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satisfaction in those events that may lower their reputation, or circumscribe their usefulness, we act in opposition to the principles of truth and benevolence. There is no individual with whose situation are not connected some duties and advantages; and when, in any case, we injuriously attempt to lessen his reputation, we are guilty of an act of baseness and injustice, of a nature far more aggravated than if we had purloined his property.

Who would not feel alarmed at the thought of incurring the criminality of narrowing the usefulness, and of diminishing the happiness, of a single individual, however slender his talents, or obscure his condition? Are not our own failures in duty sufficiently numerous without implicating ourselves in the responsibilities of others? Shall we degrade our common nature by peevishly detracting from the gifts and graces with which God has adorned and distinguished any of his creatures? Do we not consult our own happiness by cherishing that charity which suffereth long and is kind, which envieth not; which vaunteth not itself, which is not puffed up,-which thinketh no evil, which rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth?

If it be our duty to exercise candour, in forming an opinion of the character and abilities of others, it is surely meet that we should put the most favourable construction on their intentions, and allude with charitable feeling to their motives. These are so far removed from our observation, that we can only ascer tain their nature from their effects; and even here we are so liable to mistake, that we are bound to speak of them under the impression that the heart is known

to God alone. We ought to do so, because it is probable, from many considerations, that the intentions, even in cases apparently doubtful, may be good, or, at least, not so bad as we might imagine. When we make a due allowance for a false conception of facts; for prejudices formed through the influence of prevail. ing fashions; for habits insensibly contracted in early years, and which it is so difficult wholly to relinquish at a subsequent period of life; we shall find that the motives of others are not so blameworthy, at least, generally, as we are apt to suppose.

Admitting, however, that they are bad, and that they proceed from malice, it belongs to Him whose prerogative it is to judge the heart, to declare that they are so. We move out of our sphere, when we presume to meddle with the peculiar province of the Almighty: nor can we be guilty of injustice in this way to others, without diminishing the sum of our own enjoyment. There is not a more unequivocal mark of our being under the influence of improper feelings ourselves, than a disposition to attribute bad designs to others; and there certainly can be no state of mind less amiable in itself, or more unfavourable to tranquillity and happiness. It becomes us to guard against its indulgence, not only as it leads us to violate a duty which we owe to our neighbour, but as it debases our own feelings, and injures our own peace.

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Why dost thou judge thy brother? Or why dost thou set at nought thy brother? We shall all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ. So, then, every one of us shall give an account of himself to God. Let us not therefore judge one another any more; but

judge this rather, that no man put a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall, in his brother's way."

We are chargeable with slander when we fabricate tales of falsehood to lessen, and, if possible, to destroy, the reputation of others, or when we take pleasure in rehearsing such tales, though we are not their authors. Those who put such tales into circulation may be much more blamable than the inventors, inasmuch as they lend them the weight of their character and influence. They are not the forgers; but they are the persons who give the forgeries currency, and without whose instrumentality they would remain innoxious. Their motive is often malicious; proceeding from a disposition to interfere in the concerns of others; or, from the wish to lower them beneath their accustomed level, that they themselves may rise in the same proportion. What conduct can be more base, more expressive of depravity of heart, or more ruinous to the peace of society? They are accordingly ranked in Scripture with the most criminal of mankind. "Thou shalt not go up and down as a tale-bearer among thy people; neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbour*." "Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or as a thief, or as an evil doer, or as a busybody in other men's matters †."

Nor is the criminality of the slanderer diminished by the circumstance, that the tale put into circulation is true. His guilt may be just as great as if it were false; his motive is not less base; and his conduct in its consequences may be more mischievous. Who

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has given me a title to publish to the world that failing of my neighbour which I alone have discovered? The disclosure of it may impair his usefulness and happiness for life; while its concealment could have injured no one; and his activity and talents, exerted under the purifying influence of repentance, might be employed with greater benefit to mankind. I become the instrument of ruin to him and to his family, of sorrow to his friends and connexions; and I accomplish this without necessity, without subserving any end of justice or of benevolence, without profit to myself, and without any pleasure but that of a deeply depraved heart.

We become accessory to the crime of the slanderer when we patiently listen to him. Did we habitually repel with indignation the first whisper unfavourable to the reputation of our neighbour, we should at once deserve and obtain the gratitude of the person whose character we vindicated, and arrest the progress of the slanderer. But mankind too generally seem to feel a secret satisfaction in listening to the recital of what is censurable in their fellow-creatures; as if their self-approbation rose in proportion as others' were made to fall; or, as if that censorious spirit which is so natural to them was regaled by an account of the real or imputed failings of the species. Thus encouragement is given to the destroyers of character and reputation, and to the producers of suspicion and discord among mankind.

The object of the slanderer is the destruction, not of property, nor of life, but what is far dearer and more valuable than either;-character and reputation.

VOL. II.

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Our reputation is high or low, according to the place which we hold in human estimation. It altogether rests on the good opinion and affections of others. It is justly more precious to every man than silver and gold, and as a source of enjoyment, second only to the approbation of conscience. To be beloved by others, and to feel that we are not unworthy of being thus beloved, are chief elements in the happiness of man. But it is the object of the slanderer, and the direct tendency of his conduct, to deprive us of this happiness.

Our character also, for trustworthiness, depends upon the good opinion of others. Without this character, the great majority of persons could not procure a subsistence. It is necessary in all the offices of human life, and in all the departments of the business of this world. It must therefore be dear to every man whose means of living and of supporting himself and his family, almost entirely rest on his reputation for honesty and integrity. Deprive him of this reputation, that is, succeed in making the world believe that he is void of principle, and unworthy of confidence, and you take bread, comfort, and respectability from himself and his dependents. But is it not the object of the slanderer-at least, is it not the tendency, and may it not be the effect of his most criminal practice, to accomplish this?

Further; our chief instrument for usefulness in the world, is the hold which we have upon the good opinions and affections of our fellow-creatures. It is just in proportion to the estimation in which they hold us, that we have power to influence others, and

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