the subject, the reader will perceive that he has not disproved a single statement, or overthrown a single position in my essay. More need not be said. Mr. C. knows, of course, what kind of appeals best accords with the taste of his followers; and is most approved by their judgment; and it would be presumptuous, I suppose, to assert, that in thepresent controversy he has not strictly acted in accordance with such knowledge. But be this as it may, I now resign both him and his proceedings to the judgment of an enlightened public.

ARTICLE XI.

REMARKS ON CAUSE AND EFFECT IN CONNECTION WITH FATALISM AND FREE AGENCY.

By Rev. Leonard Woods, D. D., Prof. of Theol. in Theol. Sem. Andover, Mass.

[Continued from Vol. III. page 193.]

THE additional remarks which I shall make on the subject above mentioned, will be arranged under several distinct heads. And let me here repeat what I said before, that I shall refer to the essay of the anonymous writer, chiefly as an occasion of introducing several topics, which seem to require attention at the present day. It is not my object to fasten the charge of error upon any particular person. And if it shall, in any way, be made to appear, that the writer of the essay did not mean to advance and does not maintain the opinions which I call in question, it will be highly gratifying to me; but it will not materially affect my object. The question, whether he really holds the opinions which I controvert, I can cheerfully give up to be decided by himself. My object is, to examine certain subjects, which the reading of the essay has suggested to my mind, and to determine what is true and what is not true respecting them. The first subject which I shall examine is,

SECOND SERIES, VOL. III. NO. I.

19

THE POWER OF A CONTRARY CHOICE.

Many writers regard this as a matter of great importance; and some of them evidently suppose, that the power referred to is frequently denied. As there is really much indefiniteness and obscurity in the disputes which are carried on respecting this subject; we should do what we can to make it clear and definite. Let us then inquire what are the points in which all candid men are agreed; so that we may avoid needless controversy, and may, at last, fix upon the real question at issue.

First, then, all agree that we have the power of choice. Every man certainly knows that he has this power, because he often exercises it. While we live and act as rational beings, we are under the necessity of using this power, that is, of taking by way of preference one or more things among several things offered. In the common course of human affairs, different things are proposed to us. We compare them, and then determine or choose between them, so that we can no more doubt that we have the power of choice, than that we have the power to think or to walk, when we are actually thinking or walking.

Secondly. It must be evident to all, that the way and the only way, in which our power of choice is acted out, is in the choices we really make. We never exercise our power by choosing differently from what we do choose. This may be called a truism. But it is true. However great our power of choosing differently from what we do, we never, in any instance whatever, exercise it. This is clear.

Thirdly. All must agree, that at the very time in which we make any particular choice, we have no power actually to make a contrary choice; in other words, that we cannot at one and the same time make two choices, the one opposite to the other. However great our power of a contrary choice, we have no power to do this. If we should be in so singular a state of mind as to wish to do it, we could not. And when any one asserts, that we have the power of a contrary choice, he cannot really mean, that we can make the choice we do, and at the same time another choice opposite; for example, that we can choose to go north, and at the same time choose to go south. I think no one, who understands the import of words, can mean to assert such

an absurdity. And I must suppose it an inadvertency, that the anonymous writer uses language which seems to imply this, as he does, p. 407. Priestley says: "In any given state of mind, with respect both to disposition and motive, two different determinations are impossible." The anonymous writer rejects this; of course he holds, as we should suppose, that a man in the same state of mind with respect both to disposition and motive, may make two different and opposite determinations, and may do it at the same time. But I think he cannot really mean this, and if he does not, then what is the point of difference? For,

Fourthly. All agree that we have power to make different and opposite choices at different times and in different circumstances. Our choice at one time is in fact different from what it is at another time. How often is it the case, that we come to different and opposite determinations respecting the same subject? An unrenewed sinner chooses to disobey God and enjoy the pleasures of sin. The same person, when renewed by the divine Spirit, chooses to obey God and forsake the pleasures of sin. The power thus to vary our choices under the influence of different motives, objective or subjective, evidently belongs to all men, as we know from the fact that all exercise it.

Fifthly. It is a point in which all will agree, that, in any case, we might have made a different choice instead of the one we did make, if we had been disposed to do it, or had found sufficient inducements. A man who chooses the life of a farmer, might have chosen the life of a mariner, if he had been so inclined, or had found inducements sufficient to influence him to such a choice. This, I apprehend, is commonly the meaning of those who say, that we might have chosen, or had power to choose, differently from what we did; not that we might at the same time have made another and opposite choice in connection with the one we made; but that we might have made another choice instead of it, if we had been disposed to do it, or if our inducements had been sufficient. These are the necessary conditions of choice; and without them choice cannot be. If a man should tell us that he put forth an act of mind which he called choice, without any inclination or inducements, we should say, he entirely mistakes the meaning of the word. Sixthly. All agree that we may hereafter make a choice

contrary to what we now make. There may be such a change in our views, feelings, and circumstances, as will naturally lead to a change in our practical determination. Seventhly. Whenever we make a wrong choice, all agree that we ought to have made a different choice, and that our not doing it was our own fault. There are in truth motives or inducements of such intrinsic value, that we ought to be influenced by them to a right choice; and if in any case we do not make such a choice, it is not because we are not free agents, but because we are sinful agents, not because we are destitute of any of the faculties or endowments of moral, accountable beings, but because we are inclined to pervert those endowments; not because we have no power to choose, but because the power we have is under an evil bias.

Eighthly. I suppose there is a general agreement in this also, that a man does himself determine the influence which external motives shall have upon him, and that he determines this by the dispositions and habits of his own mind, or by his own inward character. A good man, by his pious dispositions, determines the influence which gospel truths shall have upon him. It is because he is a good man,--because he has what Christ calls "an honest and good heart," that the motives presented in the Scriptures excite his love, and lead him to obedience. Our Saviour asserts this connection between the state of the heart and the voluntary conduct, when he says: "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth good things; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart, bringeth forth evil things." Of this he gives a familiar illustration: "A good tree bringeth forth good fruit; and an evil tree bringeth forth evil fruit." This principle is constantly exercised in the affairs of life. By this principle we regulate our judgment as to what will be the feelings and conduct of men. We expect a man will have love, pity, generosity, or the opposite, excited by the objects placed before him, just according to his prevailing disposition or character. And if any one judges on any other principle, we say, he is ignorant of human nature.

If any one wishes to examine the fifth point above mentioned, and inquires whether we have not power to choose contrary to our inclinations and to the inducements presented before us; I reply, that we doubtless have power to

choose contrary to some of our inclinations, and some of the inducements placed before us. But have we power to choose and act contrary to all our inclinations, and to all the inducements placed before us? Did any man ever learn that he has such a power by acting it out? If not, how does he know that he possesses it? Can any man think such a power desirable? If he had it, would he ever exercise it? And of what value is a power which is never to be exercised? A power to choose according to our inclinations and desires, and under the influence of rational inducements, is a possession of great value. But a power to choose independently of all our inclinations and motives, and contrary to them, is a power to do an absurdity; and a power to do an absurdity is itself an absurdity.

But some appear to think that, in every case, choice and voluntary action might have been contrary to what it was, supposing all the motives, external and internal, and all the circumstances of action, to have remained perfectly the same. They think this is the main point, and that it is the very thing implied in the power of a contrary choice. In refer. ence to this, I cannot do better than to quote the words of an author, who was no advocate for the scheme of moral or phi. losophical necessity, but who judged according to common sense and consciousness. The author referred to, (Dr. Whateley,) says: "If nothing more is ineant," (that is, by the doctrine of necessity,) "than that every event depends on causes adequate to produce it,-that nothing is in itself contingent, accidental, or uncertain, but is called so only in reference to a person who does not know all the circumstances on which it depends; and that it is absurd to say any thing could have happened otherwise than it did, supposing all the circumstances connected with it to remain the same; then the doctrine is undeniably true, but perfectly harmless, not at all encroaching on free agency and responsibility, and amounting to little more than an expansion of the axiom, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be."

But if I have rightly understood the anonymous writer of the essay, he holds that this very principle, which Whateley says is undeniably true, and perfectly harmless, is the essence of fatalism. The doctrine which he represents as the opposite of free agency, and the great doctrine of fatalism, is, that in the moral world, as well as the natural,