of man's superiority, nor is its aptness for execution the measure of his attainments. So we rather say with Galen, that man has a hand, because he is the wisest of creatures, than ascribe to his possession of a hand his superiority of knowledge." It may be added that the argument just drawn from a comparison of the development of the brain in different animals, with the amount of intelligence seen in their actions, may be equally drawn from a comparison of that intelligence with the development of the organ of touch. Superior as is the human hand over that of the ape, that superiority is by no means equal to man's intellectual superiority over the most intelligent of the lower animals. As an instrument of communication with the outer world, and as a means of obtaining a true knowledge of form, size, and distance, man is perhaps as much indebted to the hand as to the eye; but without the mental faculty of combining their various sensations, the human hand would have no superiority in result over that

of the ape.

Equally weak is the reasoning which ascribes brute inferiority to the want of the power of speech. True it is that language is the great instrument of man's progress in knowledge, but it is no less true that man's possession of the gift of speech can only be accounted for by the supposition that he is of a superior spiritual nature, language itself being the chief outward sign of such superiority. The lower animals themselves not only use certain sounds by which to express certain emotions, but they are able also to communicate their ideas to each other. In those sounds we have the rudiments of the speech of man, and they are as perfect for the use for which they are designed as are the operations of the mental powers which interpret them. The peculiar structure of the human organs of speech as little explains man's possession of a language, as does his superior brain development the greater development of his intellectual powers. Those organs are no doubt especially fitted in man for articulation, but many animals can produce sounds as articulate as those of man; and some birds can even speak with remarkable clearness and volubility. This shows convincingly that "the main difference lies in the internal faculty or propensity. . . . . The perfect correspondence between the vocal instrument, and the laws governing the motions of the air is a contrivance, but that which prompts to the first efforts at articulation is in our intellectual nature."

In endeavouring to ascertain the true nature of the relationship between man and the lower animals, it will be necessary to treat of that relationship as of a twofold nature-that of the body, and that

of the soul, or whatever that principle may be in which reside the mental and emotional powers-as though the development of the powers of the soul is dependent, in the first place at least, on the body, they in reality exist independent of it. To show the analogy between the physical constitution of man and that of the lower animals, it will be sufficient to confine our attention to the development of the nervous system, as seen in the several organs of sense, that system being the portion of the bodily organism through which the inner principle of being holds intercourse with the outer world.

Considered as a nervous animal, man is seen to be allied to the lowest animated forms beneath him. The human being has five organs of special sense, but when we examine their operation we find that, however different may be the sensations transmitted by each, they may all be reduced to one single sense, that of touch or feeling. Smell and taste are dependent on touch, equally with seeing and hearing. In each case the impression is received by a sensitive surface, which is affected by contact with the operating medium, the difference between the sensations transmitted being caused by the structure of the organs themselves, rather than by any peculiarity in their operation. If we survey the animal kingdom we see the several organs of sense gradually losing their high and special development, until, when we reach the lowest form of animal life, no special organ of sense can be detected, and it is doubted even whether any nervous structure exists. Even, however, in the actions of the protozoa, animals without the slightest trace of any bodily organisation,-we observe the operation of something like sensation, revealing the presence of a general sense of touch. This is the very simplest form of nervous development (if that term may be applied to it), and of course it is not pretended that there is any knowledge on the part of the protozoa of the sensation. It is wholly instinctive, and that because the operation is not of a special organ of sense, but merely that of the general nervous sensitiveness which underlies all the special media of sensation.

It is not until a nervous system can be distinctly traced that we find the development of a special organ of sense. When it shows itself, however, it is seen to be one of those that man also possesses. And it is important to our argument to observe that the sensational organs of the lower animals, when they are developed, are always essentially the same as those of man. He has in their perfection all the organs of sense possessed by any of the creatures below him. Passing through the radiata, the mollusca, and the articulata, we

reach the vertebrata, in which the organs of sense are more perfectly developed than in any other of the lower animals. Among the vertebrata we may accept the ape as the nearest approach to man in bodily structure, and we find that the special nervous developments are the same in both, the only apparent difference being in the superior fineness of the organ of touch in man, he being the only animal that possesses such an organ in the form of a true and distinct hand, used only as an organ of touch. That fact is significant, as showing the special development of the general underlying nervous sensitiveness, and, as such, being the most important of all the special nervous developments.

The organs of sense being thus alike in man and in the lower animals, the sensations which are the result of the operation of those organs, must also have a resemblance. Light affects the eye of the eagle in the same way as it affects that of man, and the same sensation will in each case be impressed on the brain. And not only so, but that sensation will be interpreted in the same way in both cases. The object from which the light which gives rise to that sensation is transmitted will have the same appearance to each. Nor can we doubt its being so, when we watch brute actions, and compare them with those of man under like circumstances.

We have now reached the second point of relation between man and the lower animals, and we are met on the threshold of inquiry by the important question-to the operation of what principle are the actions of the lower animals to be referred? Are they phenomena accompanying a peculiar state or development of a material organisation merely; or must they be ascribed to the operation of a spiritual principle, independent for its being of material organisation? We, perhaps, know too little of the true nature of matter to judge whether in its ultimate essence it may not be capable of thought or will. The intimate union between the body and soul of man points to a very near approach, if not in essence, at least in mode of being, of matter to mind. Until, however, we know more of the nature of the material essence, we are justified in asserting that matter cannot think or will.

The actions of many of the lower animals so closely resemble those of man, in their motives and object, that it is usual, as we have seen, to refer brute inferiority to the restricted development of the mental powers, consequent on some difference in nervous structure, or on the want of the power of speech, without supposing any actual inferiority of mental nature. None can doubt that brute

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action is very often governed by observation, and by reasoning on the result of such observation. If that be so, it proves the exercise of the mental process (call it thought or intuition), from which judgment flows, and of the will which gives effect to the determinations of the reason. Nor can we deny to the lower animals the attributes of bodily sensibility and mental emotion. This sameness between the spiritual powers of man and the lower animals must be remembered. For if the actions and emotions of the latter are merely the result of the activity of the forces of a material organism, so must those of the former be also. Superior as the result of the operation of the mental powers may be in the case of man, if those powers operate alike in both, they must inhere in the same principle, spiritual or material. If, however, brute action is not the mere result of bodily organisation it must depend on the activity of a spiritual principle; and it is asked what is that principle? If we examine man's internal or mental actions we see that they may be classified as those of emotion, thought, and will, none of which we ever think of referring to the body alone. It is the spiritual principle of being we call the soul, the very man himself, which thinks, and which shows the result of its thought in the physical actions that flow from the determination of the will. If it be so, can we deny to the lower animals the possession of the soul? Even if the exercise of thought could be imagined to be the operation of a cunningly devised material mechanism, no mere machine could give the light which sparkles in the eye of the affectionate dog, or prompt the care of the sagacious elephant.

If the lower animals have a certain spiritual principle, which we call the soul, as part of their being, man, as a being of like emotions, thought, and mental action, must have the same spiritual principle, the possession of which is the second point of relation between them. It will perhaps be objected, that man may have a principle of being which acts in the same way as that possessed by the lower animals without its being the same in essence-that indeed the brutes have what has been called the animal soul which dies with the body, but that man has a spirit possessing all the powers of the soul in a superior degree, and in a fuller development, and which is immortal.

It is not for us to say that there cannot be two distinct kinds of spiritual essence which, though different, have yet the same powers and attributes, the only distinction between them being that those powers are more fully developed in the one than in the other. does, however, seem to be improbable. The soul is made up of cer

It

tain powers or attributes which alone give it existence, and the operation of which is alone the sign of spiritual life. Wherever, then, those powers exist, there also is the soul as the principle of being in which they inhere, and any inferiority of soul action in any particular case must depend, not on actual inferiority of spiritual nature, but either on some inferiority of bodily structure which hinders the development of the soul's powers, or on the absence altogether of some aid to that development. That man's intellectual superiority depends on superiority of bodily structure merely we think few people will now affirm. The structural difference between man and the ape is, indeed, comparatively slight; yet we see in the one case that intelligence is limited in its exercise to the satisfaction of certain wants, and soon reaches a point beyond which it can be developed no further; whilst, on the other, mental exercise is not bounded by any bodily, or even spiritual, want, the capacity for knowledge increasing with every addition made to it.

The true explanation of the inferiority of the lower animals is, that their mental powers, though not imperfect, either in their constitution, development, or operation, and though containing in themselves the germ of all truth, are yet limited in their very nature, and incapable, without the assistance of a higher principle, of reaching beyond a certain range of knowledge. The soul is essentially instinctive; but, superadded to instinct, it possesses the power of storing up its sensational experiences, of recalling them by memory, and of reasoning from them and forming judgments as to their relations. It is observable, however, that although brute reason enables its subjects to reason from past experience as to the proper conduct under particular circumstances, it never enables them to get further. The lower animals have no power of abstraction or generalization, in the proper signification of those words. They do, indeed, sometimes act as though they exercise such a power, but they do not in reality; the appearance of it arising from the intimate connection which always continues in the brute mind between instinct and reason. However perfect may be their reasoning about particulars, it never leads them to the knowledge of general truths, nor even to the remembrance of particular ones, except so far only as they may be influential over present action.

Referring now to the mental actions of man, it may be stated as an infallible formula that, if we add to the results of the mental actions of the lower animals the operation of the principle of reflection, we shall have, as the result, the perfected knowledge of man. If that be