Euthydemus, to assist him till other generals should be sent. Eurymedon and Demosthenes were chosen to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former set out immediately with ten galleys and some money, P about the winter solstice, to assure Nicias that a speedy succour should be sent him, during which, the latter was raising troops and contributions, in order to set sail early in the spring.

The Lacedemonians, on the other side, being supported by the Corinthians, were very industrious in preparing reinforcements to send into Sicily, and to enter Attica, in order to keep the Athenian fleet from sailing to that island. Accordingly they entered Attica carly, under the command of king Agis, and after having laid waste the country, they fortified Decelia, having divided the work among all the forces, to make the greater dispatch. This post is about one hundred and twenty furlongs from Athens, that is, about six French leagues, and the same distance from Beotia. Alcibides was perpetually soliciting the Lacedemonians, and could not be easy till he had prevailed with them to begin that work. This annoyed the Athenians most of all; for hitherto the enemy, retiring after they had laid waste the Athenian territories, the latter were unmolested all the rest of the year; but from the fortifying of Decelia, the garrison left in it was continually making incursions and alarming the Athenians, Athens being now become a kind of frontier town; for in the day time a guard was mounted at all the gates, and in the night all the citi

P One hundred and twenty talents.

9 A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. 1. vii. p. 494-496, et 502– 504. Diod. 1. xiii. p. 140.

Such

zens were either on the walls, or under arms. vessels as brought provisions from the island of Eubea, and which before had a much shorter passage by Decelia, were forced to go round about, in order to double the cape of Sunium, by which means, provisions, as well as goods imported, grew much dearer. To heighten the calamity, upwards of twenty thousand slaves, the greatest part of whom were artificers, went over to the enemy, to fly from the extreme misery, with which the city was afflicted. The cattle of all kinds died. Most of the horses were lamed, being continually upon guard, or upon parties. Every thing being laid waste in this manner, and the Athenians enjoying no longer the revenues which arose from the produce of their lands, there was a prodigious scarcity of money; so that they were forced to take the twentieth part of all the imports, to supply their usual subsidies.

r

* In the mean time Gylippus, who had made the tour of Sicily, returned with as many men as he could raise in the whole island; and prevailed with the Syracusans to fit out the strongest fleet in their power, and to hazard a battle at sea, upon the presumption that the success would answer the greatness of the enterprise. This advice was strongly enforced by Hermocrates, who exhorted the Syracusans not to abandon to their enemies the empire of the seas. He observed, that the Athenians themselves had not received it from their ancestors, nor been always possessed of it; that the Persian war had in a manner forced them into the knowledge of naval affairs, notwithstanding two great obstacles, their disposition, and the situation of their

Thucyd. l. vii. p. 497--500. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. 1. xiii. p. 140.

city, which stood at a considerable distance from the sea; that they had made themselves formidable to other nations, not so much by their real strength, as by their courage and intrepidity: that they ought to copy them; and since they had to do with enemies who were so enterprising, it was fit they should be equally daring.

This advice was approved, and accordingly a large fleet was equipped. Gylippus led out all his land forces in the night time, to attack the forts at Plemmyrium. Thirty five galleys of Syracuse which were in the great harbour, and forty five in the lesser, where was an arsenal for ships, were ordered to advance towards Plemmyrium, to amaze the Athenians, who would see themselves attacked both by sea and land at the same time. The Athenians, at this news, went on board also; and, with twenty five ships, sailed to fight the thirty five Syracusan vessels which were sailing out against them from the great harbour; and opposed thirty five more to the forty five of the enemy, which were come out of the little port. A sharp engagement was fought at the mouth of the great harbour; one party endeavouring to force their way into it, and the other to keep them out.

Those who defended the forts of Plemmyrium, having flocked to the shore to view the battle, Gylippus attacked the forts unexpectedly by daybreak; and having carried the greatest of them by storm, the soldiers who defended the other two were so terrified, that they abandoned them in a moment. After this advantage the Syracusans sustained a considerable loss; for such of their vessels as fought at the entrance of

the harbour, after having forced the Athenians, bulged furiously one against the other as they entered it in disorder; and by this means shifted the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with pursuing them, but also gave chace to those who were victorious in the great harbour. Eleven Syracusan galleys were sunk, and great numbers of the sailors in them killed. Three were taken; but the Athenians likewise lost three, and after towing off those of the enemy, they raised a trophy in a little island lying before Plemmyrium, and retired to the centre of their

camp.

The Syracusans also raised three trophies for their taking of the three forts; and after razing one of the smaller, they repaired the fortifications of the other two, and put garrisons into them. Several Athenians had been either killed or made prisoners there; and great sums of money were taken, the property of the public, as well as of merchants and captains of galleys, besides a large quantity of ammunition; this being a kind of magazine for the whole army. They likewise lost the stores and rigging of forty galleys, with three ships that lay in the dock. But a more considerable circumstance was, Gylippus thereby prevented Nicias from getting provisions and ammunition so easily; for, whilst the latter was possessed of Plemmyrium, they procured these securely and expeditiously; whereas, after their being dispossessed of it, it was equally difficult and hazardous, because they could not bring in any thing without fighting; the enemy lying at anchor just off their fort. Thus the VOL. 3.

52

Athenians could have no provisions but from the points of their swords; which dispirited the soldiers very much, and threw the whole army into a great consternation.

8

There afterwards was a little skirmish in defending a staccado which the inhabitants had made in the sea, at the entrance of the old harbour, to secure the shipping. The Athenians having raised towers and parapets on a large ship, made it advance as near as possible to the staccado, in order that it might serve as a bulwark to some ships that carried military engines, with which they drew up stakes by the help of pullies and ropes, exclusive of those which the divers sawed in' two; the besieged defending themselves with their harbour, and the enemy with their tower. Such stakes as had been driven in level with the surface of the water, in order to strand those vessels that should come near them, were the hardest to force away. The divers also bribed the enemy, and most of the stakes were torn up; but then others were immediately driven in their places. The utmost efforts were used on both sides, in the attack as well as the defence.

* One circumstance which the besieged considered of the greatest importance, was to attempt a second engagement both by sea and land, before the fleet and other succours sent by the Athenians should arrive. They had concerted fresh measures for a battle at sea, by improving from the errors they had committed in the last engagement. The change made in the galleys

Thucyd. 1. vii. p. 500, 501.

Ibid. p. 509-513. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. 1. xiii. p. 140, 141.