on the highest authority when we say that, with a fortnight's warning, we could not collect at Spithead five line-of-battle ships sufficiently manned to fight their guns. In less than half that time Louis Napoleon could place double that number of ships, fully equipped, in the Channel.

saying it does-at this moment paralyze the policy of England. Take, for example, the affair of the Charles et Georges. Suppose the case had been such as may have been, or certainly, in some other case, may be-that England was bound in honor and in duty to interfere in favor of an independent State exLet us gravely consider the significance of posed to armed coercion, to what purpose these two facts. Men may differ as to the would it be that she should say to France, probability or improbability of a French in- "You shall not bombard Lisbon," if the Emvasion. We don't stop to discuss that ques- peror can always reply, "You shall not sail tion now, because the invasion of England out of Portsmouth." Yet that-let Secreought not to be a question of probability; taries of State envelope the fact in what fine yet can any man venture to say that at this periphrases they please is at this moment moment it is an impossibility? With a rail- the true diplomatic situation. It is from this road to Cherbourg, with a great fleet always situation, humiliating to the pride of a great in readiness, and the crews in perpetual dis- country, as well as dangerous to the indeponibilité, the attempt is one which the pendence of a free nation, that public opinion French at least do not think by any means ought to demand from the Government dehopeless. Why are we to encourage them liverance and security. We have shown that by our carelessness in this delusion-if indeed the remedy is simple and inexpensive. Init be a delusion-when it is in our power, at deed, there is no reason why the public bura cost wholly insignificant, to put the very thens should be at all increased. For the idea of its possibility out of their heads? money which is annually expended on that Ten or twelve line-of-battle ships always fit utterly valueless force, the unembodied militia, for action in the Channel would go far to would maintain a fleet which would absolutely make the shores of England as inaccessible to assure the safety of the country-a result a French army as the moon itself. In the which the most sanguine admirers of the presence of such a force, the fanding of a militia could hardly promise us. But, cost single regiment would be, to say the least, a what it may, the end is one for which no exmost critical experiment. Is it not worth pense would be too great. The lovers of while to insure at so slight a premium against peace are those who ought most to desire the so frightful a risk? The cost would be just only security which, in making the prospects the difference between the expense of keep- of a war desperate, would diminish the temping the same number of ships in ordinary, tation to engage in it. The present defenceand maintaining them in commission at Spit-lessness of England is a positive encouragehead or in Plymouth Sound. We wonder what fractional part of such a sum would form of the amount yearly paid to insure domestic property against fire. It would be probably about one-tenth part of the duty which is paid on the tobacco we consume. Yet this is the frightful extravagance against which Mr. Bright so frantically warns us. We keep a fleet in the Mediterranean to protect Malta. We have a squadron in the Chinese Seas, on the West India station, and in the Pacific. Why is England alone to be undefended? Is it that the interests which we have in our own soil are less precious, or that the dangers which menace us are more distant?

But it is not the danger of invasion alone which presses. The affair of Lisbon has made it very evident that the question has already arisen whether England can have a policy in Europe, independent of the will of France. Without invading England, the superiority of the French naval force in the Channel may-and we have no hesitation in

ment to aggression. We are acting like an unarmed traveller, who, by displaying at once his wealth and his feebleness, suggests the idea of spoliation to the robber. There is no saying what bloodshed may be saved if it is made perfectly obvious that to attack England is not only difficult but impossible.

It is for this reason that we hold the immediate equipment of a fleet of adequate force, which shall be prepared at any moment to assure, beyond a possibility of doubt, the safety of the English coast and the independent action of English policy, to be the first and cardinal necessity of the time. We feel very confident that neither on the part of the English public nor of the House of Commons will any government want support or encouragement in carrying out so essential a work. On the other hand, the country has a right to expect that the Government shall not be wanting in applying without delay the resources which the English nation is only anxious to place at their disposal.

From The Saturday Review.
PROSPECTS OF WAR.

A CURIOUS controversy has lately arisen as to the probability of a Continental war in the spring. The French papers disclaim, with alarming earnestness, projects which seem to be imputed to their Government. Austrian writers murmur against the restless ambition of France, and Sardinian patriots naturally do their utmost to create or to inflame the animosities which may tend to separate their neighbors. It is doubtful whether there is any fire to account for so much smoke; but the uncertainty, which is the necessary consequence of warlike rumor, is in itself a serious evil. English politicians, though they are accused of fomenting every quarrel which breaks out in Europe, are for once utterly puzzled and surprised. Who are to be the belligerents? What are they to fight about? And why should they select the present time for picking a quarrel? Questions such as these serve at least to prove the absence of English complicity in the plot. The rumor in its more definite form points to an invasion of Lombardy by the combined forces of Sardinia and of France, and it is further suggested that Russia would simultaneously paralyze Austria by a concentration of forces on the Galician frontier, and in case of need by the encouragement of disturbances in Hungary. It is assumed that prudence, and jealousy of Austria, would ensure the neutrality of Prussia, and it must be admitted that the sympathies of England with Italy would modify the national inclination to oppose the aggrandizement of France. If Napoleon III. is rash enough to consider that it is for his interest to go to war, no combination of enemies, of allies, and of neutrals, could offer him a fairer prospect of success, and yet it is difficult to believe that the peace of the world is to be disturbed by a wanton aggression. Mythological critics account for the origin of the most plausible legends by their inherent symmetry and probability; and when an ingenious speculator has devised a promising game, he takes but a trifling step to the conclusion that it will be played accordingly. In council and action there is fortunately a longer interval between the conception of a scheme as possible and its practical accomplishment.

There can be no doubt that vague hopes of French intervention are prevalent in Northern Italy, or that corresponding uneasiness is felt on the German side of the Alps. The Austrian Military Gazette has discovered a menace to Lombardy in the negotiations between France and Switzerland for the purchase of the Valley of Dappes, on the western slope of the Jura. At this point the Canton of Vaud projects with an acute angle into the adjacent territory of France, and the acquisi

tion of the pass would shorten by some miles the passage between the neighboring departments of the Jura and the Ain. The Vienna journal is mistaken in supposing that the proximity of France to Geneva would be in any manner affected by the success of this infinitesimal negotiation. The French frontier has always approached within three or four miles of the city, and the railway, by which troops would ordinarily be dispatched, leaves the disputed valley far to the left. At the worst, Switzerland and Piedmont are interposed between the passes of the Jura and the plains of Lombardy, so that the additional facilities of invasion would correspond to the advantage of cutting off the angle of the South-Eastern Railway at Redhill, in a journey from Dover to Glasgow.

Other grounds for the existing alarm are less imaginary. The Austrians are naturally irritated by the blustering language of the Parisian journals; and the King of Sardinia is reported, though on questionable authority, to have warned his officers at a recent review to be in readiness if they should have the opportunity of smelling powder in the spring. It is reasonably assumed that his Government would not provoke a collision with Austria without previous assurances of the immediate support of France. The contingent assistance, however, which makes Sardinia formidable, renders her policy dependent on the convenience of her indispensable ally. Whatever may be the policy of the Emperor, he will certainly not commit to a minor Power the responsibility of commencing a war which may probably become European. A declaration of hostilities at Turin would be virtually dated from Paris, and friends and enemies would look to France as the undoubted principal in the war. The most marked indications of hostile purposes on the part of the French government consists in the silent increase of the numbers of the army by the full quota of the conscription of 1857. It is uncertain, however, whether the augmentation is a precaution, a menace, or a result of the Imperial fancy for playing with soldiers. All crowned heads seem to be affected with a mania for drilling and reviewing, and the French army, as the most complete of military playthings, constantly requires fresh improvements and additions. When a member of the Yacht Club lengthens his vessel or alters her rig, it is always doubtful whether he is projecting a cruise to America, or merely indulging his taste for naval architecture.

The real danger, whether it is great or small, is unfortunately inseparable from the position of Austria in Italy. There is no other direction in which an aggressive power could direct its forces without the risk of provoking the general resistance of Europe. In

other quarters, the independence of Austria | of France, is the open and cordial ally of would be guaranteed by England, but the ad- Austria; yet at the same time the Pope is dition of Lombardy to the kingdom of Sar- secure from a repetition of the treatment dinia could scarcely fail to meet with popular which his predecessor and ecclesiastical nameapproval. On the other hand, it may be sake experienced from the First Napoleon. doubted whether the commencement of an A French Commander in Italy would have to unnecessary war would conduce to the interest raise up Lombardy with one hand, while he of Sardinia or of France. The weaker ally kept down the Legations with the other, and might overrun and possibly retain Northern native patriots would be puzzled by a liberator Italy, but the King would inevitably lose the who was forced by domestic considerations to most ancient possession of his house. Lam- maintain the weakest and the worst of Italian artine declared, on behalf of the Republic, in Governments. It is fortunate that in modern 1848, that France would not allow Sardinia times war is the most difficult and the most to become a power of the first rank without unprofitable of undertakings. The expense, securing to herself the material guarantee of the danger, and the odium of the project Savoy, and the heir of Napoleon is not likely vaguely imputed to France more than outto be more disinterested or less ostensibly weigh the possible advantages which might patriotic than the sentimental orator. The seem to countenance the recent rumors. King of Sardinia is a manly and resolute prince, who would never willingly postpone the interests of his country to the policy of foreigners; but in a contest with Austria, conducted by the aid of a French alliance, he must sink into an auxiliary who would be dependent during the war, and who might perhaps not be consulted on the conclusion of a peace. It is at least possible that, after a doubtful campaign, the more powerful confederate might relinquish the acquisitions of Sardinia on condition of retaining his own. From the dawn of modern history, Italy has suffered from German oppression, but it has never been helped to independence or to prosperity by the emulous interference of France.

The imprudence of a warlike policy on the part of the French Government is still more obvious. Notwithstanding the encouraging array of allies and neutrals, the commencement of strife is always like the letting out of waters. The first step of a French soldier over the frontier would put an end to the English alliance, and terminate the internal jealous of the German States. Prussia might remain passive from a fear of being crushed between France and Russia, but her armies would assemble on the Rhine and on the frontier of Poland, and the wishes of the population would be unanimously favorable to Austria. During the troubles of 1848, Germany, though divided on all other questions, felt a common sympathy in the struggles and victories of Radetzky; and it was well known that if Charles Albert had ventured to blockade Trieste, the Frankfort Government was ready to declare war and reinforce Austria with the whole Federal army. The same national feeling might offer serious impediments to the success of a French expedition in Italy. It is unnecessary to dwell on the obvious complications which must result from the relations of the Papal and Imperial Governments. Rome, while it exists under the Protectorate

From The Economist. GRATUITOUS ERRORS. COUNT D'ORSAY was one of Louis Napoleon's most attached friends in exile, and one of his best and most prudent advisers when President of the Republic. It is well known that secretly he was opposed to the coup d'etat, and endeavored to dissuade Louis Napoleon from the attempt,-not, as he said, that it would not succeed in the deplorable condition into which France at that moment was plunged, but "THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR HIS OBJECT." He contended that the President who had been elected by so large a majority, not through the influence of the government of the day and its officials,-for that was necessarily all thrown into the scale of his opponent, but by the force of his name in France, "would obtain all he wanted without the odium which must necessarily attach to so violent a measure." The same remark is strikingly applicable to almost every objectionable act of Louis Napoleon's down to the present time.

Never had an aspirant to a throne an easier task, or a clearer field. Every other claimant had either voluntarily abdicated, or tacitly acquiesced in the repudiation of his pretensions. The old legitimate family of the Bourbons had sought a last asylum in England at the Revolution of 1830. Louis Philippe, who succeeded, though not without suspicion of complicity in the downfall of his predecessor, had betrayed, and his family had abandoned, France in a moment of great difficulty and danger. On the memorable night of February, when the commander of Paris, with his troops drawn up on the Boulevards, could have extinguished the Revolution which had only just been kindled in the streets of Paris in a few minutes after receiv ing an order from the civil authorities to act; at the moment when Guizot had resigned, and Molé had not accepted, office; when the

And, lastly, who is not conscious of the enormous blunder of the prosecution of Montalembert? But for it the article on the Debate upon India, able as it is, would never have been heard of except among the readers The next act of Louis Napoleon's which of the Correspondent:-now, is there a house was equally unwise and unnecessary even for in England, almost in Europe, where it is not his own objects, was the confiscation of the known? If Montalembert wrote a libel upon Orleanist property. No act could have been French institutions, it is the Emperor himself better calculated to deprive himself of the who has published it. But what has the confidence he had in part gained, and to ex- Emperor gained by the prosecution, even for cite a sympathy in favor of the only family he his own objects? Has he not greatly weakhad to fear. Montalembert, who may be saidened in place of strengthening his position

his claim to support, both at home and abroad? greater material progress than during any The most powerful despot cannot defy the similar period in her history—and this, even opinion of the world, or shock the sympathies in spite of the check upon public discussion of mankind, with impunity. There are occa- and upon intellectual freedom. Who or what sions when errors so grave wear the aspect of is it that the Emperor fears? The people of crimes. The coup d'etat was an error; the France if we mistake not, and the people of Orleanist confiscation was an error; the Europe we are certain, are only too anxious to Espinasse régime was an error; the trampling avoid a repetition of all the evils which invariupon Portugal was an error; the prosecution ably attend revolutions in France. The events of Montalembert was an error:-all were of 1848 are still too well remembered, for any errors, if for no better reason, that they were one to wish to see them repeated. What, all unnecessary for the object which Louis then, does the Emperor gain by a policy which Napoleon had in view, while they could not estranges from him the best of his own subfail to cast obloquy, odium, and suspicion on jects, and exposes him to the suspicion of al. his reign. Europe? It is certainly not greater security. for his throne, but the contrary. So gratuitous and so suicidal do his errors appear, that those who look on from a distance, involuntarily recall those occurrences by which the first Napoleon threw away an empire; and are not without their apprehensions that the world may yet witness events as reckless in their conception and as fatal in their results.

If the Emperor had more confidence in himself, it would be better for his dynasty and for France. He has great claims upon the country if he knows how to use them and to rely upon them. If these are weakened or depreciated, it will be by his own acts, not by the relative merits of any rival claimant. No one can deny that since the establishment of security under the Empire, France has made

PORTRAIT PAINTING IN MADAGASACAR- hair, arranged their toilette by one holding the What effect colored landscapes, or other views glass for another.-Ellis's Three Visits to Madaof natural objects, might produce upon the na-gascar. tives, I am unable to say; but it was curious to notice the intense interest excited by the por- D'ISRAELI THE ELDER.-As the world has traits, and the different effect produced by the always been fond of personal details respecting view of a group of trees, or flowers, a house, men who have been celebrated, I will mention or any other inanimate object. In the former that he was fair, with a Bourbon nose, and the features, the aspect, the dress, the ornaments, brown eyes of extraordinary beauty and lustre. and all the little accompaniments were subjects He wore a small black velvet cap, but his white of curious examination and animated remark by hair latterly touched his shoulders in curls alwives and children, as well as companions or most as flowing as in his boyhood. His extremfriends. One man had a mole on his cheek, ities were delicate and well formed, and his leg, and, as it was on the side next the light, it came at his last hour, as shapely as in his youth, out clear and strong; nothing excited more re- which showed the vigor of his frame. Latterly mark than this. I saw the man himself, after he had become corpulent. He did not excel in feeling the mole on his cheek with his fingers, conversation, though in his domestic circle ho go to touch the mole on the picture hanging up was garrulous. Every thing interested him; to dry, exclaiming, "How very wonderful! I and blind, and eighty-two, he was still as suscepnever felt any thing here," putting his finger to tible as a child. One of his last acts was to the mole on his cheek, "and yet there it is," compose some verses of gay gratitude to his pointing to the picture. But the form of a daughter-in-law, who was his London corresbuilding, the shades in a flower, the perspective pondent, and to whose lively pen his last years of a landscape, seemed to excite no interest. were indebted for constant amusement. He had Another phase of human character, peculiar per- by nature a singular volatility which never dehaps to no country, but rather common to all, serted him. His feelings, though always amiawas the evident anxiety about personal appear-ble, were not painfully deep, and amid joy or ance, when that was to be regarded by others or sorrow the philosophic vein was ever evident. perpetuated. I never suggested the arrange- He more resembled Goldsmith than any man ment of the dress or the hair; but rarely found that I can compare him to: in his conversation any one come and sit for a likeness without giv-his apparent confusion of ideas ending with ing some previous attention to one or both. some felicitous phrase of genius, his naiveté, his Even the laboring woman, returning from work simplicity not untouched with a dash of sarcasm in the field, with her child at her back, when affecting innocence-one was often reminded of asked if she would have her likeness taken, ad- the gifted and interesting friend of Burke and justed her burden before having her tout en- Johnson. There was, however, one trait in semble rendered permanent. Sometimes the which my father did not resemble Goldsmith: women brought their slaves to arrange their hair he had no vanity. Indeed, one of his few inimmediately before sitting down. At other firmities was rather a deficiency of self-esteem. times the men brought looking glass and comb,-Curiosities of Literature, edited by the Chan and borrowing a bowl of water to moisten their cellor of the Exchequer.