he is morally unable to do it; that is, he is under the influence of such motives, as will infallibly prevent him from thus willing. It may be thought by some, that, by a purpose or resolve, we have power to give our volitions a contrary direction. But do we form purposes independently of all motives from without and from within? Will the same influence operating upon precisely the same state of mind, lead to opposite purposes and volitions?"

"If we pass from our purposes to our affections or emotions, shall we here find the liberty to either side? It is manifest that different objects may produce different feelings in the same mind; and the same objects will produce different feelings in different minds. But while the same objects are viewed in the same manner, by a mind continuing in precisely the same state of susceptibility, will the affections excited by these objects be so changed, as to become of an opposite character? Or does the state of the mind itself become contrary to what it was before, without any cause whatever?".

"Will it be said, that our volitions are partly contingent, and partly dependent on something preceding; that there inay be some influence from motives, and at the same time a power of acting in opposition to motives? To this it may be answered, that if the very nature of liberty of will implies freedom to either side, then so far as this is controlled, and our volitions are determined by the influence of motives, by the state of the affections, or by any thing else, liberty is impaired. The saint in heaven, who is under the influence of such motives as invariably excite in him holy volitions, has not the liberty of which we are now speaking!"

"Why have metaphysicians given to the terms liberty and power, when applied to the will, a meaning so different from that which they bear in customary use, and in reference to external conduct? In common language, a man enjoys liberty wen he does as he wills; that is, when there is a fixed connection between his acts and his volitions. Whatever interrupts this connection, impairs his freedom. But according to some philosophers, liberty of will requires that there should be no dependence of our volitions upon any thing preceding, for being as they are, rather than otherwise. External liberty consists in a man's acting uniformly, according to his will. Does internal liberty imply, that he

frequently wills in opposition to his supreme affections? When we say that a man has power to the contrary external action, we mean, that if his will were different, the action would be different. But some who speak of a power to contrary volitions, seem to mean, that under the same influence, and in the same state of mind, the volitions may be different. It is a power of contingence, a capacity of being subject to accident. Is not the term power, as it is frequently used, a mere metaphysical sound,' which is to produce its effect, not by any distinct signification, in the connection in which it is introduced; but by association with feelings excited by the word, in cases of a very different nature ?"

"Liberty is commonly considered a privilege. But what privilege is conferred by the liberty of contingence, a freedom of our volitions from all influence of motives,-of argument, and persuasion, and affections? Suppose a man were to be endowed with a will which should put forth volitions wholly at random, without any regard to his feelings; that if these should urge him ever so strongly to go one way, his will would determine he should go in an opposite direction; that however much he might be pleased with obeying God, his volitions would lead him to disobey; would this be the perfection of liberty? Or suppose his volitions should spring up without any cause, or reason, or influence whatever, either from without or from within; would this be the most desirable condition of his being?" See Day on the Will, Sect. 4.

FREE MORAL AGENT.

A moral agent is one who performs actions which are of a moral nature, and are related to a moral law. But what is a free agent? The word free is relative. Taken in a good sense, it denotes the absence of something inconvenient or undesirable. A citizen of the United States is free. But from what is he free? He is not free from the authority of law, nor from the power of rulers. He is not free from restrictions as to the use of his property, or as to the business he shall pursue. In various instances his personal liberty is limited. Yet notwithstanding these various and sometimes unwelcome restraints, we say he is in a free

country, and is a free man. But from what is he free?-He is free from a despotic government. He is free from the pow. er of a king or master, who rules, not according to just and equal laws, but according to his own absolute will. He is free from oppression, and from all unnecessary and unreasonable restraints. In the Scripture sense, a man is free, who is free from the dominion of sin and has the liberty of the sons of God.

But in the case now under consideration, freedom is spoken of as an attribute of an intelligent, accountable being. Here freedom is freedom from whatever would prevent voluntary, moral, accountable action. And in regard to this, we form our judgment, not by an abstract intellectual process of argument, but by consciousness and common sense. We know that we are moral, accountable agents. This is so evident and certain, that no proof is necessary. We know also that we are free, not indeed in all respects, but so far as freedom is necessary for those who are the proper subjects of law. We are free from compulsion or force. We do what we choose, and we choose as our heart is inclined. We are not free from moral law, or from obligation to serve God. And, to take another view, we are not, in our voluntary conduct, free from the influence of our inclinations and desires, nor from the influence of external objects. In our unrenewed state, we are not free from the control of a deceitful and wicked heart. If we are Christians, we are not free from the influence of pious affections. And whether we are Christians or not, we are not free from the established laws of the mind; and one of these laws we learn from experience to be, that the executive acts of the will, called volitions, follow our inclinations and desires. That we should have a choice or determination, not conformed to our inclinations and desires, is inconceivable. Such a thing never did exist, and never can. It is indeed true that our choice and our voluntary conduct often have an effect, direct or indirect, upon our subsequent affections and desires; and this discloses another important practical principle. But who does not know that the very choice or determination of mind, which thus influences subsequent affections and desires, does itself spring from affections and desires already existing? Nor is this any thing strange. In many cases we find that the same thing is the effect of a pre-existing

SECOND SERIES, VOL. IV. NO. I.

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cause, and the cause of a subsequent effect; and that this last effect becomes the cause of another effect, and so on. No man can be a watchful observer of human affairs, without perceiving such a concatenation of causes and effects in the common course of divine Providence.

The doctrine that our volitions, or the determinations of our will proceed from our affections, is thought by some to be liable to objection with regard to the case of Adam. How, it is asked, could he be influenced in the act of his will to disobey, by his affections, or the state of his heart, when his affections were holy? I answer; while his affections all remained holy, he could not be influenced by them to disobey. But he was mutable, and the affections of his heart, which were once holy, became sinful. And it agrees with common experience, that sinful affections of heart should lead to voluntary transgression.-But how did his heart change from holiness to sin? I answer; he certainly did change, and the change must have begun somewhere. As I never experienced such a change myself, and as I am unable to look into Adam's mind and trace the process of thought and feeling which took place when he became a transgressor, 1 cannot tell how he changed from holiness to sin. This lies beyond my province. But as the inclinations, affections and desires of the heart are evidently the chief springs of voluntary action, it would seem very probable, that the change in Adam's character commenced in his heart, and that his sinful heart led to the act of disobedience. And it is certainly no more difficult to show how his affections became corrupt, and how these corrupt affections led to voluntary transgression, than it is to show how he could choose to transgress, while the affections and desires of his heart were all pure, and how this choice, proceeding from a sinless heart, could be sinful; or, in other words, to show how voluntary transgression could take place without any wrong feeling in the heart prompting to it. If, to escape this last difficulty, it should be said, that the first act of Adam's will to transgress, was an ultimate fact, and so not to be explained or accounted for, I could with equal propriety say, that the change of his heart from a pure to a corrupt state was an ultimate fact, admitting of no explanation.

If the case of the first transgression is treated metaphysically, there is no escape from difficulties. The common

theory is no more encumbered with them, than any other, and therefore the existence of insolvable difficulties cannot fairly be urged as a valid objection against it. It may be that the theory of divine truth in relation to this matter has mysteries not to be explained, and depths which no finite mind can fathom. This we know is the case with many portions of divine truth. But after all, it may be, that there is nothing in this subject, which necessarily occasions any special difficulty. The difficulties which generally perplex us, may be owing to something wrong in our habits of thinking, and particularly to our undertaking to judge of that which is wholly of a moral or spiritual nature, by our speculative faculties. It may be that the views which David had of his own misconduct, when he wrote the 51st Psalm, were not only just and true, but the only views which were fit and profitable for him. The same may be said of Peter, when he went out and wept bitterly. It may be, that he then entertained the right and proper views-the only right and proper views of his own offence. All the truth and all the philosophy, which justly belongs to any transgressor, may be contained in the humble, contrite confession; I have done wickedly;-against thee, O God, have I sinned: I abhor myself. The Lord is righteous, and I am justly condemned. We know that this is enough for the purposes of salvation, and it may be that, in regard to all important purposes, this is the end of the matter. As it is a concern of conscience and the heart, it may be, that any attempt to work out the problem in a speculative, philosophical manner, is not only needless, but hazardous; and that he who never makes the attempt, and is content to treat the subject merely in a penitent, devout and practical manner, is in the surest way to understand the truth, and to keep his mind effectually closed against the encroachments of error. And the time may come, when the wise and good man, instead of coldly inquiring after the philosophy of sin, will be wholly occupied in confessing and forsaking it, in seeking forgiveness for it, and in watchfully guarding against it. And if we could have access to Adam, and could ask him to give us an exact and faithful account of his apostacy, it may be that, after all he has learnt in the world of spirits for five thousand years, the beginning, and middle, and termination of his story would be, that he was made in the image of God, and was under perfect obligations