reasoning is often requisite in order to a just decision in morals. The effects of natural good and evil are usually quick and speedy, but those of virtue and vice are frequently remote and distant. This circumstance, together with the weakness of reason, greatly contributes to our delusion.

But a yet more powerful cause are our irregular and depraved propensities. In consequence of the original apostacy, our inclinations have received a strong bias to evil. They lean upon the wrong side in opposition to the dictates of reason and conscience. These latter, which were designed to be ruling faculties in man, are so debilitated by sin, as frequently to fall under the power of the inferior propensities. Lust and passion gain the ascendancy. Their exorbitant cravings pervert the judgment in favour of their objects. And under this corrupt influence, we confound the nature of things, putting evil for good, and good for evil. We easily persuade ourselves to believe those things to be lawful and good, which we passionately desire; and on the other part, we as readily admit those to be evil, from which we have a rooted aversion. Thus our depraved desires and affections become the most general source of the guilt described in the text. And they who are most enslaved to their lusts, are usually the most lost to a sense of the distinctions between good and evil.

Other causes however have an influence in producing this effect. False notions of religion, bigot

ry and superstition, have a surprising sway over the opinions of men with respect to morals. The vices, impurities, and dissolution of manners, which prevailed among the ancient heathen, were the obvious effects of their corruptions in religion. Having become vain in their imaginations, and lost to the knowledge of the true God, they formed to themselves idol deities, to whom they ascribed characters which could belong to none but the most abandoned and profligate of men. To these fictitious deities, they paid their religious homage. And having judged such objects worthy of their devotions, they of course considered their example and character as worthy of imitation, and as the highest model which they could propose to themselves. Hence in imitation of their gods, they gave themselves up to vile affections, being filled with "unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, envy, deceit, malignity." And while immersed in all these pollutions, in sins contrary not only to reason, but to nature itself, they still remained insensible of their guilt. Being of a reprobate mind and a seared conscience, they ceased to distinguish between light and darkness in a moral sense.

In proportion as the ancient Jews declined to idolatry, and joined with the heathen around them in their superstitions, they became addicted to their vices, and were equally stupid and depraved in their morals. And after they were reclaimed from idolatry in the literal sense, superstition led them to place

religion in rites and forms, and in tithing mint, annise, and cummin, to the neglect of judgment, mercy, and faith. Hence they continued, and many of them to this day still continue, to confound moral good and evil.

The effects of superstition in perverting men's notions of good and evil, were not more striking among Jews or Pagans, than they have been among Christians. In direct opposition to the plainest precepts of the Gospel, the latter in various instances have been accustomed to put darkness for light, and light for darkness; setting aside the most essential virtues and graces of religion, and substituting the most idle forms in their place. Nay, under the baneful influence of superstition, the different sects and persuasions among Christians have been led to hate and persecute each other; and to believe that the more furious and bloody they were, the more acceptable they would thereby render themselves to the benevolent Father of the universe. The history of the christian church abounds with instances of such a spirit. In a greater or less degree, all parties and denominations have been chargeable with it, and, under the influence of false ideas of religion, have been led to violate the plainest rules of morality.

But as another cause of our confounding good and evil, may be reckoned habit and custom, common practice and the example of principal and leading characters among a people. The commis

sion of an unlawful action, at first is usually followed with concern and remorse; but after it has been often repeated, and the habit of doing it is formed, the mind by degrees loses a sense of its culpability, and at length, perhaps, reflects upon it with approbation. In this way, many have proceeded from evil to evil, till they have arrived at such a pitch of depravity as to glory in their shame, make a mock of sin, and boast of the foulest vices. And when any particular vice is common among a people, each individual is prone to consider the general practice as an excuse for himself.

Many indeed seem to have no other ideas of good and evil, but what they derive from human laws, or from the maxims and practice of others around them. What they see done by their superiors in wealth, rank, or station, they often imitate without scruple. Under the patronage of great examples, they think themselves secure, though they disregard all the duties of religion and all the rules of virtue. Few are willing to be at the trouble of judging for themselves, or of comparing their actions with the dictates of reason and the precepts of Scripture. Many there are, who take up with the judgments of others, and are satisfied with themselves, if their conduct be conformed to the fashion and general custom of the world. With them, therefore, virtue and vice change their nature, and are as variable and uncertain as is the test by which they try them. But I pass on,

Thirdly, To show, that notwithstanding good and evil are so frequently confounded in the sentiments and practice of men, there is yet a real, essential, and immutable difference between them. This difference is in the text represented as fixed and unchangeable, as is that between light and darkness, bitter and sweet. It is not accidental or arbitrary. It results not from law or power, but from the nature of things and the moral faculties of men. Moral good and evil are the proper object of our rational powers. To discern the distinction between them, is the peculiar office of reason. Those powers of reflection which lead us from the things made, to acknowledge a Maker, and to ascribe all possible perfection to the great First Cause of all, do, at the same time, enable us, with equal clearness and certainty, to discriminate in our actions, and to consider some as good and praiseworthy, and others as evil and blameworthy. If we acknowledge the moral perfections of the Deity, and attribute to him holiness, justice, truth, and goodness; whatever we find in ourselves contrary to these perfections, our reason obliges us to censure as evil and culpable.

From the obvious relation in which we stand to God, our Maker, there evidently results a difference in our actions. As we know that we ourselves exist, so we know as certainly that there must be a God who has made us and all other creatures. If we consider him as having supreme and unlimited power, we cannot but feel that it is our duty and