which I claim as great improvements, not so much affecting the doctrines, as the philosophy of religion; and I should be glad to impart the knowledge of them to any who are disposed to learn.

Ard. If we can learn better to understand the King's book, or more deeply to feel its power, we should be glad to do so.

N. W. That is just what I propose to impart. There are some old notions which have very much embarrassed the doctrines of grace; but I have found out a way by which they can be disencumbered of them. They are nothing but " assumptions," and when they are laid aside, the greatest objections to those doctrines are taken out of the way.

Th. From whose minds are those objections removed?

N. W. From the minds of thinking men, who are willing to examine truth, and reason upon it, and see its consistency, when it can be disencumbered, as has been said, of those unfounded assumptions.

Ard. What are the assumptions you refer to?

N. W. One is, "that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good;" and another is, "that God could prevent all sin, or the present degree of it, in a moral system.'

Th. Why could not God prevent sin among his intelligent creatures, if he had seen best not to have it take place?

N. W. It is not for me to tell why he could not; it is for you to show that he can.

Th. To show that he can, I think it sufficient to say that he is the Creator of all those beings among whom sin exists. If he did not choose that they should sin, I think he would have prevented them from sinning.

N. W. How could he prevent them from sinning?

Th. By willing it; just as he accomplishes every thing else. He said, "let there be light, and there was light." He would only need to say, let all intelligent creatures be holy, and they would be holy.

N. W. In governing moral agents, God must use moral means. He must set light and motives before their minds. We do not think that any act of a creature brought into existence by the mere efficiency of God, can be an accountable act."

Th. Do you think the Holy Spirit does any thing else, in order to convert a sinner, than simply to present motives, and use the influence of moral suasion?

N. W. I do not pretend to know whether he does or not. Th. Yet you pretend to know that the human mind is such that it cannot be governed by divine efficiency without destroy

ing its free agency. Do you not think that God wishes to convert every sinner?

N. W. I believe "that God not only prefers, on the whole, that his creatures should forever perform their duties rather than neglect them, but purposes, on his part, to do all in his power to promote this very object in his kingdom."

Th. If any sinner is not converted, then, it is because God cannot convert him, without using more means than it is proper for him to use in that case.

N. W. Yes. He might increase the means, so as to convert that sinner; but in so doing, he might derange some other part of his system of moral influences, so as ultimately to do more hurt than good.

Ard. How much more simple to refer it all to the sovereign will of God, who speaks, and it is done. When God wills the conversion of a sinner, he is converted.

N. W. That is the best way for some people, who do not care about inquiring into the philosophy of things. But some like to inquire, and understand as much as they can.

Ard. I wish to know all that is revealed. And I am satisfied to stop where revelation stops. I think that teaches us, that when God wishes to convert a sinner, he speaks the word, and it is done.

N. W. What reason do you give why all are not converted?

Ard. "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes: even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

N. W. Do you not think the Spirit strives to convert every one ?

Ard. No, indeed. I think he converts every one whom he strives to convert. I think it would be highly dishonorable to the blessed Spirit, to say he strives to convert sinners, and finds himself unable.

N. W. Do you not admit that he wishes to have all men yield holy obedience, and commands them to yield it; and sends them many entreaties, and warnings, and the like, saying, "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live?" Is all this sincere, or do you say the holy God is insincere in all this?

Ard. I believe it is all sincere. And yet, I believe that God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass.

N. W. So do I. But perhaps not in the same way you do Ard. How is it?

N. W. God looks at all his creatures, and sees what degrees of influence they would need to make them obedient, and concludes whether it is better that he should use that influence and make them obedient, or let them alone to have their own choice. So he does the best he can.. He would prefer having them all obedient, if they would be. But he does not prefer to make them all so, because it would take too much of this moral influence. That is the way he decrees whatever comes to pass, some things because he chooses them for their own sake, and some because they are the best he can have.

Th. That is a strange view of the Divine Being. I like the old view better. I love to contemplate him as a Being who has all power, and wisdom, and goodness; as one who knows what system of events will bring into existence the greatest amount of good in the intelligent universe, and will bring it to pass. So that we may say, with the apostle, as the wheel of events rolls on, "We know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose." And when any event takes place which is distressing in itself, it is so refreshing to think that infinite wisdom sees this to be best; I do not mean the best that can be done for want of more power, but the best that infinite wisdom can devise, and infinite goodness desire.

N. W. But do you not think that God "prefers, all things considered, holiness to sin, in all instances, in which the latter takes place ?"

Th. No; else he would bring it to pass. I think God chooses that every event should take place just as it does, because he saw it to be wisest and best, that every event should take place just as it does.

N. W. Then you hold to the old doctrine, that "sin is a good thing;" you hold, that "sin is the very end of man's creation, the highest end of his being, the chief end of man;" that mankind are bound to believe that they shall please and glorify God more by sin, than by obedience, and therefore act accordingly."

Th. No; I do not hold any such things; and I consider it as a slander to have them imputed to me. And I never heard of any that held so; and I consider you as a slanderer of our venerable fathers, when you impute to them sentiments which they would, every one, have rejected with abhorrence. They believed, as I do, that whatever takes place is for the best; and that the sin which takes place God makes the means of good; and so, as the means of good, he chooses it should take place. As to the sin of Joseph's brethren, in selling him into Egypt, they believed that his brethren "thought evil against him,

while God meant it unto good." And as to the sin of Judas, in betraying Christ, they did not think it was "a good thing;" but they thought it was the means of Christ's death, which was the means of making atonement for the sins of the world. The evil they condemned; but the good they rejoiced in, and gave thanks for; saying with the apostle, in relation to that event, "thanks be unto God for his unspeakable gift."

CHAPTER LXVIII.

New-way. I still insist that it would be better if there was no sin, and no misery, in the universe. And I am so sure of this, that I conclude, since God has not hindered sin and misery from coming into existence, it was because he was unable to hinder them.

Thoughtful. I should not be quite so sure that I understood all things, when I had seen but a small part of them. I should conclude, that if God is infinite in knowledge, he knows what is for the best; if he is infinite in goodness, he chooses what is for the best; and if he is infinite in power, nothing can prevent him from accomplishing what he sees for the best. You choose rather to limit his power, than believe that he can bring good out of evil, and make sin the means of any good; while I, not seeing any occasion to limit the power of God, conclude that the sin and misery which exist, must be the means of good in some way, whether I can discover it or not.

N. W. Say it out. Tell us that "sin is the very end of man's creation, the highest end of his being, the chief end of

Th. I always think a man feels his deficiency in fair argument, when he resorts to abuse and misrepresentation. If you think my views wrong, and are able to show wherein, with decency and clearness, do so. I think that mercy is a glorious attribute of God, and that it is desirable it should be seen, in its full and perfect exercise. But, in order that mercy should be exercised, there must be sinners to save. And if sinners are to be saved, Christ must die. And if Christ must die, he must have betrayers and murderers. If sin had never come into the world, and men had never been redeemed by the blood of Christ, there could have been nothing known of the mercy of God: this glorious trait of his character had been forever

unseen. I believe that in connection with the work of redemption, in its final results, enough more will be seen of the glorious character of God, than could have been seen without it, to show the wisdom and goodness of that system of events, which includes the redemption of sinners, and stop every mouth, and lead all intelligent beings to conclude it was best that man should fall.

N. W. If God chooses on the whole to have all things take place just as they do, then he chooses that all the sin which takes place, should be committed; and how can he be sincere in forbidding it?

Th. In his prohibitions he expresses his feelings towards sin, as it is in its own nature. Sin is wrong. And when God forbids it, he expresses its true nature, and his real feelings towards it. But when he decrees it, and brings it to pass in his providence, he indicates what his judgment is of its results. In all those cases in which he decrees it, it is because the good of the results overbalances the evil, and renders it on the whole desirable that the event should take place. As in the case of the death of Christ, by wicked hands, more good than evil has resulted from this event, so that it has always been regarded by the Church a matter of thankfulness and praise, that Christ has died.

N. W. If I could know beforehand, that the sin which I am about to commit will be, on the whole, for the best, then it will be my duty to commit it, will it?

Th. No, indeed. What is best on the whole is not the rule of your conduct. Your knowledge is not sufficiently extensive to render it the proper rule for you, if there were no other objection. What is right in itself, as expressed in the divine law, is a suitable rule. This is easily understood, and applied to all

cases.

N. W. "It is extensively maintained that virtue consists in utility, that is, that such is the nature, relations, and tendencies of things, that greater happiness will result from virtue or holiness, than from vice or sin. How then can sin, in the nature of things, be the necessary means of greater good?" Th. Do you maintain this sentiment?

N. W. It is not necessary for me to say whether I do or not. It belongs to you to answer the objection which grows out of it.

Th. If virtue was founded in utility, vice would be founded in inutility. But I do not admit any such sentiment; and I think you ought to avow and defend it, if you believe it; or else not bring forward objections which you do not yourself believe. The rain and the sun are very useful, but they are