they feldom commit any errors, and if they have been miftaken at any time, they eafily correct thofe miftakes. They al'lo efteem any errors they commit upon taking counfel betore hand, to be better than fuch rafh fuccefs as is owing to fortune only; becaufe fuch a fortuitous advantage tempts them to be inconfiderate, while confultation, though it may fometimes fail of fuccefs, hath this good in it, that it makes men more careful hereafter; but for the advantages that arife from chance, they are not owing to him that gains them; and as to what melancholy accidents happen unexpectedly, there is this comfort in them, that they had however taken the best confultations they could to prevent them.

7. Now they fo manage their preparatory exercises of their weapons, that not the bodies of the foldiers only, but their fouls may also become ftronger; they are moreover hardened for war by fear, for their laws inflict capital punishments, not only for foldiers running away from their ranks, but for flothfulness and ina&ivity, though it be but in a leffer degree; as are their generals more fevere than their laws, for they prevent any imputation of cruelty toward thofe under condemnation, by the great rewards they beflow on the valiant foldiers; and the readinefs of obeying their commanders is fo great, that it is very ornamental in peace; but when they come to a battle, the whole army is but one body, fo well coupled together are their ranks, fo fudden are their turnings about, fo harp their hearing, as to what orders are given them. fo quick their fight of the enfigns, and fo nimble are their hands when they let to work; whereby it comes to pafs, that what they do is done quickly, and what they fuffer they bear with the, greatest patience. Nor can we find any examples where they have been conquered in battle, when they came to a clofe fight, either by the multitude of the enemies, or by their firatagems, or by the difficulties in the places they were in, no, nor by fortune neither, for their victories have been furer to them than fortune could have granted them. In a cafe, therefore, where counfel ftill goes before action, and where, after taking the best advice, that advice is followed by fo active an army, what wonder is it that Euphrates on the eaft, the ocean on the weft, the most fertile regions of Lybia on the fouth, and the Danube and the Rhine on the north, are the limits of this empire? One might well fay, that the Roman poffeffions are inferior to the Romans themfelves.

8. This account I have given the reader, not fo much with the intention of commending the Romans, as of comforting thofe that have been conquered by them, and for the deterring others from attempting innovations under their government. This difcourfe of the Roman military conduct may alfo perhaps be of ufe to fuch of the curious as are ignorant of it, and yet have a mind to know it. I return now from this di greffion.

CHAP. VI.

Placidus attempts to take Jotapata, and is beaten off. Vespafan marches into Galilee.

A

ND now Vefpafian, with his fon Titus, had tarried fome time at Ptolemais, and had put his army in order. But when Placidus who had overrun Galilee, and had befides flain a number of those whom he had caught (which were only the weaker part of the Galileans, and fuch as were of timorous fouls) he faw that the warriors ran always to thofe cities whofe walls had been built by Jofephus, he marched furiously against Jotapata, which was of them all the strongest, as fuppoling he thould eafily take it by a fudden furprife, and that he fhould thereby obtain great honour to himfelf among the commanders, and bring a great advantage to them in their future campaign; becaufe, if this strongest place of them all were once taken, the reft would be fo affrighted as to furrender themselves. But he was mightily mistaken in his undertaking; for the men of Jotapata were apprifed of his coming to attack them, and came out of the city, and expected him there. So they fought the Romans brifkly when they leaft expected it, being both many in number, and prepared for fighting, and of great alacrity, as efteeming their country, their wives and their children to be in danger, and eafily put the Romans to flight, and wounded many of them, and flew * feven of them; because their retreat was not made in a diforderly manner, because ftrokes only touched the furface of their bodies, which were covered with their armour in all parts, and because the Jews did rather throw their weapons upon them from a great distance, than venture to come hand to hand with them, and had only light armour on, while the others were completely aimed. However three men of the Jews fide were flain, and a few wounded; fo Placidus, finding himself unable to affault the city, ran away.

2. But as Vefpafian had a great mind to fall upon Galilee, he marched out to Ptolemais, having put his army into that order, wherein the Romans ufed to march. He ordered those auxiliaries which were lightly armed, and the archers to march firit, that they might prevent any fudden infults from the enemy, and might fearch out the woods that looked fulpicious

• I cannot but here oblerve an eastern way of speaking, frequent among them, but not ufual among us, where the word only or alone is not let down, but perhaps fomeway fupplied in the pronunciation. Thus Jofephus bere lays, that thofe of jotapata flew leven of the Romans, as they were marching cff. becaule the Ro. mans retreat was regular, their bodies were covered over with their armour, and the jews fought at fomne distance: His meaning is clear, that thele were the reafons why they flew only, or no more than leven. I have met with many the like examples in the fcriptures, in jofephus, &c. but did not note down the particular places. This obfervation ought to be borne in mind upon many occafions.

ly, and were capable of ambulcades. Next to thefe followed that part of the Romans which was completely armed, both footmen and horsemen. Next to these followed ten out of every hundred, carrying along with them their arms, and what was neceffary to mealure out a camp withal; and after them, fuch as were to make the road even and ftraight, and if it were any where rough and hard to be paffed over, to plain it, and to cut down the woods that hindered their march, that the army might not be in diftrefs or tired with their march. Behind thele he fet fuch carriages of the army as belonged both to himself and to the other commanders, with a confiderable number of their horfemen for their fecurity. After these he marched himself, having with him a felect body of footmen, and horfemen, and pikemen. After thefe came the peculiar cavalry of his own legion, for there were an hundred and twenty horfemen that peculiarly belonged to every legion. Next to thefe came the mules that carried the engines for fieges, and the other warlike machines of that nature. After thefe came the "mmanders of the cohorts and tribunes, having about them foldiers chofen out of the reft. Then came the enfigns encompaffing the eagle, which is at the head of every Roman legion, the king and the ftrongest of all birds, which feems to them a fignal of dominion, and an omen that they fhall conquer all against whom they march; these facred enfigns are followed by the trumpeters. Then came the main army in their fquadrons and battalions, with fix men in depth, which were followed at laft by a centurion, who, according to cuf tom obferved the reft. As for the fervants of every legion, they all followed the footmen, and led the baggage of the foldiers, which was borne by the mules and other beafts of burden. But behind all the legions came the whole multitude of the mercenaries; and thofe that brought up the rear came last of all for the fecurity of the whole army, being both footmen and thofe in their armour alfo with a great number of horie

men.

3. And thus did Vefpafian march with his army, and came to the bounds of Galilee, where he pitched his camp and reftrained his foldiers, "who were eager for war; he alfo fhewed his army to the enemy, in order to affright them, and to afford them a feafon for repentance, to fee whether they would change their minds before it came to a battle, and at the fame time he got things ready for befieging their ftrong holds. And indeed this fight of the general brought many to repent of their revolt, and put them all into a confternation; for thofe that were in Jofephus's camp, which was at the city called Garis, not far from Sepphoris, when they heard that the war was come near them, and that the Romans would fuddenly fight them hand to hand, difperfed themfelves, and fled not only before they came to a battle, but before the enemy ever came in fight, while Jofephus and a few others were left behind;

and as he faw that he had not an army fufficient to engage the enemy, that the fpirits of the Jews were funk, and that the greater part would willingly come to terms, if they might be credited, he already defpaired of the fuccefs of the whole war, and determined to get as far as he poffibly could out of danger; fo he took thofe that ftaid along with him, and fled to Tiberias.

CHAP. VII.

Vefpafian, when he had taken the City Gadara, marches to Jotapata. After a long Siege, the City is betrayed by a Defert er, and taken by Vefpafian.

O Vespasian marched to the city Gadara, and took it upon the first onfet, because he found it deftitute of any confiderable number of men grown up and fit for war. He came then into it, and flew all the youth, the Romans having no mercy on any age whatsoever; and this was done out of the hatred they bore the nation, and because of the iniquity they had been guilty of in the affair of Ceftius. He alfo fet fire, not only to the city itself, but to all the villas and imall cities that were round about it; fome of which were quite deftitute of inhabitants, and out of fome of them he carried the inhabitants as flaves into captivity.

2. As to Jofephus, his retiring to that city which he chofe as the most for his fecurity, put it into great tear; for the people of Tiberias did not imagine that he would have run away, unless he had entirely despaired of the fuccefs of the war. And indeed as to that point, they were not mistaken about his opinion; for he faw whither the affairs of the Jews would tend at laft, and was sensible that they had but one way of elcaping, and that was by repentance. However, although he expected that the Romans would forgive him, yet did he choose to die many times over, rather than to betray his country, and to difhonour that fupreme command of the army which had been intrufted with him, or to live happily under those against whom he was fent to fight. He determined, therefore, to give an exact account of affairs to the principal men at Jerufalem by a letter, that he might not by too much aggrandizing the power of the enemy, make them too timorous, nor by relating that their power beneath the truth, might encourage them to ftand out when they were perhaps difpofed to repentance. He allo fent them word, that if they thought of coming to terms, they muft fuddenly write him an answer; or if they refolved upon war, they muft fend him an army futficient to fight the Romans. Accordingly he wrote these things, and fent mellengers immediately to carry his letter to Jerufalem.

3. Now Vefpafian was very defirous of demolishing Jotapata, for he had gotten intelligence that the greatest part of the enemy had retired thither, and that it was, on other accounts, a place of great fecurity to them. Accordingly he fent both footmen and horsemen to level the road, which was mountainous and rocky, not without difficulty to be travelled over by footmen, but abfolutely impracticable for horfemen. Now thefe workmen accomplished what they were about in four days time, and opened a broad way for the army. On the fifth day, which was the twenty first of the month Artemifius [Jyar], Jofephus prevented him, and came from Tiberias, and went into Jotapata, and raifed the drooping fpirits of the Jews. And a certain deferter told this good news to Vefpafian, that Jofephus had removed himself thither, which made him make hafle to the city, as luppoling, that with taking that he thould take all Judea, in cafe he could but withal get Jofephus under his power. So he took this news to be of the vastest advantage to him, and believed it to be brought about by the providence of God, that he who appeared to be the most prudent man of all their enemies, and of his own accord, fhut himfelt up in a place of fure cuftody. Accordingly he fent Placidus with a thousand horfemen, and Ebutius a decurion, a perfon that was of eminency both in counsel and in action, to encompass the city round, that Jofephus might not escape away privately.

4. Vefpafian alfo the very next day, took his whole army and followed them, and by marching till late in the evening, arrived then at Jotapata; and bringing his army to the northern fide of the city, he pitched his camp on a certain small hill which was feven furlongs from the city, and ftill greatly endeavoured to be well feen by the enemy, to put them into a confternation; which was indeed fo terrible to the Jews immediately, that no one of them durft go out beyond the wall. Yet did the Romans put off the attack at that time, because they had marched all the day, although they placed a double row of battalions round the city, with a third row beyond them round the whole, which confifted of cavalry, in order to ftop up every way for an exit; which thing making the Jews defpair of elcaping, excited them to act more boldly; for nothing makes men fight fo defperately in war as neceflity.

5. Now when the next diy an alfault was made by the Romans, the Jews at firft ftayed out of the walls and oppofed them, and met them as having formed themfelves a camp before the city walls. But when Vefpafian had set against them the archers and lingers, and the whole multitude that could throw to a great diflance, he permitted them to go to work, while he himfelf, with the footmen, got upon an acclivity, whence the city might eafily be taken. Jofephus was then in fear for the city, and leaped out, and all the jewifh multitude with him; thefe fell together upon the Romans in great num