Answ. 1. The reason why Christ speaketh only of the man's case is, because he was occasioned only to restrain the vicious custom of men's causeless putting away their wives; having no occasion to restrain women from leaving their husbands. Men having the rule did abuse it to the woman's injury, which Christ forbiddeth. And as it is an act of power, it concerneth the man alone; but as it is an act of liberty, it seemeth to me to be supposed, that the woman hath the same freedom; seeing the covenant is violated to her wrong. And the apostle in 1 Cor. vii. doth make the case of the man and of the woman to be equal in the point of infidelity and desertion. I confess that it is unsafe, extending the sense of Scripture beyond the importance of the words upon pretence of a parity of reason (as many of the perjured do by Lev. xxx. in case of vows); lest man's deceitful wit should make a law to itself as divine, upon pretence of interpreting God's laws; but yet when the plain text doth speak but of one case (that is, of men's putting away their wives,) he that will thence gather an exclusion of the woman's liberty, doth seem by addition to be the corrupter of the law. And where the context plainly sheweth a parity of reason, and that reason is made the ground of the determination in the text, there it is safe to expound the law extensively accordingly. Surely the covenant of marriage hath its conditions on both parts; and some of those conditions are necessary to the very being of the obligations, though others are but needful to the wellbeing of the parties in that state. And therefore, though putting away be only the part of the husband, as being the ruler, and usually the owner of the habitation, yet departing may be the liberty of the wife. And I know no reason to blame those countries, whose laws allow the wife to sue out a divorce, as well as the husband.

Quest. x. May the husband put away the wife without the magistrate, or the wife depart from the husband without a public legal divorce or licence?'

Answ. Where the laws of the land do take care for the prevention of injuries, and make any determination in the case (not contrary to the law of God,) there it is a Christian's duty to obey those laws: therefore if you live under a law which forbiddeth any putting away or departing, with

out public sentence or allowance, you may not do it privately upon your own will. For the civil governors are to provide against the private injuries of any of the subjects. And if persons might put away or depart at pleasure, it would introduce both injury and much weakness into the world. But where the laws of men do leave persons to their liberty in this case, they need then to look no further than to the laws of God alone. But usually the sentence of the civil power, is necessary only in case of appeal, or complaint of the party injured: and a separation may be made without such a public divorce, so that each party may make use of the magistrate to right themselves if wronged. As if the adultery be not openly known, and the injuring party desire rather to be put away privily than publicly, (as Joseph purposed to do by Mary) I see not but it is lawful so to do, in case that the law, or the necessity of making the offender an example, require not the contrary, nor scandal or other accidents forbid it not. See Grotius's learned Notes on Matt. v. 31, 32. and on Matt. xix. and 1 Cor. vii. about these questions.

Quest. XI. 'What if both parties commit adultery? may either of them put away the other, or depart; or rather (must they forgive each other?'

Answ. If they do it both at once, they do both forfeit the liberty of seeking any compensation for the injury; because the injury is equal (however some would give the advan-tage to the man): but if one commit adultery first, and the other after; then either the last offender knew of the first, or not. If not, then it seemeth all one as if it had been done at once. But if yea, then they did it either on a supposition of the dissolution of the matrimonial obligation, as being loosed from the first adulterer, or else upon a purpose of continuing in the first relation: in the latter case, it is still all one as if it had been done by them at once, and it is a forfeiture of any satisfaction: but in the former case, though the last adulterer did sin, yet being before set at liberty, it doth not renew the matrimonial obligation: but yet, if the first offender desire the continuance of it, and the -return of the first-injured party; shame and conscience of their own sin, will much rebuke them, if they plead that in-jury for continuance of the separation.

Quest. X11. But what if one do purposely commit adultery, to be separated from the other?'

Answ. It is in the other's power and choice, whether to be divorced and depart, or not, as they find the good or evil -consequents preponderate.

Quest. XIII. Doth not infidelity dissolve the relation or obligation; seeing there is no communion between light and darkness, a believer and an infidel ?'

Answ. It maketh it unlawful for a believer to marry an infidel (except in case of true necessity); because they can have no communion in religion. But it nullifieth not a marriage already made, nor maketh it lawful to depart or divorce: because they may have mere conjugal communion still. As the apostle purposely determineth the case, in 1 Cor. vii.

Quest. XIV. 'Doth not the desertion of one party, disoblige the other?'.

Answ. 1. It must be considered what is true desertion. 2. Whether it be a desertion of the relation itself for continuance, or only a temporary desertion of co-habitation, or congress. 3. What the temper and state of the deserted party is. It is sometimes easy, and sometimes hard to discern which is the deserting party. If the wife go away from the husband unwarrantably, though she require him to follow her, and say that she doth not desert him, yet it may be taken for a desertion, because it is the man who is to rule and choose the habitation. But if the man go away, and the woman refuse to follow him, it is not he that is therefore the deserter.

Quest. But what if the man have not sufficient cause to go away, and the woman hath great and urgent reasons not to go? As suppose that the man will go away in hatred of an able preacher, and good company, and the woman if she follow him, must leave all those helps, and go among ignorant, profane, heretical persons, or infidels; which is the deserter then?'

Answ. If she be one that is either like to do good to the infidels, heretics, or bad persons whom they must converse with, she may suppose that God calleth her to receive good by doing good: or if she be a confirmed, well-settled Christian, and not very like, either by infection, or by want of

helps, to be unsettled and miscarry, it seemeth to me to be the safest way to follow her husband. She must lose indeed God's public ordinances by following him: but it is not imputable to her, as being out of her choice; and she must lose the benefits, and neglect the duties of the conjugal ordinance, if she do not follow him. But if she be a person under such weaknesses, as make her remove apparently dangerous as to her perseverance and salvation, and her husband will by no means be prevailed with to change his mind, the case then is very difficult what is her duty, and who is the deserter. Nay, if he but lead her into a country where her life were like to be taken away, (as under the Spanish Inquisition,) unless her suffering were like to be as serviceable to Christ as her life. Indeed these cases are so difficult, that I will not decide them: the inconveniences, (or mischiefs rather) are great, which way soever she take: but I most incline to judge as followeth: viz. It is considerable first, what marriage obligeth her to, simply of its own nature; and what it may do next, by any superadded contract, or by the law or custom of the land, or any other accident. As to the first, it seemeth to me, that every one's obligation is so much first to God, and then to their own souls and lives; that marriage as such, which is for mutual help, as a means to higher ends, doth not oblige her to forsake all the communion of saints, and the place or country where God is lawfully worshipped, and to lose all the helps of public worship, and to expose her soul both to spiritual famine and infection, to the apparent hazard of her salvation (and perhaps bring her children into the same misery); nor hath God given her husband any power to do her so much wrong, nor is the marriage-covenant to be interpreted to intend it. But what any human law or contract, or other accident which is of greater public consequence, may do more than marriage of itself, is a distinct case, which must have a particular discussion.

Quest. But what if the husband would only have her follow him, to the forsaking of her estate, and undoing herself and children in the world, (as in the case of Galeacius Caracciolus, Marquis of Vicum;) yea, and if it were without just cause?'

Answ. If it be for greater spiritual gain, (as in his case,)

she is bound to follow him: but if it be apparently foolish, to the undoing of her and her children without any cause, I see not that marriage simply obligeth a woman so to follow a fool in beggary, or out of a calling, or to her ruin. But if it be at all a controvertible case, whether the cause be just or not, then the husband being governor must be judge. The laws of the land are supposed to be just, which allow a woman by trustees to secure some part of her former estate from her husband's disposal: much more may she beforehand secure herself and children from being ruined by his wilful folly: but she can by no contract except herself from his true government.

Yet still she must consider, whether she can live continently in his absence: otherwise the greatest sufferings must be endured, to avoid incontinency.

2. Moreover, in all these cases, a temporary removal may be further followed, than a perpetual transmigration, because it hath fewer evil consequents.

And if either party renounce the relation itself, it is a fuller desertion, and clearer discharge of the other party, than a mere removal is.

Quest. xv. 'What if a man or wife know that the other in hatred doth really intend by poison or other murder, to take away their life? May they not then depart?'

Answ. They may not do it upon a groundless or rash surmise; nor upon a danger which by other lawful means may be avoided; (as by vigilancy, or the magistrate, or especially by love and duty.) But in plain danger, which is not otherwise like to be avoided, I doubt not, but it may be done and ought. For it is a duty to preserve our own lives as well as our neighbours. And when marriage is contracted for mutual help, it is naturally implied that they shall have no power to deprive one another of life: (however some barbarous nations have given men power of the lives of their wives.)- And killing is the grossest kind of desertion, and a greater injury and violation of the marriage-covenant than adultery; and may be prevented by avoiding the murderer's presence; if that way be necessary. None of the ends of marriage can be attained, where the hatred is so great.

Quest. xvI. If there be but fixed hatred of each other,