An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of MoralsA. Millar, 1751 - 253 pages |
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abfolutely Actions Affection againſt agreeable alfo allow'd alſo amongſt antient Approbation arifes ariſe Athenians Beauty becauſe beneficial Benevolence betwixt Blame Cafe Cenfure Character Cicero Circumftances Compariſon Conclufions Confequences confiderable confifts Converfation Cuſtoms Defire Diftinctions diſcover Efteem eſtabliſh'd eſteem'd faid fame fays feel feems felves fhall fhould firft firſt focial Virtues fome Friendſhip ftill ftrong fuch fufficient fuperior fuppofe fuppos'd fure greateſt Happineſs higheſt himſelf human Hypothefis impoffible indifferent Induſtry Inftance Intercourfe Intereft itſelf Juftice Laws leaſt lefs Love Mankind Meaſure ment Merit Mifery Mind moft moral moſt muft muſt Nature neceffary Neceffity never obferve Object oppofite ourſelves Paffions Palamedes particular Perfon pernicious philofophical pleaſe Pleaſure Poffeffion poffeft poffible pofition Polybius Praiſe prefent Principles Purpoſe Qualities Queſtion racter Reaſon refult Regard requifite Rule ſeems Self-love ſelfiſh Senfe Sentiment ſhall Society Species ſuch Syftem thefe themſelves theſe thofe thoſe tion ufeful Underſtanding univerfal uſeful Utility whofe
Popular passages
Page 199 - But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions ; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end ; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means. It is requisite a sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies.
Page 95 - Would any man, who is walking along, tread as willingly on another's gouty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on the hard flint and pavement?
Page 205 - But after every circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no farther room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself. The approbation or blame, which then ensues, cannot be the work of the judgment, but of the heart; and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment.
Page 193 - ... a sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy.
Page 6 - What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes possession of the heart and animates us to embrace and maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only the cool assent of the understanding and, gratifying a speculative curiosity, puts an end to our researches.
Page 174 - Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment?
Page 170 - This class of accomplishments, therefore, must be trusted entirely to the blind, but sure testimony of taste and sentiment ; and must be considered as a part of ethics, left by nature to baffle all the pride of philosophy, and make her sensible of her narrow boundaries and slender acquisitions.
Page 204 - ... then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions have this influence. We consider all the circumstances in which these actions agree, and thence endeavour to extract some general observations with regard to these sentiments. If you call this metaphysics, and find anything abstruse here, you need only conclude that your turn of mind is not suited to the moral sciences.
Page 211 - Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood; the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue.
Page 50 - It must also be confessed, that wherever we depart from this equality, we rob the poor of more satisfaction than we add to the rich ; and that the slight gratification of a frivolous vanity, in one individual, frequently costs more than bread to many families, and even provinces.