LETTERS' FROM THE REVEREND JOHN WESLEY, ΤΟ VARIOUS PERSONS. DEAR SIR, I. To his Father. Lincoln College, December 19, 1729. As I was looking over, the other day, Mr. Ditton's Discourse on the Resurrection of Christ, I found, toward the end of it, a sort of essay on the Origin of Evil. I fancied the shortness of it, if nothing else, would make you willing to read it; though very probably you will not find much in it which has not occurred to your thoughts before. "Since the supreme Being must needs be infinitely and essentially good, as well as wise and powerful, it has been esteemed no little difficulty to show how evil came into the world. Unde malum,* has been a mighty question." (Page 424.) There were some, who, in order to solve this, supposed two supreme, governing principles; the one a good, the other an evil, one: Which latter was independent on, and of equal power with, the former, and the author of all that was irregular or bad in the universe. This monstrous scheme the Manichees fell into and much improved; but were sufficiently confuted by St. Austin, who had reason to be particularly acquainted with their tenets. But the plain truth is, the hypothesis requires no more to the confutation of it, than the bare proposing it. Two supreme, independent principles, is next door to a contradiction in terms. VOL. XII. Whence did evil arise ?-EDIT. It is the very same thing, in result and consequence, as saying two absolute infinites; and he that says two, had as good say ten or fifty, or any other number whatever. Nay, if there can be two essentially, distinct, absolute infinites, there may be an infinity of such absolute infinites; that is as much as to say, none of them all would be an absolute infinite, or, that none of them all would be properly and really infinite. "For real infinity is strict and absolute infinity, and only that.” "From the nature of liberty and free-will, we may deduce a very possible and satisfactory (perhaps the only possible just) account of the origin of evil. "There are, and necessarily must be, some original, intrinsic agreements and disagreements, fitnesses and unfitnesses, of certain things and circumstances, to and with each other; which are antecedent to all positive institutions, founded on the very nature of those things and circumstances, considered in themselves, and in their relation to each other. "As these all fall within the comprehension of an infinite, discerning mind, who is likewise infinite, essential rectitude and reason; so those on the one side must necessarily (to speak after the manner of men) be chosen or approved of by him, as the other disliked and disapproved; and this on the score of the eternal, intrinsic agreeableness and disagreeableness of them. "Farther: It noway derogated from any one perfection of an infinite Being, to endow other beings which he made with such a power as we call liberty; that is, to furnish them with such capacities, dispositions, and principles of action, that it should be possible for them either to observe or to deviate from those eternal rules and measures of fitness and agreeableness, with respect to certain things and circumstances, which were so conformable to the infinite rectitude of his own will, and which infinite reason must necessarily discover. Now, evil is a deviation from those measures of eternal, unerring order and reason; not to choose what is worthy to be chosen, and is accordingly chose by such a will as the divine. And to bring this about, no. more is necessary, than the exerting certain acts of that power we call free-will. By which power we are enabled to choose or refuse, and to determine ourselves to action accordingly. Therefore, without having recourse to any ill principle, we may fairly account for the origin of evil, from the possibility of a various |