SERMON XXXVIII.

OF CONTENTMENT.

PHIL. iv. II.

I have learned, &c.

THESE words fignify how contentedness may be attain- SERM. ed, or how it is produced: it is not an endowment innate XXXVIII. to us; it doth not arrive by chance into us; it is not to be purchased by any price; it springeth not up of itself, nor arifeth from the quality of any state; but it is a product of discipline; I have learned.

It is a queftion debated in Plato, εἰ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετὴ, whether virtue be to be learned; St. Paul plainly refolveth it in this cafe by his own experience and teftimony. What Seneca faith in general of virtue (Nature giveth not virtue; it is an art to become good a) is most true of this virtue ; it is an art, with which we are not born, no more than with any other art or science; the which, as other arts, cannot be acquired without ftudious application of mind, and induftrious exercife: no art indeed requireth more hard study and pain toward the acquiry of it, there being fo many difficulties, fo many obftacles in the way thereto : we have no great capacity, no towardly difpofition to learn it; we muft, in doing it, deny our carnal fense, we must fettle our wild fancy, and suppress fond conceits; we must bend our stiff and stubborn inclinations;

* Non dat natura virtutem, ars eft bonum fieri. Sen. Ep. 89.

Virtus etiamfi quofdam impetus ex natura fumit, tamen perficienda doctrina eft. Quintil. xii. 2.

SERM, we must reprefs and reftrain wanton defires; we must XXXVIII. allay and ftill tumultuous paffions; we must cross our

humour and curb, our temper: which to do is a hard chapter to learn; much confideration, much practice, much contention and diligence are required thereto.

Hence it is an art which we may obferve few do much study; and of the ftudents therein few are great proficients; fo that; Quí fit, Mecænas? Horace's question, How comes it to pass, that nobody liveth content with the lot affigned by God? wanted not fufficient ground.

However, it is not, like the quadrature of the circle, or the philofopher's ftone, an art impoffible to be learned, and which will baffle all study: there are examples, which fhew it to be obtainable; there are rules and precepts, by obferving which we may arrive to it.

And it is certainly a moft excellent piece of learning; moft deferving our earneft ftudy: no other fcience will yield fo great fatisfaction, or good use; all other sciences, in comparison thereto, are dry, and fruitless curiofities; for were we mafters of all other knowledge, yet wanted the skill of being content, we should not be wife or happy; happiness and difcontent are acúsara, (things incompa-, tible.)

or

But how then may this fkill be learned? I anfwer, chiefly (divine grace concurring) by these three ways. 1, By understanding the rules and precepts, wherein the practice thereof confifteth. 2. By diligent exercife, or application of thofe rules to practice; whereby the habit will be produced. 3. By feriously confidering, and impreffing upon our minds thofe rational inducements (fuggefted by the nature and reafon of things) which are apt to perfuade the practice thereof. The first way I have already endeavoured to declare; the Second wholly dependeth upon the will and endeavour of the learner; the third I fhall now infift upon, propounding fome rational confiderations, apt, by God's help, to perfuade contentedness, and ferving to cure the malady of difcontent. They may be drawn from several heads; from God, from ourselves, from our particular condition

XXXVIII.

or ftate; from the world, or general ftate of men here; SERM. from the particular ftate of other men in comparison to ours; from the nature and confequences of the duty itself; every thing about us, well examined and pondered, will minifter fomewhat inducing and affifting thereto.

18.

I. In regard to God we may confider, that equity doth 1 Sam. iii. exact, and gratitude requireth, and all reason dictateth, that we should be content; or that, in being discontented, we behave ourselves very unbeseemingly and unworthily, are very unjust, very ingrateful, and very foolish toward him.

15.

1. Equity doth exact this duty of us, and in performing it we act juftly toward God, both admitting his due right, and acknowledging his good exercise thereof; that faying in the Gofpel, Is it not lawful for me to do what I Matt. xx. will with mine own? is a most evident maxim of equity: it is therefore the natural right and prerogative of God, as the Creator and Preferver, and confequently the absolute Lord, Owner, and Governor of all things, to affign his station, and allot his portion to every person, as he judgeth good and convenient; it is most just that inviolably he should enjoy this right: he being also infinitely wife and good, it is likewise most just to acknowledge that he doth perfectly well manage this right. Now by contentful fubmiffion to God's difpofal of things, we do worthily exprefs our due regard to both these, avowing his right, and approving his exercise thereof; but by discontent and regret at what happeneth, we do in effect injure God in both those respects, difavowing his right, and impeaching his management. We do thereby fo renounce his right, as (fo far as conceit and wish do reach) to invade it, and ufurp it to ourselves; fignifying, that in our opinion things ought not to be ordered according to his judgment and pleasure, but after our fancy and humour; we claim to ourselves the privilege of controlling his estate, and difpenfing his goods, fo as to be our own carvers, and to affume to ourselves fo much as we think good; we imply, that, if we were able, we would extort the power

SERM. out of his hands, and manage it ourselves, modelling the XXXVIII. world according to our conceits and defires.

veni æquos

adverfus

adverfus

We do alfo, (fince we cannot but perceive the other atMultos in tempt of difpoffeffing God to be frivolous and fruitless,) in effect, charge God with misdemeanour, with iniquity or homines, infirmity in his diftribution and disposal of things; intiDeos nemi- mating, that in our opinion he doth not order them fo nem. Sen. juftly or so wifely as might be, (not so well as we in our Ep. 93. wisdom and juftice fhould order them;) for did we conceive them managed for the beft, we could not but judge it most unreasonable to be aggrieved, or to complain: so heinously infolent and unjust are we in being discontent. In earnest, which is most equal, that God fhould have his will, or we? For fhame we shall fay, God: why then do we not contentedly let him have it?

It is indeed, if we confider it, the highest piece of injuftice that we can be guilty of, exceeding that which we commit in any other fort of disobedience. For as in any state feditious mutining is the greatest crime, as most directly violating the majesty, and fubverting the authority of the prince; fo in the world, none may be supposed more to offend and wrong its fovereign Governor, than fuch malecontents, who dislike and blame his proceedings: even a Heathen could teach us, that it is our duty to fubject our mind to him that administereth all things, as good citizens to the law of the commonwealth; if we do not, we are rebellious and feditious, which is the highest pitch of injuftice toward our most gracious Sovereign.

Again, there can be no greater injury or affront offered 1 John v.10. to God, than to give him the lie, by questioning his veracity or fidelity; this discontent plainly doth involve: for God hath exprefsly declared himself ready upon all Matt.vi. 25, occafions to do us good; he hath promised to care for us, and never to forfake us, or leave us deftitute; which word of his if we did not diftruft, and take him to be unfaithful, we could not be discontent: as no man is dif

36.

Heb. xiii. 5.

5 τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτάσσειν τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα, καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοί που είται τῷ νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως. Arr. i. 12.

pleased with his condition, or fufpicious of want, who SERM. knoweth that he hath abundant fupply of all he can need XXXVIII. in a fure place; that he hath a person most able, most willing, most faithful, engaged to fuccour him; so, did we believe God to be true, who hath promised to help us, we could not be difcontented for fear of any want.

We must at leaft, in fo doing, fufpe&t God to be deficient in goodness toward us, or unwilling to help us; or we must apprehend him impotent, and unable to perform what he would, and what he hath promised for us, (like those infidels, who faid, Can God furnish a table in the Pf. lxxviii. wilderness? Can he give bread also, can he provide flesh for 19. his people ?) which conceits of God are also very unworthy, and injurious to him.

2. Gratitude requireth of us this duty: for we having no right or title to any thing; all that we have coming from God's pure bounty; he having upon us all (whatever our condition comparatively is, or may feem to us) freely conferred many great benefits, common to all men among us, (our being, life, reason, capacity of eternal happiness, manifold spiritual bleffings, incomparably precious and excellent,) we in all reafon fhould be thankful for these, without craving more, or complaining for the want of other things. Whereas alfo all events, how cross foever to our fenfual conceits or appetites, are by God defigned and difpenfed for our good, gratitude requireth that we should thank God for them, and not murmur against them.

Surely if, instead of rendering God thanks for all the excellent gifts which he most liberally (without any previous obligation to us, or defert of ours) hath bestowed on us, and continueth to bestow, we fret, and quarrel, that he doth not in smaller matters feem to cocker us, we are extremely ingrateful and difingenuous toward him. If any great perfon here fhould freely beftow on us gifts of

Iniquus eft qui muneris fui arbitrium danti non relinquit, avidus qui non lucri loco habet quod accepit, fed damni quod reddidit, &c. Sen, ad Polyb. 29.