SECTION V. Surrender of the Athenians. They came, like mountain torrent red SCOTT. 2. Intim'idated, part. terrified, discou- |19. Ingen'uous, a. open, fair, candid. raged. 6. Av'enues, passages. Ford'able, a. passable, not too deep to be waded through. Detachments, s. bodies of troops separated from the main army. 22. Ela'te, part. overjoyed, puffed up. 24. Super'fluous, a. more than enough. Retriev'e, v. to recover, to restore. 26. Annihilated, v. blotted out of exist ence. Obscu'rity, s. darkness, insignificance, 1. THERE now remained but two methods for them to choose; either to attempt the passage a second time, for which they had still ships and soldiers sufficient, or to abandon their fleet to the enemy, and retire by land. 2. Demosthenes recommended the former plan; but the soldiers were so much intimidated by their late defeat, that they had not courage to undertake it. The second method was therefore adopted; and they accordingly prepared to set out in the night, the better to conceal their march from the enemy. 3. Hermo'crates, however, the Syracu'san general, was extremely unwilling that so large a body of men (amounting to nearly forty thousand) should be suffered to depart, lest they should fortify themselves in some corner of the island, and renew the war. At the same time he knew it would be impossible to persuade the Syracu'sans to oppose their march that evening, as they were engaged in celebrating their late victory, and solemnizing the festival of Her'cules. 4. He therefore fell upon another expedient. He sent out a few horsemen, who were to pass for friends of the Athenians, and ordered them to tell Nic'ias not to retire till day-light, as the Syra cu'sans lay in ambush for him, and had seized on all the passes. 5. Nic'ias was so weak as to believe this intelligence, and accordingly delayed his departure not only that evening, but the whole of the next day, in order that the soldiers might have more time to prepare for their march, and carry off whatever might be necessary for their subsistence. 6. But this delay proved fatal to the Athenians; for early the next morning the enemy took possession of all the difficult avenues, fortified the banks of the rivers in those parts where they were fordable, broke down the bridges, and sent detachments of horse up and down the plain; so that there was no place which the Athenians could pass without fighting. 7. They set out upon their march the third day after the battle, with a design to retire to Cata'na1. 8. Their army was divided into two bodies, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx; the first being commanded by Nic'ias, and the second by Demosthenes, with the baggage in the centre. 9. In this manner they proceeded for several days, during which they were terribly harassed by the enemy, who hung upon their rear, and overwhelmed them with showers of darts and arrows, but never would stand a general engagement when the Athenians offered them battle. Finding, therefore, their numbers daily decrease, and being at the same time in extreme want of provisions, they altered their plans, and, instead of continuing their march to Cat'ana, they directed their route towards Camari'na and Gela. 11. As this scheme was executed in the night, 10. 1 Nothing could be more affecting than the commencement of this retreat. Great numbers, either dead or dying, were abandoned to wild beasts or the cruelty of the enemy. Some, who were sick or wounded, hanging on the necks of their friends and companions, conjured them, with many tears, to take them with the army; others, dragging themselves along, followed, as far as their strength allowed, and, when this failed, had recourse to tears and sighs, calling upon the gods as well as men, to revenge this apparent cruelty; so that every place resounded with groans and mournful lamentations. it was attended with so much confusion, that the rearguard, under Demosthenes, soon parted from the main body, and lost their way. The next day the Syracusans came up with them, and surrounded them in a narrow place; and though they defended themselves for some time with incredible bravery, yet finding it impossible to effect their escape, they were at last obliged to surrender prisoners of war, which they did upon condition that they should not be put to death, nor condemned to perpetual imprisonment. About six thousand men surrendered on these terms. 12. In the mean time, Nic'ias proceeded on his march, and, crossing the river Erine'us, encamped on a mountain, where the enemy overtook him the next day, and summoned him to surrender, as Demosthenes had done. 13. Ni'cias at first could not believe what they told him concerning Demosthenes, and therefore begged leave to send some horse to inquire into the truth; but when he found that matters really were so, he offered to defray all the expenses of the war, provided they would suffer him to quit the island with his forces. 14. This proposal, however, was rejected by the enemy, who immediately renewed the attack; and though Nic'ias defended himself during the whole night, and even continued his march next day to the river Asina'rus, he was quickly pursued thither by the Syracu'sans, who drove most of the Athenians into the stream; the rest having already thrown themselves into it, in order to quench their burning thirst. 15. Here the most terrible havoc ensued1; so that Nic'ias finding all things desperate, was obliged to surrender on this single condition, that Gylip'pus should discontinue the fight, and spare the lives of his men. 16. The lives of the men, indeed, 1 So intent were they on quenching their thirst, that they took no measures to defend themselves, though what they drank was rather the blood of their companions than the waters of the stream. The Asinarus was for many miles dyed with their blood, eighteen thousand Athenians having on this occasion been inhumanly slaughtered. were spared; but Nic"ias and Demosthenes, after being scourged with rods, were cruelly put to death; a striking proof of the barbarity of the age. By this savage act, the Syracu'sans tarnished the glory they had acquired by the gallant defence of their city, and the signal victory they had won. 17. It must be owned, indeed, that Gylip'pus, and even many of the Syracu'sans themselves, did all they could to save the lives of the Athenian generals; but the great body of the people, urged on by their orators, and particularly by Di'ocles, one of their most popular leaders, could be satisfied by nothing less than the blood of these two illustrious men 1. 18. The fate of Nic'ias is the more to be lamented, as no man was ever more remarkable for humanity and good nature; and though he headed this expedition in obedience to the commands of his countrymen, yet he did every thing in his power to prevent them from undertaking it. Demosthenes too was a man of so respectable a character, that the famous orator of the same name, many years after, valued himself on account of his being of the same family. 19. As to the prisoners, they were shut up in the dungeons of Syr'acuse, where many of them perished through want and bad treatment; but those that survived, being afterwards sold for slaves, recommended themselves so strongly to their masters by, their modest, prudent, and ingenuous behaviour, that many of them soon obtained their liberty. 20. Some, however, owed that favour to their being able to repeat the finest scenes of Eurip'ides' tragedies, of which the Sicilians were passionately fond: so that when they returned to their own country, they went and saluted the poet as their deliverer, and informed him 1 Among others who pleaded for the lives of the Athenian commanders, Nicolaus, a venerable old man, who had lost two sons in the war, was none of the least earnest. In an eloquent and impressive speech, he entreated his countrymen to pity them in their distress; but his arguments and eloquence were alike unavailing. of the great advantage they had derived from being acquainted with his verses. 21. The Athenians were so little prepared to receive the news of this defeat, or rather, indeed, they were so confident of receiving accounts of a contrary nature, that they condemned to death the man that first brought the intelligence; but when they found that matters were really worse than fame had reported, they were at once overwhelmed with grief and despair. 22. They had never indeed been reduced to so deplorable a condition as they now were, having neither horse, foot, money, ships, nor mariners; in a word, they sunk into the deepest despondency, and expected every moment that the enemy, elate with so great a victory, and strengthened by the junction of the allies, would come and invade Athens both by sea and land with all the forces of Peloponne'sus. 23. Ci'cero, therefore, had reason to say, when speaking of the battles in the harbour of Syracuse, that it was there the troops of Athens, as well as their galleys, were ruined and sunk, and that in this harbour the power and glory of the Athenians were miserably shipwrecked. 24. The Athenians, however, did not suffer misfortune to render them inactive, but assumed courage from despair. They raised money for building new ships; they retrenched all superfluous expenses; and they established a council of old men, to examine every matter before it was brought into the assembly of the people. In a word, they took every step that could possibly tend to retrieve their ruined affairs, or at least prevent them from growing worse. 25. But nothing could restore them to their former splendid condition; for from this time forward the Athe'nians present us with a very different picture from what they have hitherto done. We are no longer to behold them making a figure in fine arts and arms, giving lessons in politeness, humanity, philosophy, and war, to all the nations around, and aiming at the erection of an empire, which, if |