ment of the glory of God, there must be an intentional consecration of ourselves to this object. It is to the voluntary co-operation and service of moral agents, directed to this end, that God attaches any value; because that alone renders themselves and their services virtuous. That in all their doings there should be a designed subserviency to God and to his glory, is clear, both from the nature of the case, and from the language of Scripture. "Whether ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God. -Whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him.-Glorify God in your bodies and spirits, which are his."

We may receive credit from a fellow-creature, when our conduct accords with his inclinations, though we never seriously designed to please him; but we cannot so impose on a Being who claims the heart as his right, and whose omniscience discerns how far this claim is complied with. The actions which cannot please an earthly friend, as proofs of affection, when he knows that they were neither begun nor ended with any design of pleasing him, cannot be acceptable, when performed in a similar manner to God.

Is

Are not those actions truly virtuous, it will be asked, which proceed from the moral feelings of our nature, even though they should not be performed with an immediate view to the authority and glory of God? not the action of the dutiful child, who instinctively exerts its strength in relieving the necessities of an aged parent, though in performing this duty it should never think of the will of the Deity, pleasing in the

sight of Him who has commanded children to honour their father and mother? Is not the conduct of the man, who yields to the gentle emotions of humanity, by hastening to the house of mourning, to console and animate the sufferers, in conformity to the will of God and agreeable to him, though the authority of God should not have been in all his thoughts? Does the most virtuous being on earth think of the Almighty, of his will as his rule, and of his glory as his ultimate end, every time he performs a beneficent action? Is this compatible with the weakness of humanity? Could it have been uniformly practised by prophets and apostles?—In reply to this, I remark,—

That there are certain affections in our nature which are common to us with the inferior animals. To these I have already alluded, and do not intend to recur to them. The exercise of some of them is doubtless most beautiful, whether in the human species, or in the brute creation. They have a softening influence upon man; and though they are not entitled to the sacred name of virtue, when the actions to which they lead are performed apart from intelligence and design, they may be considered as important auxiliaries to it. It is not possible to witness the fondness with which the young of all animals are regarded by those who have been instrumental in giving them being, without interest. The mother, when she hangs sleepless, night after night, over the cradle of her sick infant, even though she does not think for a single moment, that it is for the good of mankind, and agreeable to the will of heaven, that she should act thus, does what is in itself most lovely and pleasing, just

because she is exhibiting, in her patience and tenderness, the strength of an affection which the great Parent of all has rendered natural. Why should it be thought strange that a woman could forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb, if there be not instinctive feelings in human nature which lead to an opposite conduct ? "When we enter some wretched hovel, and see that wretchedness, which is so much more dreadful to the eye of him who beholds it, than to the ear of him who is told in his splendid apartment, that there is misery upon the earth;-when we look through the darkness to which there is no sunshine, on some corner, darker still, where the father of those who have strength only to hang over him and weep, is giving to them his last blessing, which is all that remains to him to give," do we not, from instinctive compassion, as if led by the hand of Him that made us, hasten to afford whatever relief is in our power? The exercise of this compassion is pleasing as it is beneficial; but if it be not under the direction of intelligence and design, on what ground is it better entitled to the name of virtue than the exercise of similar affections in the lower animals? But the question is," say they who oppose the doctrine which I am attempting to establish," not whether it be virtue to conform our will to that of the Deity, when that will is revealed to us, or clearly implied, for of this there can be no doubt. It is, whether there be not in our nature, a principle of moral approbation, from which our feelings of obliga. tion, virtue, and merit flow; and which operates, not independently of the divine will, indeed, for it was the

divine will that implanted in us this very principle, but without the necessary consideration, at the time, of the expression of the divine will; and, conse quently, without any intentional conformity to it or disobedience. The mother, though she should, at the moment, forget altogether that there is a God in nature, would still turn with moral horror from the thought of murdering the little prattler who is sporting at her knee; and who is not more beautiful to her eye by external charms and graces, than beautiful to her heart by the thousand tendernesses which every day and almost every hour is developing; while the child, who, perhaps, has scarcely heard that there is a God, or who, at least, is ignorant of any will of God, in conformity with which virtue consists, is still, in his very ignorance, developing those moral feelings which are supposed to be inconsistent with such ignorance. Of all the mothers, who at this moment, on the earth, are exercised, and virtuously exercised, in maternal duties around the cradles of their infants, there is, perhaps, not one who is thinking, that God has com manded her to love her offspring, and to perform for them the many offices of love that are necessary for preserving the lives which are so dear to her. The expression of the Divine Will, indeed, not only gives us new and nobler duties to perform, it gives a new and nobler delight also to the very duties which our nature prompts ;-but still there are duties which our nature prompts; and the violation of which is felt as moral wrong, even when God is known and worshipped, only as a demon of power, still less benevolent than the very barbarians who howl around his altar in

their savage sacrifice. But for the principle of moral approbation which the Divine Being has fixed in our nature, the expression of his will would itself have no moral power, whatsoever physical pain or pleasure it might hold out to our prudent choice."

To this I answer, that the exercise of these maternal affections, to which there is here an allusion, is always pleasing, because they are pleasurable in the very exercise, and because the want of them is unnatural and monstrous; but if virtue be the product of the understanding and will, and confer praise or blame, merit or demerit, on the agent, I see not on what ground the mere instinctive exercise of those affections which are common to us with the lower animals, should be dignified with that sacred appellation. There is virtue in the exercise of our feelings and faculties only when they are intentionally made subservient to the great and ultimate end of our being.

There are, indeed, moral feelings and principles in human nature, otherwise man would not be a moral agent, and, consequently, would be incapable of obey. ing the will of God. From his original endowments, he would exhibit the great outlines of character belonging to a moral and accountable being, though he were totally ignorant of God, and of the relations which he bears to him; but his yielding to the moral or other instincts of his nature, as he yields to any animal impulse, without design and without end, whatever amiability it gives to his outward deportment, does not, as it appears to me, confer upon him true moral worth. That is only to be acquired by

* Brown's Lectures, vol. iv. p. 108.