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to obey his commands, but that he yielded to temptation and became a sinner. And it may be, that he would wonder at us, philosophizing sinners, that we should have so much trouble of a speculative, metaphysical kind, respecting our depravity, and so little of a spiritual kind, arising from a sense of the moral evil that is in us, and of our ill desert as transgressors.

I do not mean to discard mental philosophy, as a science. It is certainly interesting, and conducive to the great end of our being, to turn our attention to the nature of the immortal mind, and to observe the established principles or laws which govern its operations. But mental philosophy, as a science, has its own province, and should never interfere with moral science. It must be founded wholly upon the facts of consciousness. It must take those facts as they are; just as the science of physics takes the facts in the natural world as they are, and builds upon them. Now our spiritual consciousness teaches us, that we are the proper subjects of moral law, and that we are accountable to God for our conduct, and are deserving of praise or blame according as we conform or not to the rule of right. This then is a fact, settled for ever, and not on any account to be called in question. Whatever we find the laws of mental action to be, this fact remains. It is a first principle. What then shall we think, if a man comes forward and says,-If the laws of the mind are so and so, we cannot be moral, accountable beings? We tell him, the proper inquiry is, whether such are the laws of the mind. If, on a careful examination, we find them to be so, this can never justify us in setting aside the great fact of our spiritual consciousness, that we are moral, accountable beings. We cannot infer from one wellknown truth, that another well-known truth, is not a truth. Whatever we find to be metaphysically true as to the nature of the mind or the mode of its acting-whether the necessarian scheme, or the opposite, or some one still different, proves to be the right scheme-the important truth remains in full force, and will remain for ever, that we are moral agents, justly accountable to God for our conduct, and are praiseworthy or blameworthy, according as we obey or disobey the moral law. Let us then no longer create to ourselves difficulties and perplexities by attempting to carry the decisions of the speculative understanding into the province of conscience or moral sense. Let us judge by our speculative

faculty on speculative subjects, and by our moral faculty on moral subjects-never suffering one of these to interfere with the other. In this way, the decisions of each may become more clear and satisfactory, and the disputes which are carried on by speculative reason, respecting the affairs of conscience, may all come to an end. And as to the difficulties which have been accumulating of late in regard to moral agency, it may be that they are chiefly factitious or imaginary; and if so, the best mode of treating them is not to encounter them, but to dismiss them.

MORAL NECESSITY.

Why should there be any objection to this phrase, or to that which is intended by it? Writers explain moral ne. cessity to be the certain connection between moral causes and their effects; or, the invariable influence of moral causes. Moral causes are the inclinations, affections and desires of the heart, together with the objects to which they relate. The language is scientific, and has its use in philosophical treatises, though not exactly suited to popular discourse. And yet the sacred writers frequently use language which implies all that is meant by necessity in this case, and they sometimes use the very word, and in the sense which scientific writers affix to it; as St. Paul says, a necessity is laid upon him to preach the gospel; and Christ says, that there is a necessity that offences should come, and that his death is an event which must come to pass. Similar language is often used, in common discourse, in which it is always expected, that a meaning will be given to words correspondent with the nature of the subject. Now as scientific use, in this case, so well agrees with Scripture use, and with the prevailing use in common discourse, what valid objection can be made against it? If we interpret the language relative to this subject according to the acknowledged principles of interpretation, giving it a meaning corresponding with the nature and circumstances of the case, how easily should we rid ourselves of difficulty? And is it a mark of candor and enlargedness of mind, to indulge a prejudice against modes of speech which have long been in good use, or to insist upon fixing a meaning upon them, foreign to the manifest design for which they are employed?

THE GREAT MISTAKE.

President Edwards and others say, what evidently agrees with fact, that the connection between a moral action and its cause is certain, so as to ensure the existence of the action; and that "moral necessity may be as absolute as natural necessity; that is, an effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural, necessary effect is, with its natural cause." The truth of this must be perfectly evident, if we look at particular instances of moral necessity. The moral perfections of God, his wisdom, righteousness and goodness, are moral causes. The effect certainly connected with them or resulting from them, is holy, righteous, and benevolent action. Such a being as God cannot do wrong. He must do right. It is absolutely certain that he will do right. To suppose that infinite, immutable righteousness and goodness will lead to any thing but right action, is palpably absurd. The sincere love of believers to Christ is a moral cause, and is invariably connected with obedience as its effect. "He that loveth me keepeth my words." The effect follows from the very nature of love. It cannot be otherwise. If we know that any one truly loves Christ, we know that he will obey Christ. And if any one does not obey, we know he does not love. The carnal mind, or depraved heart, is a moral cause, and is certainly connected with its effect, which is transgression of God's law. They in whom this cause exists, Paul says, "cannot be subject to the law," and "cannot please God." Disobedience must follow from the carnal, selfish heart, as certainly as any natural effect follows from a natural cause. The disposition of Satan is a moral cause; and the certain, invariable consequence is, and will be, rebellion against God. To suppose it will be otherwise would be obviously inconsistent. The things above mentioned are very plain. Who will say they are not? Now because right or wrong action is the certain result of moral causes, does it follow that the action is neither right nor wrong? Because moral causes produce their effect as certainly and invariably as physical causes, does it follow that the effect is a physical effect? Because there is as real an influence in the one case as in the other, does it follow that the influence is of the same nature? It does certainly result from the corrupt passions and desires of

man, that offences will take place. There is a necessity for this. So the original word avayan signifies. See Matt. 18: 7. But can we conclude that this necessity is of the same nature with physical necessity? Or can we conclude that the offences which flow from it are destitute of a moral nature, and deserve no blame, because this is the case with the effects of a physical necessity? Here is the great mistake. And if any one falls into this mistake, he will be likely to go wrong on the whole subject. It certainly is a mistake. It is not true, that if the influence of moral causes is as certain and invariable, as the influence of physical causes, the effects must be of the same nature with physical effects. It certainly is not true, that because the strong and unquenchable love of Paul's heart had as certain an influence to lead him to preach the gospel, as the power of steam has to propel an engine, therefore he was no more praiseworthy for preaching, than an engine is for moving. Because the infinite perfection of God does as certainly and invariably result in holy and benevolent action, as the power of gravitation produces its appropriate effect, and because it is as really impossible for God to lie, as it is for gravitation to produce an effect contrary to its nature, it certainly does not follow from this, that holy action in God has no more excellence or praiseworthiness, than the effect of gravitation in material bodies. It is not the high degree or the constancy of the influence which a moral cause exerts, that gives character to its effects. Nor is it the high degree or the constancy of the influence of a physical cause, that gives character to its effects. Moral and physical causes are in their nature entirely different. The fact that they are all causes, does not make them the same causes, or like causes. If moral causes have an influence which is equally powerful with physical causes, and which equally prevents or takes away all resistance, this does not alter the nature of the causes, nor the nature of their influence, nor the nature of the effects produced. To suppose that it does is the great mistake. If any one makes this mistake, he may easily correct it, if he will lay aside the technical language which occasions the difficulty, and will speak of cases, where moral causes exist and operate, in plain, common language, and for practical purposes -if, instead of saying that God acts under the influence of moral necessity, he will say, his actions certainly and invariably flow from his infinite wisdom and goodness-if in

stead of saying, that Christians are influenced by a moral necessity, he will say, their love and gratitude to Christ, and their benevolence to their fellow men, are motives which certainly influence them to pious and benevolent actions— and if, instead of saying, that sinners act as they do, from a moral necessity, he will say, they act from the selfishness, the pride, the covetousness and desperate wickedness of their hearts. By contemplating these common and wellknown facts, as expressed in common language, it would seem that all unprejudiced men may become satisfied. And why should not scientific men be equally satisfied, when the same facts are expressed in scientific language? But if any of us have a dislike to the scientific language of Edwards and others on the present subject, let us take care that we do not impute to them a meaning which never entered their minds, and that we do not deny or overlook what is equally a matter of fact, whether it is expressed in common or in scientific language.

FATALISM.

So far as the present subject is concerned, the word Fatalism, which is often used in a very vague sense, is evidently intended to denote the opposite of the doctrine, that we are free, moral, accountable beings the proper subjects of lau-under the government of a wise, righteous and benevolent God-and praiseworthy or blameworthy according to our conduct. Fatalism then must imply, that we are not free, moral, accountable beings; that we are not the proper subjects of law; that we are not under the government of a wise, righteous and benevolent God; and that we are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy for our conduct. Fatalism may be set forth in a variety of forms; but in all its forms, it must imply what is stated above. It may be proper and useful then, to consider it as including these several points, which are here expressed in language which is perfectly unambiguous and plain. Now in order to satisfy ourselves whether the doctrine of moral necessity involves or leads to Fatalism, we must have a clear conception of what moral necessity is. And it will be just and right to consider it to be what its most intelligent advocates represent it to be; that is, the certain and invariable connection of moral causes and moral effects. The doctrine implies that all the external voluntary actions of men, and all their inward affections, purposes, etc., result

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