This by no means implies that the translation is a close one. It is a very free translation. It is more a condensation than an abridgment: but it is an abridgment too. My object was to convey the meaning of the original in the clearest way I could; and to this all other considerations were made to vield. The serious view that I have taken of my enterprise is proved by the amount of labour and of pecuniary sacrifice that I have devoted to my task. Where I have erred, it is from want of ability; for I have taken all the pains I could. One suggestion that I made to Mr. Lombe, and that he approved, was that the three sections-Mathematics, Astronomy, and Physics-should be revised by a qualified man of science. My personal friend, Professor Nichol, of Glasgow, was kind enough to undertake this service. After two careful readings, he suggested nothing material in the way of alteration, in the case of the first two sections, except the omission of Comte's speculation on the possible mathematical verification of Laplace's Cosmogony. But more had to be done with regard to the treatment of Physics. Every reader will see that that section is the weakest part of the book, in regard both to the organization and the details of the subject. In regard to the first, the author explains the fact, from the nature of the case,—that Physics is rather a repository of somewhat fragmentary portions of physical science, the correlation of which is not yet clear, than a single circumscribed science. And we must say for him, in regard to the other kind of imperfection, that such advances have been made in almost every department of Physics since his second volume was published, that it would be unfair to present what he wrote under that head in 1835 as what he would have to say now. The choice lay therefore between almost re-writing this portion of M. Comte's work, or so largely abridging it that only a skeleton presentment of general principles should remain. But as the system of Positive Philosophy is much less an Expository than a Critical work, the latter alternative alone seemed open, under due consideration of justice to the Author. I have adopted therefore the plan of extensive omissions, and have retained the few short memoranda in which Professor Nichol suggested these, as notes. Although this gentleman has sanctioned my presentment of Comte's chapters on Mathematics and Physics, it must not be inferred that he agrees with his Method in Mental Philosophy, or assents to other conclusions held of main importance by the disciples of the Positive Philosophy. The contrary, indeed, is so apparent in the tenour of his own writings, that so far as his numerous readers are concerned, this remark need not have been offered. With the reservation I have made, I am bound to take the entire responsibility, the Work being absolutely and wholly my own. It will be observed that M. Comte's later works are not referred to in any part of this book. It appears to me that they, like our English criticisms on the present Work, had better be treated of separately. Here his analytical genius has full scope; and what there is of synthesis is, in regard to social science, merely what is necessary to render his analysis possible and available. For various reasons, I think it best to stop here, feeling assured that if this Work fulfils its function, all else with which M. Comte has thought fit to follow it up will be obtained as it is demanded. During the whole course of my long task, it has appeared to me that Comte's work is the strongest embodied rebuke ever given to that form of theological intolerance which censures Positive Philosophy for pride of reason and lowness of morals. The imputation will not be dropped, and the enmity of the religious world to the book will not slacken for its appearing among us in an English version. It cannot be otherwise. The theological world cannot but hate a book which treats of theological belief as a transient state of the human mind. And again, the preachers and teachers, of all sects and schools, who keep to the ancient practice, once inevitable, of contemplating and judging of the universe from the point of view of their own minds, instead of having learned to take their stand out of themselves, investigating from the universe inwards, and not from within outwards, must necessarily think ill of a work which exposes the futility of their method, and the worthlessness of the results to which it leads. As M. Comte treats of theology and metaphysics as destined to pass away, theologians and metaphysicians must necessarily abhor, dread, and despise his work. They merely express their own natural feelings on behalf of the objects of their reverence and the purpose of their lives, when they charge Positive Philosophy with irreverence, lack of aspiration, hardness, deficiency of grace and beauty, and so on. They are no judges of the case. Those who are those who have passed through theology and metaphysics, and, finding what they are now worth, have risen above them-will pronounce a very different judgment on the contents of this book, though no appeal for such a judgment is made in it, and this kind of discussion is nowhere expressly provided for. To those who have learned the difficult task of postponing dreams to realities till the beauty of reality is seen in its full disclosure, while that of dreams melts into darkness, the moral charm of this work will be as impressive as its intellectual satisfactions. The aspect in which it presents Man is as favourable to his moral discipline, as it is fresh and stimulating to his intellectual taste. We find ourselves suddenly living and moving in the midst of the universe, -as a part of it, and not as its aim and object. We find ourselves living, not under capricious and arbitrary conditions, unconnected with the constitution and movements of the whole, but under great, general, invariable laws, which operate on us as a part of the whole. Certainly, I can conceive of no instruction so favourable to aspiration as that which shows us how great are our faculties, how small our knowledge, how sublime the heights which we may hope to attain, and how boundless an infinity may be assumed to spread out beyond. We find here indications in passing of the evils we suffer from our low aims, our selfish passions, and our proud ignorance; and in contrast with them, animating displays of the beauty and glory of the everlasting laws, and of the sweet serenity, lofty courage, and noble resignation that are the natural consequence of pursuits so pure, and aims so true, as those of Positive Philosophy. Pride of intellect surely abides with those who insist on belief without evidence and on a philosophy derived from their own intellectual action, without material and corroboration from without, and not with those who are too scrupulous and too humble to transcend evidence, and to add, out of their own imaginations, to that which is, and may be, referred to other judgments. If it be desired to extinguish presumption, to draw away from low aims, to fill life with worthy occupations and elevating pleasures, and to raise human hope and human effort to the highest attainable point, it seems to me that the best resource is the pursuit of Positive Philosophy, with its train of noble truths and irresistible inducements. The prospects it opens are boundless; for among the laws it establishes that of human progress is conspicuous. The virtues it fosters are all those of which Man is capable; and the noblest are those which are more eminently fostered. The habit of truth-seeking and truth-speaking, and of true dealing with self and with all things, is evidently a primary requisite; and this habit once perfected, the natural conscience, thus disciplined, will train up all other moral attributes to some equality with it. To all who know what the study of philosophy really is,-which means the study of Positive Philosophy, its effect on human aspiration and human discipline is so plain that any doubt can be explained only on the supposition that accusers do not know what it is that they are calling in question. My hope is that this book may achieve, besides the purposes entertained by its author, the one more that he did not intend, of conveying a sufficient rebuke to those who, in theological selfishness or metaphysical pride, speak evil of a philosophy which is too lofty and too simple, too humble and too generous, for the habit of their minds. The case is clear. The law of progress is conspicuously at work throughout human history. The only field of progress is now that of Positive Philosophy, under whatever name it may be known to the real students of every sect; and therefore must that philosophy be favourable to those virtues whose repression would be incompatible with progress. |