satisfy. Their state of mind may be wrong. I must believe that it is. But theirs is an error of quite a different character from that of an obtrusive and contumacious renunciation of all belief in any future retribution.

It is foreign to my design, and beyond my present limits, to go into a discussion of the particular grounds already mentioned, which are alleged in support of the opinion that future punishment is temporary. In the most summary manner to glance at a few considerations on which the mind ought most seriously to reflect, is all that I can be permitted to do.

If the doctrine of future existence, i. e. the certainty of this doctrine, be dependent on revelation for its supportand this I must on the whole believe-then it follows, that all we can know of future happiness or misery with certainty, must be from the declarations of Scripture, or from legiti mate consequences drawn by fair reasoning from those declarations.

Now it is palpable, at first view, that most of the doubts and difficulties suggested above, are such as arise from reasoning in the main independently of the Scriptures. That God is good, kind, merciful, compassionate, paternal-is true beyond all doubt. That he is just also, is equally true. Nor do I suppose his justice, truth, compassion, or any other at tribute of such a quality, is different in its nature from the like attributes in ourselves; for we are made in his image, and we can have an idea of his moral attributes only by reasoning from an analogy with our own, and then separating from those attributes, as existing in him, all idea of imperfection. But still, there is one most important and fundamental consideration, in respect to this whole matter, which does not seem to be properly regarded by doubters of the class in question. This is, that God superintends the concerns of a UNIVERSE; and that all things, present, past, and future, are all perfectly before him. It is such a being, and such an one only, who is capable of judging what par ticular thing or measure is conducive to the highest good of the whole. It is only such a being who can judge, where the safe and proper bounds of mercy are to be placed, and how far the right and power of pardon shall be exercised. Even an earthly government, that should exercise indiscrimi nately the right of pardon, would be deemed weak, ineffi

cient, yea, contemptible, inasmuch as this would be merely bidding up a bounty for transgression of the laws. Must not God's inoral government maintain the honour and dignity of his laws?

You will answer in the affirmative. Some punishment must be inflicted. But then-endless punishment! O that dreadful thought! Endless misery for finite crime!

True; it is a dreadful thought. All punishment is dreadful in a greater or less degree, else it would not be punishment. But tell me : Can any one, except the omniscient God, unfold or even understand the extent of the evils occasioned by sin? It must be true that no one can do this except Нe.

If then, in his Law, he has actually affixed such a penalty to sin, what are we to believe? That it is just, or unjust? It is a plain case of duty here, to acquiesce in his judgment and decision. The question turns, then, simply on what he has decided in his word.

As to endless punishment, do not our State Governments immure criminals for life? May not punishment continue as long as sinning? And is it just that our civil government should exercise such a power? If you concede this point, why may it not be true, that the Supreme Governor of the Universe may immure in the State Prison of the Universe (if I may be allowed so to speak), such as cannot be permitted to go at large without jeoparding the order, harmony, peace, and happiness of the Universe? Can we be the proper judges of what is necessary to preserve and promote these in all their extent and mutual relations? Or must He, of necessity, be the only competent judge?

The appeal is made, moreover, and often with thrilling effect too, to parental feelings, and the question asked, Would you be willing that a child of yours should become for ever miserable?' The first and spontaneous answer is— No! No! How then can God be willing that any of his children should be for ever miserable?' He is not, in one sense. He has no pleasure in it. He has sworn that he has none. But this does not decide the point, that, as a legislator and governor and judge, he may not feel obliged to inflict such a punishment. Supposing an earthly parent to be fully and on good grounds assured that a prodigal son will never reform, and that he will use all the efforts possible

to corrupt the rest of his family-is such a father justified in retaining such a child in his own house? Surely there are cases, many cases, where he could not be justified, but must cast him out, in order that the peace and happiness of the innocent should be secured. Cannot God judge better than we, when this ought to be done; and can any one but He decide on the propriety and necessity of doing it?

But God has power to make all men happy; how then can his benevolence permit any to be for ever miserable?' God has power, I answer, to make all happy, both here and hereafter, so far as omnipotence is concerned. He can make and unmake worlds by a single word. But if the possession of such a power confers obligation on benevolence to save from all misery (and this is the very gist of the argument), then why does his benevolence actually permit sin and misery in this world? It will not be called in question, that this world is full of both.

But we may go a step farther. To talk of mere power, in such a case, does not seem to be saying much to the purpose. There is a harmony, a consistency, a complete congruity, in the divine character and attributes. God has determined to create moral beings, and to place them under a moral government as free and responsible agents. He looks on this as a plan which infinite wisdom and goodness must adopt. If now he should use his simple omnipotence so as to defeat a part of the plan of moral government and retribution which he has devised, then he would array one part of his attributes against another. He cannot, consistently with his plan of governing the world, make any free rational agents happy, who are sinners, so long as they remain impenitent. He could, so far as his power is concerned, unmake them, and create new and holy beings in their stead. But his wisdom and his goodness have not led him to adopt such a plan of government. When we say that God can do this or can do that, we should always say so with the express understanding, that all his attributes in their harmonious relation, and also the nature of the government which he has adopted, permit him to do this or that consistently.

Who shall judge, now, where pardon may be safely extended-and beyond which the general good will not permit it? I know of none but God who can judge. Why then should we suppose ourselves to be within the limits of pro

priety or safety, when we undertake to decide this question for Him?

So might I reason, in regard to most of the difficulties suggested. They are in fact either doubts or decisions. savouring of presumption, and grounded on our limited, imperfect, and often unreasonable, sympathies. They depend too, in great part, on our a priori speculations about the best means of accomplishing the highest happiness and the greatest good. Alas! how often do we suffer ourselves to be drawn away, and led into error, by the very limited views and wishes that we entertain!

One remark more and I have done with this part of the subject. One of the most impressive of all the objections. felt and made against endless misery, is, that, as many seem to hold and teach the doctrine, it represents all future punishment as undistinguishing and of equal severity.

I readily acknowledge that the subject may be so treated as to make such an impression. If, for example, only one expression, or one image employed by the sacred writers, be set before the minds of those who are uninstructed, and this without any explanation, such an impression may easily be made. I will suppose a preacher to speak habitually of hell merely as a lake of fire, and to convey the idea that this expression is to be literally understood, and give no explanations; then will it not be almost a matter of course, that many of his hearers will suppose he means to teach a kind of equality of punishment in a future world, and an equality which involves the idea of most aggravated torture appointed for the least as well as the greatest of sinners? All, as the matter is represented, are cast into the same lake without distinction. How then can the punishment of one differ from the punishment of another?

Such a question a teacher of this class ought naturally to expect. But another teacher, who has effectually learned, that all language borrowed from the material world and appropriated to the description of a world which is immaterial and spiritual, must of necessity be taken in a modified or tropical sense; who, at the same time, takes pains to inculcate on the minds of his hearers the scriptural idea, that every one will be rewarded according to his works, and that punishment will never exceed the measure of crime, and always will keep pace with it-such a teacher may avoid any

SECOND SERIES, VOL. IV. NO. I.

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grounds of just objection in respect to the matter before us. At all events, the whole doctrine of the Bible, in relation to this matter, should be taught, and then there is no room in reality for the objection to be made which we are consider. ing. Future punishment, inflicted by divine justice which is not fallible, never can exceed the measure of guilt.

Cannot divine justice render the sinner miserable, so long as he continues to be a sinner, i. e. so long as he remains impenitent? Can there not be ends answered by this, of which we are not now, and cannot be, proper judges? Is it not true, that God only is able to foresee all the consequences resulting from sin, and from the continued punishment of it? Is it not true, that he will never punish too severely?

It will be admitted, I trust, by candid and reasoning men, that in the nature of things, as the world is constituted, sinners cannot be happy without being brought to repentance. It follows from their very nature, while sinning and impenitent, that they are incapable of the happiness of heaven.

The whole question then turns, at last, on the simple point, whether repentance in a future world is a doctrine of Scripture. Independently of the Scriptures it will not be contended, that we can establish any thing wholly satisfactory, in respect to this deeply interesting question.

Do the Scriptures then teach such a doctrine? I am un. able to find it. I know of but one text to which the sober expositors of Scripture are wont to appeal with confidence, when they attempt to defend the affirmative of this question. This is 1 Pet. 3: 18-20, where the apostle speaks of Christ's "going and preaching to the spirits in prison, which were sometime [formerly] disobedient," i. e. in the days of Noah, and before the flood. Is there ground here, for such an important conclusion as they deduce from this text?

If so, then several things would seem to follow:

(1) That only the antediluvians, certainly among the most wicked of all men, enjoyed the proffers of salvation in a future world, through the preaching of Christ; for only these are included in the passage. (2) It was only the Spirit that quickened Christ (according to our English version), which sent or enabled him to go and preach to the spirits in prison. How this life-giving Spirit (life-giving in the natural sense) is appropriately spoken of as accomplishing such a work through Christ, I am unable to see. And how Christ,