander of the troops was united with that of satrap, more especially in the frontier provinces, where a divided command would have been dangerous. Two or three distinct satrapies were also occasionally accumulated in the hands of a single person, who thus became a sort of petty king, and was Hence revolts frequently tempted to shake off his allegiance. occurred, and, long before the time of Alexander, whole provinces had detached themselves from the central government, and maintained only a nominal dependence.9

3. To guard against this danger, the principal one to which empires of such a character are exposed, was one of the chief aims of the Persian political system. With this view, brothers, or other near kinsmen of the monarch, were usually selected for the more important satrapies, while in other cases it was sought to attach

5 These commanders are constantly distinguished from the satraps by Herodotus. See v. 25, and 123; also Their in. i. 162, iv. 143, vi. 43, &c. dependence of the satrap is especially evident in the history of the Ionian insurrection. See v. 109, 116; vi. 6, &c. The special passage which marks this distinction is Xen. Cyrop. VIII. vi. § 1.

Heeren (As. Nat. i. p. 338, note, E. T.) thinks that it may be traced in the arrangements made by Cyrus in Lydia, Tabalus being the commandant of Sardis, Mazares the leader of the forces, and Pactyas the Certainly in satrap or governor. modern Persia it is the fact, that the commandants of fortresses are independent both of the civil governor and the officer in command of the troops of the province, and receive their appointment and orders from the Shah (Chardin, ii. p. 302).

7 This was evidently the case with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus (Thucyd. viii.; Xen. Hell. i..iv.), with Aryandes (Herod. iv. 166, 167), and with the younger Cyrus (Xen. Anab. 1. i. § 2). Latterly it became almost universal (Arrian, Exp. Alex. iii. 8; Xen. Econ.

iv. § 11).

8 Oroetes was satrap of Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia, at the time of his revolt (Herod. iii. 127). Cyrus the younger, of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia (Xen. Anab. I. ix. § 7). Tissaphernes after the death of Cyrus received all his governments, and held them together with his own (Xen. Hell. III. i. § 3).

9 Pontus was certainly in this condition, likewise Paphlagonia, and most probably Cappadocia. (See Heeren, ut supra, p. 426, and compare his Manual of Ancient History, p. 294-7.) The Uxians of the Koordish mountains were absolutely independent (Arr. Exp. Al. iii. 17).

1

Hystaspes, of the blood-royal, was satrap of Persia under Cambyses (Herod. iii. 70), of Parthia under his own son Darius (Beh. Inser. col. iii. par. 16). Artaphernes, a half-brother of Darius, was made by him satrap of Lydia (Herod. v. 25). Achæmenes, a son of Darius, was made by Xerxes satrap of Egypt (ib. vii. 7). Masistes, another son of Darius, was about the same time satrap of Bactria (ib. ix. 113). Pissuthnes, satrap of Lydia in

558 the dangerous functionary to the interests of the Crown, by giving him a wife from among the princesses of the royal house.2 Nor was security expected from this plan without further safeguards. The powers of the satraps were checked, and their ambitious longings controlled, in various ways. Some of these have already come under notice. The independent authority of the military commanders and of the governors of fortresses was the most important of all, and made rebellion in ordinary cases hopeless. It was only where such distinctions had ceased to be maintained, where, for one reason or another, the civil and military administrations had been placed in the same hands, that a successful revolt could be contemplated. Even, however, where this had been done, the monarch's interests were not left uncared for. The governor of a province, in ancient as in modern Persia, was attended by a royal Secretary, receiving his appointment from the Crown, and bound continually to keep watch upon the satrap, and report his proceedings to the sovereign. A practice is also said to have obtained, to which the jealousy of modern times fails to present a parallel, whereby it was thought to secure still more completely the obedience of the provincial governors. Royal Commissaries were sent year by year from the court to the several satrapies, to make inquiries upon the spot, and bring the king back an exact account of their condition.4 This usage, however, must have been gradually discontinued, or have degenerated into a formality.

ROYAL SECRETARIES AND COMMISSARIES. APг. Book III.

3

4. Despite these checks the power of the satraps was at all times great, and little short of regal. As they represented the monarch, their courts were framed upon the royal model: they had their

the early part of the Peloponnesian war, was most likely a cousin of Artaxerxes (Thucyd. i. 115, Herod. vii. 64). Cyrus received his extensive governments from his father (Xen. An. 1. ix. § 7). Was Tritantæchmes, satrap of Babylon in the time of Herodotus (i. 192), cousin to Artaxerxes? (See Herod. vii. 82, where he is called the son of Artabanus.)

2 Pharnabazus married a daughter of Artaxerxes Mnemon (Xen. Hell. v. i. § 28). Pausanias, when he aspired to be satrap of Greece under Xerxes, himself proposed a similar connection (Thucyd. i. 128). The commanders of

the troops were perhaps even more often attached to the monarch in this way than the satraps. (Cf. Herod. v. 116, vi. 43, vii. 73; Arrian, i. 16, &c.)

3 See Herod. iii. 128. Chardin, Voyage en Perse, ii. p. 302: "Il y a en chaque province avec le gouver. neur. . . . un Vakannviez, ou Secré taire, mis de la main du roi, dont l'office consiste principalement à rendre compte à la cour de tout ce qui se passe."

See Xen. Cyrop. VIII. vi. § 16, where Xenophon expressly states that the practice continued to his day. And compare Econom. iv. § 8.

ESSAY III.

GREAT POWER OF THE SATRAPS.

559

palaces, surrounded by magnificent parks and hunting groundstheir numerous trains of eunuchs and attendants, and their own household troops or body-guard. They assessed the tribute on the several towns and villages within their jurisdiction at their pleasure, and appointed deputies, called sometimes like themselves satraps, over cities or districts within their province, whose office was regarded as one of great dignity. So long as they were in favour at court, they ruled their satrapies with an absolute sway, involving no little tyranny and oppression. Besides the fixed tribute which each satrap was bound to remit to the king, and the amount that he had to collect for the payment of the troops of his province, he might exact, for his own personal expenses and the support of his court, whatever sum he considered his province able to furnish. All persons who had any favour, or even justice to ask, approached him with gifts, without which success was not to be looked for; and hence enormous fortunes were accumulated.1 The sole limit upon the rapacity of the satrap was the fear of removal, in case the voice of complaint became so loud as to reach the ears of the monarch. Nor did the populations suffer only in purse from the tyranny of their governors. Instances are found

5 Βασίλεια. Xen. Anab. I. ii. § 7; Hell. IV. i. § 15. Compare Cyrop. VIII. vi. §§ 11-13.

6 Cyrop. loc. cit. § 10. The bodyguard of Oroetes consisted of a thou. sand Persians (Herod. iii. 127).

7 See the history of Zênis and Mania (Xen. Hellen. III. i. §§ 10-12). The tribute seems to have been raised by a land-tax (Herod. vi. 42), payable partly in money and partly in kind (Herod. i. 192). Herodotus, in his account of the satrapies (iii. 90, 94), gives only the money portion, or rather that part of it which went into the royal treasury. The entire amount drawn from the people was probably three or four times as much.

How large this amount in some cases was is evident from what Herodotus tells us of Tritantæchmes, satrap of Babylon, whose daily revenue was an artaba of silver, or more than 2501. (See Herod. i. 192, and compare Heeren's As. Nat. i. p. 410, E. T.) Heeren has misconceived in one point

the positions occupied respectively by the satrap and the monarch with regard to the revenue. He speaks of the satrap as paying over the balance of what he had collected to the king, after providing for his own expendi ture (p. 423); whereas in point of fact the payment to the king was a fixed sum, and the fluctuating balance was the satrap's.

See Xen. Hell. I. i. § 10, and § 12, where what is said of Mania sufficiently indicates the usual practice. (Compare Anab. I. ix. § 22.)

1 Tritantæchmes, besides his warhorses, owned 800 stallions, and 16,000 mares! His Indian dogs were quartered on four large villages, which he exempted from any other payment (Herod. i. 192). Tithraustes, the successor of Tissaphernes, in one year disbursed eighty talents (nearly 20,000l.), to purchase peace for his province (Xen. Hell. III. iv. § 26, and v. § 1).