66 66 66 "ly attributed to, and do truly belong to one and the same "Divine nature; that there are such frequent and evident "assertions in Scripture of the unity of God, and yet such "plain distinctions signified by the terms Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as imply both a perfect unity of nature, and yet a distinction in the Godhead; and that this distinction, whatever it may be, is not the same with that which we conceive "between the attributes of God, nor a mere distinction of "name, office, or relation, but some other distinction, of "which we have but a confused conception, and which we "can express by no particular language. A more accurate "acquaintance with spiritual beings, and especially with the "nature of God, might develop the mysterious parts of "this doctrine. Till then, we profess our faith in them 66 only as mysteries." * I am not sensible that there is any thing in my volume inconsistent with the modesty of such statements as these. If Mr. Yates chooses still to say, this is "rendering the doctrine "invulnerable by reducing it to a shadow," he is extremely welcome. If it be but a Scripture shadow," seen as in a "mirror, darkly”—it has all the substance which the Divine Author of the Bible has thought fit to give it, and therefore all that, in our present state, we dare wish it to have. Nothing delights Unitarians more than when they prevail with Trinitarians to go beyond the limits of the Bible, and to try their wits in attempts to explain by fanciful comparisons, or to demonstrate by metaphysical argumentation, the doctrine of the Trinity. If Mr. Yates, then, will insist for explanations of what I have admitted to be inexplicable, he may. I shall follow the advice of the king of Israel," Answer him * Venn's Posthumous Sermons, Vol. I. Sermon VIII. "not;" at least till I have acquired, what it is my prayer to be enabled to avoid, a little more of Unitarian presumption. In the passage before quoted from my first Discourse, I have expressly condemned all such speculations, as worse than unprofitable. The following sentences from a subsequent part of the same Discourse, are of a similar complexion: "Were we "to say, that the persons of the Godhead are one and three "in the same sense, we should evidently affirm what is contrary "to reason; because such a proposition would involve in the very terms of it an irreconcilable contradiction. But so long 66 66 as we do not pretend to know or to say, how they are one and "how they are three; to prove that we assert what is contrary to "reason, when we affirm that they are both, is, from the very "nature of the thing, impossible. For what is it which is to ❝ be proved contrary to reason? Upon the supposition made, "we cannot tell: it is something which we do not know; of the "nature and circumstances of which we are left in total ignoThe truth is, we are lost, completely lost, whenever "we begin, in any view of it whatever, to think about the "Divine essence. We can form no more distinct conception " of a Being that never began to exist, or of a Being that is "every where present, and yet is wholly nowhere, than we "can of one essence, in which there are, and have been from "eternity, three distinct subsistences." * ❝rance. Mr. Yates, as a generous and manly disputant, ought, as I have already said, to have carried these qualifying explanations along with him, in interpreting the remainder of my Volume. Instead of this, he has introduced another writer; he has attempted, by such perverse interpretations of my words as have been noticed, to make me chargeable with all the grossness and presumption of that writer; whose modes of expression I am * Discourse I. p. 23. so far from being disposed to adopt and to defend, that I consider them as in the highest degree indiscreet and unwarrantable, as (in the phraseology of the law) "travelling "beyond the record:"-I should have said being wise above what is written, were it not that I should have appeared to fall into the common error, of quoting, as from the Bible, words which it does not contain. CHAPTER II. HAVING found such disingenuousness in the statement of our sentiments themselves, we need not be surprised, if we discover similar want of fairness in the comments on the evidence by which they are supported. To these comments Mr. Yates proceeds in the beginning of the second chapter of his Second Part; and he commences them with the following most surprising sentence: "I. In the first place, he" (Mr. Wardlaw) "objects to the "proof of the unity of God derived from the appearances of "the material creation." This is one of the many parts of Mr. Yates's work at which I felt the difficulty of repressing the risings of indignation. I could scarcely conceive it possible, that Mr. Yates seriously believed what he here affirms.-Did he really think, that, in my remarks on the part of the subject referred to, it was my object to invalidate the doctrine of the Divine Unity, for the sake of establishing that of the Trinity? If he did, then he must also have thought, that I, as well as himself, consider the two doctrines as inconsistent with each other, contrary to my own express and frequently repeated declaration;-for which courtesy let the reader determine the extent of my obligation. 66 But did not Mr. Yates know that one object of my first Discourse was to assert and prove the unity of God; although the general design of the series of Discourses rendered it unnecessary to enlarge on the argument in support of it?-I have said in the Discourse referred to:-" Whatever may be "the views we entertain as to the extent of natural evidence in "support of the unity of the Godhead, there can be no doubt "that this doctrine forms one of the first and fundamental "truths of Divine revelation. It is in many places of the inspired volume distinctly and plainly affirmed; and it appears "pervading the whole, as one of those great leading princi"ples, to which it owes the peculiarity of its general complex❝ion, and to which all the subordinate parts of the system "bear a constant reference:"-" That the unity of God is a "leading doctrine of the Scriptures, and that this doctrine is "pointedly affirmed in the text, as an admonition to the Is"raelites against the Polytheism of the surrounding nations, "I need not, I apprehend, take time to prove:"-" The unity "of the Godhead is proclaimed in the text in terms fitted to "impress the vast importance of the doctrine on the minds of "the Israelites," &c. Now, suppose I had" objected to the proof of the unity of "God derived from the appearances of the material creation," I have at least most decidedly declared my belief both of its reality and importance as an article of revelation. Does Mr. Yates, then, think his friend, his dear friend, capable of the abominable hypocrisy of endeavouring to strengthen the argument for the Trinity at the expense of the evidence for the Unity? and that too, at the very moment that he is affirming his belief of the latter as decidedly as his conviction of the former?-I am free to say, that if I saw the doctrine of the Trinity to be inconsistent with the Divine unity, I should feel the necessity of renouncing the former for the security of the latter. But I fear I must, along with it, renounce those Scriptures, in which I am satisfied it is so clearly taught; and which are established to be a revelation from heaven by so " many "infallible proofs." With regard to the argument for the Divine unity drawn from the appearances of the material creation, my object, in the few cursory remarks allotted to it, was merely to show, in rather an incidental way, that it was not without its difficulties; and especially, that, however conclusive it might be as handled by philosophers, it was, on different accounts, more recondite, and remote from common apprehension, than the proof from nature of the existence and perfections of Deity. Mr. Yates's illustration of the argument, however excellent, might yet be added to the extract I have given from Dr. Paley in my first Note (A.) in confirmation of the justice of this observation. --I stated amongst other things, in just hinting the difficul ties attending this argument, that harmony of design, even when fully established, does not necessarily and at once warrant the inference of only one designer; because "unity of "counsel may subsist among a plurality of counsellors."— Of Dr. Paley, from whom this limitation of the argument was taken, Mr. Yates says: "With respect to Dr. Paley, it "should be recollected, that he was (at least professedly) a "Trinitarian. His system of Christian faith would incline "him to consider uniformity of plan as proving only unity "of design maintained by three designers. He therefore "carries the argument no further than to the proof of unity " of counsel.” (P. 134.)—Having adopted Dr. Paley's view of the argument, I of course feel myself involved in all this. Let us see what its plain meaning is:-it means, |