From the different Orphic fragments we find that the Orphic

By the ancient Theologists, according to Macrobius, the Sun was

To which may perhaps be added, from Sanchoniatho, the three sons of Genus.

Fire,

Light,

Flame.

By omitting the Earth, Water, and other materials, which, in the formation of the world, are elsewhere disposed of, and passing over the refinements of the Pythagoreans, who sometimes even deviated so far as to place the Tảyadóv, the final cause, as the Monad, and the three concauses as the Triad, I think we may find in the above enumeration sufficient ground for maintaining the

opinion, that the persons of the Trinity of the Gentiles, viewed under a Physical aspect, were regarded as the Fire, the Light, and the Spirit or Air of the Etherial fluid Substance of the heavens: which in a Metaphysical aspect were held to be no other than the Power or Will, the Intellect or Reason, and the Spirit or Affections of the Soul of the World; accordingly as the prior Monad was contemplated in its Etherial or Intellectual subsistence.

Metaphysicians have at length approximated to a truth, which, in the Metaphysics of Christianity, is laid down with as much perspicuity and decision, as is the Immortality of the Soul, or as any other of those points which have been so continually agitated among philosophers, modern as well as ancient. The distinction between the Intellect, and the Emotions or Affections, to which, simple as it may appear, such laborious approaches have been made through the mazy paths of Metaphysics, is clearly drawn; and the respective seats of them are assigned, it may be figuratively, but most naturally, to the Head and Heart.

The old division of the Mental Powers into those of the Will and the Understanding, has long been superseded by the division of the school of Reid into the Intellectual and Active Powers, But under the name of the Active Powers, the Will and some part of the Emotions have been also confounded by that school. Later writers, who have drawn the distinction between the Intellect and the Emotions, appear generally to regard the Will as a subordinate appendage to the Emotions, connected perhaps with the material structure of the Animal.

There is an ambiguity in the word Will or Volition, which may be divided into the Wish, and into the Power to act. The Soul thinks, wishes, acts; and the Power to act appears to me to be a mental Power, as distinct from the Wish or any of the Emotions, as it is independent of any material structure or combination. We may conceive a disembodied spirit with the Intellectual Powers, the Train of Thought only, without the Emotions; and again such a spirit, with the Intellect and Emotions, without the Power of action; and such a being might be susceptible of every sentiment terminating in contemplation, such

as all intellectual Tastes, Memory, Regret, and a variety of others. Stewart, in his speculations upon persons dreaming, supposes the Intellectual Powers with the Train of Thought in exercise, while the Active powers are suspended. But, of the Faculties and Powers which he confounds under that name, it is manifest that the Emotions are not suspended: and though the Power over the material frame is very generally unexercised during sleep, it is a very singular phænomenon, that when the Wish to do any particular action is notified, the Soul presently takes it for granted that the deed required is actually done, and the train of thought is influenced and diverted by some internal power, though the wish is not really gratified. And there is nothing more common in nature than to have the wish without the power to act, or the power without the wish.

I speak only of the immortal and immaterial soul: but if we look more closely into the matter we may observe, in the involuntary motions of the body, in its animal appetites, sensations, and desires, and perhaps in its perceptions, something of a material or corporeal spirit or frame of life, acting independently, though subject to the immortal soul, and whose operations appear to be carried on solely by the powers of nature. And it is this which appears to be so continually leading men astray into Materialism. And herein Plato's disposition is curious. He places the Intellect in the Head; a Soul endued with some of the passions, such as fortitude, is supposed to reside in the Chest, about the Heart : while another soul, of which the appetites, desires, and grosser passions are its faculties, about the Stomach and Spleen. The more refined Emotions he confounds with the Intellect; which I believe is likewise the case with Kant.

The numerous passages in the Scriptures in which the Persons of the Christian Trinity are shadowed forth by the same natural and mental powers which I suppose to constitute the original triad of the Gentiles, are too numerous to require to be specifically referred to.-The Father is continually typified as a Fire accepting the sacrifices, consuming and punishing the guilty, as the Lord of all power and might, to whom all prayers are com

monly addressed;-the Son as Light, as a Mediator and a Teacher, enlightening the understanding, addressing himself more particularly to the Intellect, pointing out the distinctions between good and evil;-the Spirit, as Spirit or Air, a mighty rushing wind, operating upon the Affections, Feelings, or Emotions. We are commanded by the Christian faith to look to the Son for knowledge, to obey his instructions, and to accept the conditions of Salvation he has offered to the Spirit, for grace to influence us in all our feelings, wishes and intentions—and to the Father, our prayers are to be directed for the power to act.

I

I would not presume to lay stress upon any of the hypotheses may have advanced or adduced in this inquiry. Man is apt to indulge his fancy in building systems which he conceives may set forth the wisdom or magnify the power of his Creator; but when he brings them to the test, and finds the truth itself, he finds it infinitely more sublime than the happiest flight of his imagination. Yet as we must necessarily take all our ideas, as well as our language, from the sensible world-as we are taught that it it is a glass, in which things spiritual are purposely, but darkly, shadowed forth-and as we are assured that man is formed in the express image of his Maker; I deem that we outstep not the bounds of true philosophy, when we humbly trace, in the glorious works of the Almighty, a confirmation of his word.

INDEX

OF THE

ABBREVIATIONS AND OF THE AUTHORS AND EDITIONS

CITED OR REFERRED TO.

See Introduction, p. lvii.

A.-Syncelli Codex Parisianus (1711.) Bekker, Ed. Plato.