Ꮲ Ꭺ Ꭱ Ꭲ
III.

[May be

overcome

"Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris irâ,
"Servitii patiere jugum, tolerabis iniquas
"Interius leges. Tunc omnia jure tenebis,
"Cum poteris rex esse tui."

Thirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all things judiciously, and provides for all occurrences, is not so easily surtled resolu- prised with outward objects. Only Ulysses wept not at the

by a set

tion.]

16.]

meeting with his wife and son". "I would beat thee" (said the philosopher), "but that I am angry." One spake lowest [2 Sam. when he was most moved. Another poured out the water xxiii. 15, when he was thirsty. Another "made a covenant with" [Job xxxi. his "eyes." Neither opportunity nor enticement could pre1.1 [Gen. vail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the fire with the three xxxix. 7-children. It is not the strength of the wind, but the lightness of the chaff, which causeth it to be blown away. Outward objects do not impose a moral, much less a physical, necessity; they may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive, to true liberty.

12.]

[Dan. iii. 13-18.]

T. H.-Thirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, external objects presented to men of such and such temperatures do make their actions necessary; and says, the power that such objects have over us proceeds from our own fault. But that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power. And therefore that opinion may hold true for all this answer. Further he saith, "Prayer, fasting," &c. may alter our habits. "Tis true; but when they do so, they are causes of the contrary habit, and make it necessary; as the former habit had been necessary, if prayer, fasting, &c., had not been. Besides, we are not moved nor disposed to prayer, or any other action, but by outward objects; as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent. Thirdly, he saith, "a resolved mind is not easily surprised:" as the mind of Ulysses, who when others wept, he alone wept not; and of the philosopher that abstained from striking, because he found himself angry; and of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty; and the like. Such things, I confess, have or may have been

I.

done; and do prove only, that it was not necessary for DISCOURSE 706 Ulysses then to weep, nor for the philosopher to strike, nor for that other man to drink; but it does not prove, that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to abstain as he did from weeping, nor the philosopher to abstain as he did from striking, nor the other man to forbear drinking. And yet that was the thing he ought to have proved.

Lastly, he confesseth, that the disposition of objects "may be dangerous to liberty, but cannot be destructive." To which I answer, 'tis impossible: for liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost; and if it cannot be lost, which he confesseth, I may infer it can be in no danger at all.

J. D. The third pretence was out of moral philosophy [Reply.] misunderstood,-that outward objects do necessitate the will. I shall not need to repeat what he hath omitted, but only to satisfy his exceptions. The first is, that it is not material, though the power of outward objects do "proceed from our own faults, if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power." Well, but what if they do proceed from causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do? Then his answer is a mere subterfuge. If our faults proceed from causes that are not and were not in our own power, then they are not our faults at all; it is not a fault in us, not to do those things which never were in our power to do; but they are the faults of these causes from whence they do proceed. Next, he confesseth, that it is in our power by good endeavours to alter those vicious habits which we had contracted, and to get the contrary habit. "True" (saith he), 'but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way, as well as the former habit did the other way.' By which very consideration it appears, that that which he calls a 'necessity' is no more but a proclivity. If it were a true necessity, it could not be avoided nor altered by our endeavours. The truth is, acquired habits do help and assist the faculty, but they do not necessitate the faculty. He who hath gotten to himself a habit of temperance, may yet upon occasion commit an intemperate act; and so on the contrary. Acts are not opposed to habits, but other habits. He adds, that "we are not moved to prayer or any other action but by outward

III.

PART objects; as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent." Wherein are two other mistakes: first, to make "godly preachers," and "pious company," to be “outward objects," which are outward agents; secondly, to affirm, that the will" is not moved but by outward objects." The will is moved by itself, by the understanding, by the sensitive passions, by angels good and bad, by men, and most effectually, by acts or habits infused by God, whereby the will is excited (extraordinarily indeed but) efficaciously and determinately. This is more than "equivalent" with "outward objects."

Another branch of mine answer was, that a resolved and prepared mind is able to resist both the appetibility of objects and the unruliness of passions; as I shewed by examples. He answers, that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to weep, nor the philosopher to strike, but I do not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear. He saith true. I am not now proving, but answering. Yet my answer doth sufficiently prove that which I intend;-that the rational will hath power, both to slight the most appetible objects, and to control the most unruly passions. When he hath given a clear solution to those proofs which I have produced, then it will be time for him to cry for more work.

Lastly, whereas I say, that "outward objects may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive, to true liberty;" he catcheth at it, and objects, that "liberty is in no danger, but to be lost, but" I "say, it cannot be lost, therefore" he infers, that it is "in no danger at all." I answer, first, that liberty is in more danger to be abused than to be lost;many more men do abuse their wits than lose them ;secondly, liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or diminished, as when it is clogged by vicious habits contracted by ourselves, and yet it is not totally lost; thirdly, though liberty cannot be totally lost out of the world, yet it may be totally lost to this or that particular man, as to the exercise of it. Reason is the root of liberty; and though nothing be more natural to a man than reason, yet many, by excess of study, or by continual gormandizing, or by some extravagant passion, which they have cherished in themselves, or by doting too much upon some affected object, do become very sots, and

1.

deprive themselves of the use of reason, and consequently of DISCOURSE liberty. And when the benefit of liberty is not thus universally lost, yet it may be lost respectively to this or that parti707 cular occasion. As he who makes choice of a bad wife, hath lost his former liberty to choose a good one.

PART should weigh each action thus, yet he doth not; so still there is liberty..

III.

[The understand

equally

balanced between two alter

Thirdly, I conceive it is possible, in this mist and weakness ing may be of human apprehension, for two actions to be so equally circumstantiated, that no discernible difference can appear between them upon discussion. As suppose a chirurgeon natives.] should give two plasters to his patient, and bid him apply either of them to his wound; what can induce his reason more to the one than to the other, but that he may refer it to chance, whether he will use?

[Answer.]

But leaving these probable speculations, which I submit to better judgments, I answer the philosopher briefly thus:— admitting that the will did necessarily follow the last dictate of the understanding, as certainly in many things it doth; yet, first, this is no extrinsecal determination from without, and a man's own resolution is not destructive to his own liberty, but depends upon it. So the person is still free. Secondly, this determination is not antecedent, but joined with the action. The understanding and the will are not different agents, but distinct faculties of the same soul. Here is an infallibility, or a hypothetical necessity; as we say, Quicquid est, quando est, necesse est esset:" a necessity of consequence, but not a necessity of consequent. Though an agent have certainly determined, and so the action be become infallible, yet, if the agent did determine freely, the action. likewise is free.

T. H.-The fourth opinion which he rejecteth, is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding. But it seems he understands that tenet in another sense than I do. For he speaketh, as if they that held it did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain; which is a thing that he thinks with reason to be untrue. But I understand it to signify, that the will follows the last opinion or judgment immediately preceding the action, concerning whether it be good to do it or not; whether he hath weighed it long before or not at all. to be the meaning of them that hold it. t [See above, p. 25. note c.]

And that I take
As, for example,