served in the French army in America during the Revolution, and who had negotiated and signed the Treaty of St. Ildefonso. The former warmly urged the cession of Louisiana; the latter as warmly opposed it. On the morning of the 10th, tidings came from London that the Peace of Amiens was ended and war was at hand. Bonaparte at once sent for Marbois, and ordered him to open negotiations immediately with Livingston, without waiting for the arrival of Monroe, whose appointment had been announced to the First Consul. He told Marbois not to accept less than fifty millions of francs for the province. Monroe reached Paris on the 12th of April, and the negotiations went on rapidly.1

Marbois first fixed the price of the cession at 80,000,000 francs, and asked in addition that the United States should pay the claims due from France to American citizens, reckoned at 20,000,000 francs. The sum finally agreed on was 60,000,000 francs, and a sum not exceeding 20,000,000 francs to meet the claims of Americans.2 The treaty made the cession. Two conventions were made: one fixing the amount to be paid and the mode of payment, the other the method of settling the claims due to American citizens. The treaty did not attempt a precise description of the boundaries of the territory ceded. It copied from the Treaty of St. Ildefonso the article which ceded the territory to France, and transferred that territory to the United States. An attempt to define the limits with exactness would probably have been unsuccessful. It was thought that there were advantages in describing the extent of the cession in these general terms. When Bonaparte's attention was called to the form of the stipulation, he said, “If it was not somewhat vague already, it would perhaps be politic to make it so."4 The treaty gave to the French and the Spaniards exclusive right for twelve years to bring into the ports of Louisiana the products of their countries or colonies on the same terms as Americans; it placed French vessels, after twelve years, on the most favored nation basis, and promised the admission of the French inhabitants to American citizenship at the earliest time practicable, and assured immediate protection of them in the enjoyment of liberty, property, and religion. The treaty and the two conventions were signed on the 30th of April, in less than three weeks after the commission began their work.

1 Garden (viii. 56) gives a most interesting account of the interview of Bonaparte with his two counsellors, and of his decision.

2 It is interesting to note that Livingston, in a letter, dated April 13th, to the Secretary of State, suggested that if the price necessary to secure the province seemed too great, the territory west of the Mississippi might be sold to some friendly power, and the American government be thus reimbursed. (For. Rel. ii. 554-)

8 The cession in the Treaty of St. Ildefonso uses general terms only in defining the territory. It speaks of it as of "the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had

It were superfluous to dwell upon

when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other states." The treaty of 1803 cedes "the said territory, with all its rights and appurtenances, as fully and in the same manner as they have been acquired by the French Republic in virtue of the above-mentioned treaty concluded with His Catholic Majesty.”

4 Garden, Hist. des Traités, viii. 75.

6 There was subsequently some unprofitable discussion between the friends of Livingston and those of Monroe concerning the relative credit due to each for the success of this negotiation. Even these two gentlemen allowed themselves

the vast and permanent political and economical consequences to the United States of the purchase of Louisiana.1

While the negotiation of the Louisiana treaty was proceeding in France, Rufus King, minister to England, and Lord Hawkesbury were completing a convention for determining more accurately the northern boundary between American territory and that of Great Britain. The fifth article provided that the line between the Lake of the Woods and the Mississippi should be the shortest between the two points. But as their convention was signed May 12, 1803, twelve days later than the treaty with France, which gave to the United States the right to all the territory France was entitled to under the Treaty of Utrecht, the Senate feared that the fifth article of the convention with England might work a limitation of our rights under the French treaty, and so dropped it. The British did not agree to this alteration of the convention.2

3

After the completion of the treaty for the purchase of Louisiana, Monroe repaired to London to assume the duties of minister at the Court of St. James. He was specially charged with the task of securing a treaty which should bind Great Britain to abstain from the search of American vessels, from the impressment of seamen taken from such ships, from the abuses of blockade, and from other wrongs which were suffered at her hands.3 The downfall of the Addington ministry soon after Monroe had opened correspondence with Lord Hawkesbury, the accession of the Pitt ministry with Lord Harrowby in the foreign office, and the absence of Monroe on public business in Spain for several months, made progress impossible for two years. In May, 1806, William Pinkney was united with Monroe in a commission for negotiation with Great Britain. After the death of Pitt, the Fox-Grenville ministry showed so conciliatory a disposition that hopes for reasonable success in the negotiation seemed justified. But Fox soon became too ill to attend to affairs. Lord Auckland and Lord Holland were appointed commissioners. On December 31, 1806, a treaty, which was far from satisfactory to the American commissioners, was completed.5

to write upon the matter. See Livingston to Madison (For. Rel. ii. 573), and Monroe MSS, referred to in Gilman's Monroe, p. 84; Hunt's Life of Edward Livingston, p. 305. They worked with practical harmony during the negotiation, whatever feelings of rivalry, if any, they then cherished.

1 The prolonged debates on the so-called French spoliation claims of Americans for damages done to their commerce by the French have created a somewhat voluminous literature of Congressional reports, memorials, etc., on the interpretation of the early treaties with France, and especially of the conventions of 1800 and 1803. An excellent summary of the discussions is found in Wharton's Digest of Int. Law, ii. 248 et seq., where copious references are given to authorities. The subject has engaged the atten

tion of many of the ablest statesmen and lawyers down to this day. No better succinct dis cussion of it can be found than that given in the opinions of the Court of Claims (through Judge John Davis), rendered May 17 and 24, 1886, and Nov. 7, 1887 (Wm. Gray, Administrator, v. U. S., and Wm. R. Hooper, Aďr, v. U. S.).

2 For. Rel. ii. 584-591. See Monroe's interview with Lord Harrowby on the subject (Ibid. iii. 93). The latter objected with spirit to the procedure of ratifying a part of a treaty. Monroe reminded him that such a course in respect to Jay's treaty had proved satisfactory.

8 For project of the treaty drawn by the State Department, and the explanations of Mr. Madison, see For. Rel. iii. 82-89.

4 For. Rel. iii. 113, 116, 117.

5 The treaty is given in For. Rel. iii. 147.

The fundamental defect of the treaty was that it contained no concession from Great Britain on the important subject of the impressment of seamen. The British were willing to give assurance that impressment should be resorted to only on extraordinary occasions and under certain precautions, but they were fortified by the law officers of the crown in the stubborn

maintenance of the doctrine that merchant vessels on the high seas were not neutral territory in such a sense as to forbid visitation and search by the British navy in the pursuit of British subjects. Finding all attempts to move the British commissioners on this point vain, Monroe and Pinkney reluctantly signed the treaty, which in their opinion had merits rendering it worthy of ratification. But it encountered severe criticism from Mr. Madison, and was so unacceptable to Mr. Jefferson that he did not even send it to the Senate.1

1 Madison's criticism may be found in For. Rel. iii. 166. Jefferson, in his annual message in 1807, justified his disapprobation of the treaty by saying: "Some of the articles might have been admitted on a principle of compromise, but others were too highly disadvantageous; and no sufficient provision was made against the principal source of the contentions and collisions which were constantly endangering the peace of

the two nations." After his return home, Monroe made an elaborate defence of the action of the commissioners, in a letter to Madison, dated "Richmond, Feb. 28, 1808." It is found in For. Rel. iii. 173 et seq. It was charged at the time, but doubtless without any ground, that Jefferson and Madison opposed the treaty in order to damage Monroe's prospects for the presidency. Wharton's Digest of Int. Law, § 150 b, says:

* [From the National Portrait Gallery (1839); engraved by E. Wellmore, after a painting by C. B. King.

Rembrandt Peale's picture, engraved by A. B. Durand, is in Wheaton's Pinkney (1826). — ED.]

The commissioners were instructed to renew efforts to reach a more satisfactory result. Hardly had they begun their conference with Mr. Canning, who had been placed in charge of foreign affairs, when the news of the attack of the British man-of-war "Leopard" on the United States frigate "Chesapeake," near to the American shore, and the capture of some of the latter's seamen, interrupted negotiations. The discussion of the question of reparation for that outrage was soon transferred to Washington, and Mr. Rose was sent out to represent Great Britain in the matter. His instructions forbidding him to offer any reparation until the repeal of the order which our government made immediately after the attack on the "Chesapeake," that our waters should be closed to all British men-of-war, his mission speedily terminated without any result.1 Canning finally informed Monroe and Pinkney that it was impracticable to open a negotiation on the basis of a treaty which our government had refused to consider. Monroe therefore returned home towards the end of 1807, and left Mr. Pinkney alone to the thankless task of representing his country in fruitless. protests against the outrageous Orders in Council, by which Great Britain. was harassing American commerce, as France was ruining it by her decrees. Since the British Orders precluded neutrals from trading directly with France or her colonies, or from carrying French goods; and since the French decrees cut off neutrals in the same way from trading with Great Britain or her colonies, and from carrying English goods, the commerce of the United States was driven from the seas.2 Congress, in self-defence, passed two notable acts: one (December 22, 1807) placing an embargo on all vessels in American ports, and the other (March 1, 1809), interdicting commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France and their dependencies. The relations between the States and the two great belligerent powers of Europe, who were harassing American citizens by an invasion of the rights of neutrals, became strained. All efforts to obtain relief or redress were long in vain. The limits of this narrative forbid a detailed report of the voluminous diplomatic correspondence which took place.1 The attempts to secure justice from Great Britain were so unsatisfactory that on June 18, 1812, a bill declaring war with Great Britain was signed by the President, and hostilities soon began.5

3

"Mr. Madison's private correspondence shows how reluctant he was to overrule it [the treaty]. Mr. Jefferson, in his subsequent letters to Mr. Monroe, speaks of his final non-acceptance of the treaty as an act peculiarly painful to himself. No one can study Mr. Monroe's unpublished writings without seeing that the scar remained with him through his whole life."

1 Reparation was offered and accepted in November, 1811. See For. Rel. iii. 499, for the correspondence.

2 For the British order, see For. Rel. iii. 263284; for French decrees, see Ibid. 284-292.

3 These acts are found in Statutes at Large, ii. 451 and 528.

4 It can be largely found in For. Rel., iii. The British ministers at Washington during this period were Erskine, Jackson, and Foster.

5 President Madison's message of June 1st, though it did not formally recommend war, was written in expectation of it. The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, reciting the grievances and urging war, was written by Calhoun. It is given in For. Rel. iii. 567. The impressment of seamen, the orders in council, and various illegal blockades, are the chief causes dwelt on.

On June 26 the Secretary of State wrote to Jonathan Russell, who since the return of Mr. Pinkney had been left in charge of the legation at London, authorizing him to conclude an armistice with Great Britain, provided the latter would repeal the Orders in Council, abstain from illegal blockades, return impressed American seamen, and abandon the practice of impressment. In case this were done, it was promised that the United States would by law forbid the employment of British seamen on our vessels. The offer thus made through Mr. Russell was declined by Lord Castelreagh.1

In March, 1813, the Emperor of Russia offered his services as mediator, and the United States accepted the offer.2 John Quincy Adams, then minister at St. Petersburg, Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, and James A. Bayard, were appointed commissioners. Their instructions, which were somewhat prolix, named the stipulation against impressments as the chief object to be sought in negotiation. Two methods were suggested for adjusting the difficulty. The first consisted in imposing restraints on the naturalization of the seamen of one country by the other, and in excluding from service on vessels all others not naturalized. The second proposed to prohibit the naturalization of seamen, and to exclude from the service of each country all the natives of the other. Either method would be accepted by the United States. The commissioners were to seek to obtain a better definition of neutral rights, and especially of blockade, and to ask for indemnity for our losses by illegal seizure. The American requests on these points were not, however, to be made indispensable conditions of peace. Assurance might be given that the non-importation act would be repealed by Congress in case of peace.

Gallatin and Bayard sailed on May 9, 1813, for St. Petersburg. On their way they touched at Gottenburg. From that place Gallatin wrote to Alexander Baring, asking him in effect to acquaint the British government with the purpose of the mission. Gallatin and the President had supposed that Great Britain would willingly accept the mediation of Russia. But Mr. Baring's reply to Gallatin's letter speedily undeceived that envoy. It informed him that the services of Russia had been declined by the British government, but also assured him that an offer would be made to treat directly, either at London or Gottenburg, and that there was in England a strong desire for peace. Though the commissioners were cordially received at St. Petersburg, they could, of course, in these circumstances, accomplish nothing there. While they were at the Russian capital, Gallatin learned that the Senate had refused to confirm his appointment. They objected to his holding at the same time the office of commissioner and that of Secretary of the Treasury. Castlereagh having offered, on November 4, 1814, to open direct negotiations, the President accepted