The happiness which is derived from the exercife of a beneficent temper, is very rarely an object of confideration, efpecially in an agc, when the spirit of commerce, the love of lucre, and a contracted regard to the individual, give the strongeft bias to all our opinions and judgments. They who inherit overgrown fortunes, they who have received liberal donations, they who have acquired wealth, are reckoned among the happy, though they employ them only in fulfilling the purposes of folly, vanity and vice. A fplendid table, a fine houfe, a handfome equipage, even gaudy apparel, we are more apt to confider as characteristical of the happy man, than generous efforts to relieve the wretched, to fupport the unfortunate, to comfort the difconfolate, to patronize the deferving. Thefe we ftill regard as marks of virtue, but we feldom confider them as fymptoms of happinefs. Even the motives which excite the generality to actions of a public and beneficent nature, when they are not merely fordid and felfifh, are fo depend-1 ent upon the views fuggefted by our reafoning powers, that they have little connexion with the heart; and the man who should

urge

urge the pleasure of a kind and beneficent action, and the fweet enjoyment which it brings along with it, as the motive to a perfon's performing it, would be deemed ignorant of what is reckoned the most effential branch of human knowledge, the knowledge of the world. But in reality, under this boafted knowledge, the blindeft prejudice, and the groffeft ignorance often lurk and the world, not only in its purest and most virtuous, but even in its corrupted and depraved ftate, affords arguments fufficient to confute the men who value themselves for knowing it beft.

It was hinted already, that the most infallible teft of the value of any difpofition or behaviour, is its being conducive to the natural and real felicity of men: and to this teft I might fafely fubmit all the laws, and all the maxims of the gofpel. If the temperate, the manly, the confcientious, not the effeminate, the weak, and the timid, were to be the judges, I fhould not fear the decifion even with refpect to its fevereft laws, the endurance of perfecution, lo's of goods, refignation of life.

But

But our prefent inquiry is more confined, It was the faying of the Lord Jefus, It is more bleffed to give than to receive. In this faying, the felicity of a beneficent temper is afferted in the strongest manner. The encomium feems to be given to the action; but it is obvious that human actions are praife-worthy, only fo far as they refult from right difpofitions, and that it is only the agent that deferves commendation or blame, reward or punishment,

The circumftances of our Saviour's life, gave him frequent occafions for introducing this fentiment with propriety; and as it is addreffed to the tender and generous feelings of human nature, it must have made the deepest impreffion on his followers. The application which the apostle Paul makes of this faying in my text, difcovers the effect which it produced on him, and fhews that he regarded it as a practical truth of the greatest moment. In this laft difcourfe to the elders of Ephefus, whom he had affembled at Miletus, he was able to make this noble appeal to them; I have coveted no man's filver, or gold, or apparel. Yea, you yourselves know, that these hands have miniftered unto my

neceffities,

I

neceffities, and to them that were with me. have fhewed you all things, how that fo labouring ye ought to Support the weak; and to remember the words of the Lord Jefus, how he faid, It is more blessed to give than to receive. Though in these words there is a comparifon between the happiness of bestowing, and that of receiving, yet it will be putting no violence on them to confider them fimply as a declaration of the bleffedness of a beneficent temper. That with which this temper is contrafted, and to which it is preferred, being an acknowledged mark of good fortune, and a fource of enjoyment, the other must be ftill more fo.

I propose, therefore, in this difcourse, to confirm and illuftrate the happiness of a beneficent difpofition; and to fuggeft a few of thofe reflections which naturally arife from the confideration of this fubject.

By a beneficent difpofition, I mean a difpofition to do good to others from the principles of kindness, affection, or humanity, which includes not only acts of charity, generofity and liberality, for these must in a great measure be dependent upon our external circumstances, but also all the means we

ufe,

ufe, the pains we take, or the wishes we en tertain for the comfort, enjoyment and happinefs of our fellow-creatures. That fuch a difpofition must be of the utmost confequence to our own fatisfaction and happiness, I think will appear evident from feveral confiderations.

In the first place, This will appear by confidering in general what it is that must conftitute human felicity.

To write a treatise concerning human nature, requires perhaps as much knowledge, attention and reflection, as the compofition of a performance on any other fubject whatever; but fuch a treatise is not necessary, either for directing our conduct, or for determining the operation of our feelings. We are all men, and we all feel that the gratification of our natural defires, where the gratification is not forbidden by any other principle of our mind, is always a fource of enjoyment to us. But the nature, and the kinds of our enjoyments are as different and various as the powers and principles which give rise to them. Except a few of them, however, which regard felf-prefervation, they are almost all connected with our focial natures,