While I relate matters of fact, from the beft evidence which I am capable of receiving, if I have mifrepresented them, Ilie open to contradiction; and, when I recapitulate the principles from which I have drawn my reasoning, I am not fo obftinately attached to my own opinion as to be proof against conviction. If I am guilty of any errors in the course of this unconnected performance, they must be attributed to my not having received fufficient information, or to my want of ability in using the materials which I had acquired. I have never wilfully misreprefented a fact, nor defignedly drawn from it a fallacious confequence. I have not laboured to establish any favourite system, and, with the vanity of a projector, fupported it at the expence of my veracity. But however trifling this performance may appear, both my head and my heart have co-operated in its production, and I really fat down to write what I thought, not to think what I fhould write." Ardeo, mihi credite incredibili quodam amore patriæ quod volent denique homines exiftiment; nemini ego poffum effe bene de republica merenti non amicus. CICERO. A CITIZEN. For the POLITICAL REGISTER. The GOUT and a late STATESMAN. Statefman. A A Dialogue. H! what again, renew your visit vile! Your bitter malice makes me now but smile ; You toil in vain, in vain your throbs begin, I feel a thousand sharper pains within, Your pangs but mitigate my greater fmart, Meer cordials to my harrafs'd mind and heart. Gout. I'll plague you then with hotter fharper points States. Ay there, my haughty foul must soon submit, Gout. Gout. With new invented tortures I'll attack;' States. All pains of fenfe my mental throbs defpife My brazen buckler, and my coat of steel Statef. Can I look back --beat down that fcorpion rod! How ftatues to my name began to live? Can I look back? now, now perform your part, Now wrench my nerves, now wring my wretched heart; } I'll I now inflame each hot morbific part, Your guilty head, your hands, your feet, your heart. A buckler bafe, a proftituted fcreen, The POLITICAL BAROMETER. The following fenfible Letters contain too true a Defcription of our Misfortunes, to be omitted in this Regifter. TH LETTER I. Auguft 10. 1768. HE greateft part of my property having been invested in the funds, I could not help paying fome attention to rumours or events, by which my fortune might be affected yet I never lay in wait to take advantage of a fudden fluctuation, much lefs would I make myself a bubble to bulls and bears, or a dupe to the pernicious arts practifed in the alley. I thought a prudent man, who had any thing to lofe, and really meant to do the beft for himself and his family, ought to confider of the ftate of things at large, of the profpect before him, and the probability of particular events. A letter which appeared fome days ago in the public Papers, revived many ferious reflections of this fort in my mind, because it seemed to be written with candour and judgment. The effect of those reflections was, that I did not hesitate to alter the fituation of my property. I owe my thanks to that writer, that I am fafely landed from a troubled ocean of fear and anxiety, on which I think I never will venture my fortune and my happiness again. Perhaps it may not be ufelefs to individuals to fee the motives on which I have acted. In the first place, I confider this country as in a fituation, the like of which it never experienced before, but which the greatest empires have experienced in their turn. The fucceffes of the late war had placed us at the highest pinnacle of military glory. Every external circumstance seemed to conVOL. III. tribute tribute to our profperity; the moft formidable of our enemies were reduced, and commerce had promifed to increase with the extent of our dominion. But at this point I fear we met with our ne plus ultra. The greatnefs of a kingdom cannot long be stationary. That of Great Britain carried in itfelf an interior principle of weaknefs and decay. While the war continued, our fuperiority at fea gave us an exclufive commerce with the richeft quarters of the world, and fupplied us with wealth to fupport fuch efforts as no nation ever made before. But when the conclufion of peace had reftored our rivals to the enjoyment of their former trade, the very efforts which had maintained the war, rendered it impoffible for us to meet thofe rivals upon equal terms in foreign markets. The national debt had rifen to a point fo far beyond the reach of oeconomical fpeculations, that the diminution of the principal almoft ceafed to be a queftion, and the miniftry found difficulty enough in providing funds for payment of the intereft. Here then we find an interior principle of decay, the operation of which is not lefs certain than fatal, The increase of your debt requires a proportionate increase of trade, at the fame time that it not only prevents that increase, but operates in the contrary direction. A news-paper will not admit of fuch a deduction, or I would undertake to demonftrate, that all the profitable part of our foreign trade is loft, and that, in what remains, the balance is confiderably against us. But the fact is notorious. The fituation of our Eaft-India Trade is fo far altered for the better, that we do not fend fuch quantities of bullion as heretofore to China, and indeed we have it not to fend. Yet the refources of this trade are, at the best but precarious: nor is the balance of it even now clearly in our favour. A fingle defeat in India (an event not quite out of the limits of poffibility) would go near to annihilate the company. But it was in the colonies that our beft and fureft hopes were founded. Their extenfive commerce would have fupported our home manufactures, when other markets failed, and rewarded us in fome measure for that fecurity and extent of dominion, which the blood and treasure of this country had purchased for them, Here too our moft reafonable expectations are difappointed. Not only the merchant who gives credit on the fecurity of perfonal good faith, is ruined by it, but, in a public view, the fum of the debts of individuals is held out in terrorem to awe us into a compliance with pretenfions, which shake the foundation of our political exiftence. We fhall be woefully deceived if we form our calculations of the real ftate of trade, on the large commiffions, long credit, or extenfive enter-prizes prizes of particular merchants. The commercial profperity of a nation depends upon the certainty of the return, not on the magnitude of the venture. As things are now managed in the city the greatest house falls firft, and draws with it the ruin of a multitude of little ones. Next to the parties immediately concerned, the public creditors will be the first to feel the confequences of this ruinous fyftem. The funds allotted for their fecurity depend chieflyupon the produce of the cuftoms; thefe depend upon your trade, and it requires no prophet to foretell that a falfe and ruinous fyftem of trade cannot long be maintained. It begins with private beggary, and ends in public ruin. I do not pretend to fay that the land-holder will be quite at his ease, when public credit is fhaken. But his at leaft is a folid fecurity; the other a meer bubble, which the first rude breath of ill-fortune or of danger may reduce to nothing. I wish it could be proved that any one circumftance in this reprefentation is falfe or exaggerated. On the other hand, if it be true, the concealment, of a moment more or Jefs, fignifies nothing. It is agreed on all hands, that we are in no condition to meet a war. Our enemies know and prefume upon it. The experience of many centuries fufficiently proves that their natural reftlefsnefs will not long permit them to observe the conditions of any peace. At prefent they have other additional motives to draw them into action. The articles of the laft peace difhonoured them in the eyes of Europe. Neceffity alone compelled them to fubmit to it. As long as the neceffity fubfifts, the peace will be maintained. In the mean time, they hazard fuch ftrokes as would be a juft foundation of a war, if we had ftrength or fpirit to renew it. Dunkirk remains undemolished, and Corfica is added to the dominion of France. They know the miferable state of our finances, the diftraction and weakness of our government, and above all the alarming differences which threaten a rupture with our colonies. To fuppofe that they will not take advantage of thefe circumftances, is fuppofing that a few years have changed the ftamina of a French conftitution. On the other hand, to fay that they are as little in a condition to make war as ourselves is meer trifling. Their enterprizes prove the contrary. Their finances are upon a much better footing than ours, and at the worst, they have a remedy, which a British parliament will never make use of, but in the laft extremity. The French apply it without fcruple, and, as far as I can obferve without any bad effect to themselves. In fhort, they confider our weakness more than their own ftrength, in adherence to their old policy, que la foibleffe de l'ennemi fait notre propre force. 292 A prů |