Could the French monarch have remained satisfied with the neutrality of the pontiff, the motives which had led to its adoption were sufficient to have induced Leo to persevere in it; but as the contest approached, Francis became more desirous of engaging the pope to take a decided part in his favour. Such, however, was the aversion which Leo entertained to the establishment of the French in Italy, that even the solicitations of his brother to favour their cause were of no avail, As far as expressions of respect and paternal admonitions could appease the king, Leo spared nothing that might be likely to conciliate his favour; but the more Francis pressed him to a decision, the more apparent became his inclination to the cause of the allies. In order, however, to ascertain his intentions, Francis despatched, as his ambassador to Rome, the celebrated Budæus, who is deservedly considered by Guicciardini, as "perhaps one of the most learned men of the age, both in Greek and Roman literature."* He was shortly afterwards succeeded by Anton-Maria Pallavicini, a Milanese nobleman, who was supposed to possess great influence with the pope ;† but the endeavours of the king to obtain a positive sanction to his enterprise were still ineffectual. Sometimes Leo appeared to have serious intentions of entering into a treaty, and required, as a preliminary, that the states of Parma and Piacenza should be guaranteed to the church, the refusal of which he conceived would afford him a sufficient apology for joining the cause of the allies. At other times he is said to have made propositions, couched in such ambiguous terms, as, when assented to, always required further explanations, and which left the negotiations in the same state of suspense as

จ

they treaty begun. The French and Italian writers are aut such dire idering the conduct of the pontiff on this occasion asiived it of artifice and disingenuousness; but they appear not suciently to have attended to the difficulties of his situation, or at least not to have made sufficient allowance for them, As head of the church, and both by his disposition and office, the acknowledged arbiter and mediator of Europe, he ought not perhaps to have been solicited to take a decided part in the threatened hostilities; and as a prince whose temporal

Guicciard. lib. xii. † Ligue de Camb liv. iv. Murat. Ann. vol. x. p. 107

authority was supported rather by public opinion, and the favour of surrounding states, than by his own forces, it was evident that he could not, without endangering his own safety, accede to the propositions of the king. If therefore the reiterated efforts of the French monarch to engage the pope in his interests, were not followed by the consequences which he wished, they were followed by such as he might reasonably have expected, and instead of inducing the pope to unite the power of the Roman and Florentine states with the arms of France, compelled him, in conformity with his former maxims, to embrace the cause of the allies. In the month of June he issued a monitory, subjecting, in general terms, all those who should again disturb the states of the church, and in particular Parma and Piacenza, to the penalties of excommunication ;* and in July, he openly acceded to the general league expressly formed for the defence of Milan. Nor, if a decision could no longer be delayed, can it be denied, that in making this election, he chose the part that did the most credit to his character, or that an opposite conduct would have rendered him deservedly liable to the suspicion of having sacrificed his principles and his country to the favour of the French monarch, and the aggrandisement of his own family.

Gly mea

The first decisive indications of approaching hostilities appeared in Genoa, where Ottaviano Fregoso, who held the chief authority in that city, which he had obtained by the favour and preserved by the assistance of the pope,† unexpectedly relinquished his title of doge, and assumed that of governor for the king of France. That so bold a measure could not be adopted without the participation and encouragement of king, was apparent; but the event proved that the Magnificen of Fregoso to avail himself of the honours and em, were to be the rewards of his defection, had prema the en led him to this treacherous attempt. The Adorni and the eschi, the ancient enemies of the Fregosi, were vigilant in grasping at any opportunity that might effect his ruin. Uniting their arms with those of Prospero Colonna, who commanded the forces of the duke of Milan, and being joined by six thousand Swiss, who had already arrived in Italy, they proceeded to

Lünig, vol. ii. p. 802.

b

Ap. Fabr. in Vita Leon. X. p. 88.

wards Genoa. Fregoso had assembled for his defence about five thousand men ; but conceiving that they would be unable to support so powerful an attack, and despairing of obtaining timely aid from France, he was reduced to the humiliating necessity of having recourse to the pope, to protect him from the chastisement which his treachery had so justly merited. Whether Leo believed Fregoso to be sincere in his contrition, or whether, as is much more probable, he was unwilling to exasperate the French monarch, certain it is, that on this occasion he exerted his authority with Colonna to prevent the intended attack, and a negotiation was entered into, by which Fregoso was allowed to retain his authority as doge, on his engaging not to favour the cause of the French, and paying to the Swiss a considerable sum of money as an indemnification for their expenses.

*

In order to exculpate himself from the disgrace which he had incurred by this transaction, Fregoso is said to have addressed a letter to Leo X., in which, after having particularised all the motives of his conduct, and alleged all the excuses in his power, he finally endeavours to vindicate the steps which he had taken by the example of the pontiff himself; assuring him, "that he well knew it would be difficult to apologise for his conduct, if he were addressing himself to a private individual, or to a prince who considered matters of state by those rules of morality which are applicable to private life. But that in addressing himself to a sovereign, who was obi inferi lents to no one of the age, and whose penetration -y, and Th the country scovered that the measures which he had adopted they diviappeared necessary for the preservation of his further excuse must appear superfluous; it tood that it was allowable, or at least customar overeign to resort to expedients of an extraordinary mature, not only for the preservation, but even for the extension and increase of his dominions." On this production, in which Fregoso is supposed to have satirically alluded to the conduct of the pope, in his negotiations with the king of France, and which has been considered as the manifesto of that monarch against Leo X.† it may be remarked, that if it was written to • Guicciard. lib. xii. vol. ii. p. 87. Murat. An. vol. x. p. 111. Ligue de Camb. liv. iv. vol. ii p. 413. Guicciard. lib. xii. vol. ii. p. 87.

au

such directio beinived

prevail upon Leo to interpose his authority for the protection of Fregoso, it was ill calculated to effect its purpose; if it was addressed to the pontiff afterwards, it was an ungrateful return for a magnanimous and unmerited favour; and that at whatever time it was produced (if indeed such a document ever existed) its application was equally insolent and absurd; the connexion between Leo X. and Francis I. bearing no similarity to that which subsisted between Fregoso and the pontiff, who had invested him with that very authority which he had endeavoured to pervert to purposes the most opposite to those for which it had been intrusted to him.

In pre

As soon as the intentions of the pope were known, Francis I. thought proper to dispense with the pretexts under which he had made such formidable preparations, and to avow his purpose of attempting to recover the states of Milan. If we compare the measures adopted by Francis on this occasion with those of Charles VIII. about twenty years before, we shall be led to conclude, that of all the objects which at that time engaged the attention of mankind, the destructive science of war had made the most rapid progress. In fact, the commencement of the modern system of warfare is to be referred to this period, when the disorderly bodies of mercenary troops, dependent on their own particular leader, and armed in various modes, gave way to regular levics, duly disciplined, and to those immense trains of artillery which have ever since been found the most effectual implements of destructior paring to carry his arms beyond the Alps, it w necessary that Francis should first provide for! home. The province of Gascony was threatene of Aragon, and that of Burgundy by the Hely, the defence of the former he despatched the prend the ex with five hundred lances, and about five the beifantry, whilst la Tremouille hastened to Provence, with a considerable body of troops, to prevent the incursions of the Swiss. The army destined for the expedition to Milan is said to have consisted of four thousand lances, being double the number retained in the service of Louis XII., and which may be computed, with their usual attendants, at twenty thousand cavalry; but the accuracy of this statement has been questioned, and it is probable the number employed in this service did not greatly

em

Over

buld not

ement of

thee

vever,

at

cly mead MagnificFor

itrec,

exceed half that amount. * To these were added several large bodies of infantry, as well Germans as French, amounting in the whole to upwards of thirty thousand men, and a much more formidable train of artillery than had ever before been collected. On arriving in the Lionese, where they were directed to assemble, they were also joined by Pietro Navarro, at the head of ten thousand Biscayans, or Basque infantry, whom he had raised, rather by the credit of his military reputation, than by the influence of his rank or his pecuniary resources. This celebrated officer, who had long held a conspicuous command in the Spanish army, after having been made a prisoner at the battle of Ravenna, had remained in confinement; his captor having demanded as his ransom twenty thousand gold crowns, which his avaricious sovereign had refused to pay. On the accession of Francis to the throne, he found Navarro languishing in prison, and being pleased with the opportunity of attaching such a man to his interests, he paid his ransom, and gave him the command of a troop of Biscayans, his countrymen. Navarro, although of mean extraction, had a sense of honour and fidelity, the criterion of an elevated mind. Before he would accept the bounty of the king, he again addressed himself to his former sovereign, once more entreating to be liberated, and replaced in his former employ. On the reiterated refusal of Ferdinand, Navarro transmitted to him a resignation of all the grants which had been of de to him as a reward for his services, and took an oathe labourgiance to the French monarch, to whom his talertly obliged rience were of singular service, and to whom haery, and to les retained an unshaken fidelity.

the country arallied powers remiss in preparing for the def they divide The movement of troops throughout the wholesuch direction untry far exceeded any recent example, After rived in the d Fregoso, doge of Genoa, to obedience, Prosper Prosport the head of the Milanese forces, hastened into Piedmont to oppose the entrance of the French The viceroy Cardona, with upwards of twelve thousand Spaniards, directed his march towards Vicenza, then occupied by the Venetian general d'Alviano; who, not being prepared to contend with so great a force, retired in haste to the Brentel;

* Murat. Ann. vol. x. p. 111. But Guicciardini atates the forces at 60,000.