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tain powers or attributes which alone give it existence, and the operation of which is alone the sign of spiritual life. Wherever, then, those powers exist, there also is the soul as the principle of being in which they inhere, and any inferiority of soul action in any particular case must depend, not on actual inferiority of spiritual nature, but either on some inferiority of bodily structure which hinders the development of the soul's powers, or on the absence altogether of some aid to that development. That man's intellectual superiority depends on superiority of bodily structure merely we think few people will now affirm. The structural difference between man and the ape is, indeed, comparatively slight; yet we see in the one case that intelligence is limited in its exercise to the satisfaction of certain wants, and soon reaches a point beyond which it can be developed no further; whilst, on the other, mental exercise is not bounded by any bodily, or even spiritual, want, the capacity for knowledge increasing with every addition made to it.
The true explanation of the inferiority of the lower animals is, that their mental powers, though not imperfect, either in their constitution, development, or operation, and though containing in themselves the germ of all truth, are yet limited in their very nature, and incapable, without the assistance of a higher principle, of reaching beyond a certain range of knowledge. The soul is essentially instinctive; but, superadded to instinct, it possesses the power of storing up its sensational experiences, of recalling them by memory, and of reasoning from them and forming judgments as to their relations. It is observable, however, that although brute reason enables its subjects to reason from past experience as to the proper conduct under particular circumstances, it never enables them to get further. The lower animals have no power of abstraction or generalization, in the proper signification of those words. They do, indeed, sometimes act as though they exercise such a power, but they do not in reality; the appearance of it arising from the intimate connection which always continues in the brute mind between instinct and reason. However perfect may be their reasoning about particulars, it never leads them to the knowledge of general truths, nor even to the remembrance of particular ones, except so far only as they may be influential over present action.
Referring now to the mental actions of man, it may be stated as an infallible formula that, if we add to the results of the mental actions of the lower animals the operation of the principle of reflection, we shall have, as the result, the perfected knowledge of man. If that be so, the true explanation of the difference between human and brute mental development is to be found, not in any difference in capability of development, but in the fact of the operation of the mental powers being enlarged in man by the addition of a spiritual principle which the lower animals have not. The origin of all mental action is to be traced to certain intuitions which reside in, and may be said to be the life of, the soul. It is their working which is seen in instinct, and to dependence on them the operation of the simple reason of the lower animals owes all its perfection. Those intuitions are all-powerful in brute action; indeed, so much so, that, while they are the great living principles of action, the animal may be said to be merely the instrument by which they work. In man those intuitions are equally influential, and he is, up to a certain period of his life, equally their instrument. As man gains experience, however, he loses his dependence on the intuitions of instinct for the guidance of his conduct, and with the exercise of reflection he gradually arrives at the knowledge of certain principles of truth, on which are founded all the superstructures of his philosophy. But those principles of truth are in reality nothing but the very intuitions which had in infancy guided his hand, now made his own, and become the instruments by which he works for the extension of his knowledge.
We see, then, in man two spiritual principles; one in which the principles or intuitions of truth reside, and the other that which searches out those principles and makes them its own. The first, that which the lower animals possess equally with man, and which is the seat of the will, is the soul. The second, that which man alone possesses, is the spirit—the seat of that reflection, or higher reason, to the operation of which on the sensations conveyed through the several sensuous organs man's physical science is owing. There are two objections to this theory of a dual spiritual nature, which I must shortly consider. The first, the philological one, is plausible, but, in reality, of no force. It is that the two words, “soul” and “spirit" (the only two names which can be used to denote the two spiritual principles I have named) are both of the same meaning, literally denoting “air” or “ breath”. It has been said that “ soul is coincident with halitus, breath, derived from halare, to breathe, a root familiar in the words exhale, inhale, and itself only an enlarged form of the earlier word aëő or áő, a beautiful onomatopæia, expressive in its long, open, vowels of the very act which it designates"; and that “spirit takes us to the very origin of words, resting on the beautiful lisp or whisper with which the breezes quiver the leaves.” That may be quite true ; but it is a remarkable fact that in most languages, and probably in all the older ones, there are two such words, having the same ultimate meaning, and yet used as though intended to express different ideas.
As little conclusive is the objection that we cannot imagine more than one kind of spiritual essence, and that, therefore, the idea of a dual spiritual nature in man cannot be true. Such belief is the result, not of reasoning, but of mere prejudice, which, if contrary to fact, must be got rid of as quickly as possible. We know nothing of spirit in its essence, nor what may be the modes of its development. If, therefore, we find certain facts, which cannot be explained without the supposition of there being more than one of such modes, or even spiritual cssences, we are bound to receive that supposition as a fact, throwing on one side all our prejudices, whether they are connected with religious belief, or arise from defective scientific education.
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL
SOCIETY OF PARIS. *
The two last livraisons of the Bulletins of the Anthropological Society of Paris are now before us, and are fully equal in scientific interest to any of the previous publications which have emanated from the same source. The lucid and comprehensive exposition of the past labours of the Paris Society, with which M. Broca favoured us, and which was published in the last number of the Anthropological Review, has placed our readers entirely au courant with the past labours of the French Society; and it will be the future task of the editors of the Anthropological Review to give periodical abstracts of the summarized conclusions which are arrived at in the Quarterly Bulletins of the Paris Society.
Enjoying the high privileges of the presidency in 1863 of M. de Quatrefages, with M. Gratiolet as vice-president, M. Broca as general secretary, and MM. Trélat and Dally as annual secretaries, the Society is as efficiently represented as it was during the years when the
* Bulletins de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris. Vol. iv. First and Second Fasciculas-January to May, 1863.
ne management, a question of me
presidential chair was filled by MM. Martin Magron, Isidore Geoffroy St. Hilaire, Béclard, and Boudin ; and the fact that more than two hundred members are at present enrolled in its books, renders the future prosperity of the Society, so long as it shall continue to be superintended under efficient management, a question of certain success. The interest which the French nation has long taken in sound anthropology, would augur well for the success of the science in that country; and we regret that England has been so tardy in the establishment of an Anthropological Society.
The remarkable work by the Abbé Brasseur de Bourbourg, on the Quiché Language of Central America, forms the subject of an able report by M. Pruner Bey. The analysis which he makes of this work is of the most lucid character; and those who have had the patience, or the sorrow, to wade through the tedious and turgid platitudes with which the abbé has filled his work, will feel a pleasure in reading the nine terse pages in which M. Pruner Bey has compressed the few known facts respecting the Quichés. M. Pruner Bey concluded his abstract of the abbé's generalizations by stating that he had examined in the galleries of the Museum twelve skulls of Quiché Indians of Vera Cruz, and that he discovered in them characters slightly different from those ordinarily assigned to the American cranium; thus, while the Mexican skull is brachycephalic, the skulls of the Guatemalan aborigines exhibited a type intermediate between dolicho- and brachycephaly. In a philological sense, while the languages of Mexico and of the North American nations are polysynthetic, the Quiché, Maya, and the language of Yucatan are analytic; in the Quiché an idea can only be expressed by a periphrasis, which in the Aztec is conveyed in one word. The Quiché drama which M. Brasseur publishes, was gathered from the tradition of the natives, and written in European characters shortly after the period of the Conquistadores.
M. Pruner Bey also contributes a valuable report on the climate of Egypt, on which Dr. Schnepf has recently published a work. Both these learned authorities agree that the influence of cold and wet on foreigners in hot climates is much more visible than in our latitudes. Dr. Schnepf describes, on the banks of Lake Menzaleh, the existence of a variety of men entirely distinct from the Arabs; and he controverts the opinion of M. Mariette, who considers them descendants of the Hyksos. Dr. Schnepf states that the Hyksos were strangers in Egypt; and the most minute researches do not enable us to find in this country a single foreign family who have prospered and have propagated for many generations. He concludes that the Hyksos, whether they were Shemites or not, do not appear to have escaped this law, any more than the modern Greeks and Turks. As regards the Jews, Dr. Schnepf denies the cosmopolitism; and alleging that, amongst the Egyptian Jews of the present day, not one can trace back their descent to the fifth generation, he condemns the Jews to the same destiny as the other immigrants into Egypt—that of extinction. M. Pruner Bey denies these propositions; and to his able report on the subject we must refer for the arguments which he brings forward.
Chile, although its zoological and botanical forms of life have been long studied with success, has many points of interest yet unascertained in its anthropology. A commission, consisting of MM. Béclard and Rameau, with M. Pruner Bey as reporter, has drawn up a series of interrogatories. Taking the Chileno population in 1854 as 1,340,000 souls, of which 20,000 are foreigners, the population being comprised under Europeans born in the country, and Mestizos. There are some mulattos, but no negroes; whilst only 10,000 pure Indians still survive. The committee put a series of the most searching questions respecting the physical characters of the Araucaños, and contrast the frequently divergent statements of D’Orbigny, Dumoutier and Blanchard, Domeyko, Molina, Smith, and Parish. No author states whether the Araucaños are prognathous or orthognathous; and the committee state that no artificial deformation of the skull appears to have existed amongst the Chilenos. As regards the religious ideas of the Araucaños, no general proposition appears to be laid down; while it is admitted that they believe in a future life, that their Paradise is placed in the west, and that they believe in a good and an evil principle. As regards the Mestizos, their females appear less fertile than the Spaniards, and their greatest vice is drunkenness. All the classes of society include Mestizos, and the race has produced generals and other dignitaries. The committee do not correlate this fact with the form of government adopted in Chile. The reading of this series of instructions produced an animated debate on the questions relative to the colour of the skin, which were alluded to in the report. MM. Pruner Bey, Quatrefages, Dally, Trélat, Sanson, Bertillon, D’Omalius D'Halloy, and others joined in the discussion, which ultimately centered in the question of the “ fundamental antithesis” of anthropology
-monogeny or polygeny. We shall intentionally pass over the discussion in the present stage of the question, while we express our admiration for the manner in which the contending parties marshalled their arguments.
M. Pruner Bey contributes an entirely original and highly valuable