I.

whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the DiscOURSE will is a necessary cause, and (by this which is said) the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

PART and it is moved in respect of the matter.

III.

[The will is not a

cause of its particular acts.]

Much more man,

who hath a perfect knowledge and prenotion of the end, is most properly said to move himself. Yet I do not deny but that there are other beginnings of human actions, which do concur with the will: some outward, as the First Cause by general influence, which is evermore requisite, angels or men by persuading, evil spirits by tempting, the object or end by its appetibility, the understanding by directing; so [me inward, as] passions and acquired habits. But I deny, that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it physically to one, except God alone, Who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases: and where there is no antecedent determination to one, there is no absolute necessity, but true liberty.

His second argument is ex concessis. "It is out of connecessary troversy," saith he, "that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause.' The argument may be thus reduced ;necessary causes produce necessary effects; but the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions. I might deny his major. Necessary causes do not always produce necessary effects, except they be also necessarily produced; as I have shewed before in the burning of Protagoras his book. But I answer clearly to the minor, that the will is not a necessary cause of what it wills in particular actions. It is without "controversy" indeed; for it is without all probability. That it wills when it wills, is necessary; but that it wills this or that, now or then, is free. More expressly; the act of the will may be considered three ways; either in respect of its nature, or in respect of its exercise, or in respect of its object. First, for the nature of the act. That which the will wills is necessarily voluntary, because the will cannot be compelled; and in this sense, "it is out of controversy, that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions." Secondly, for the exercise of its acts, that is not necessary. The will may either will or suspend its act. Thirdly, for the object; that is not necessary but free. The will is not extrinsecally determined to its objects. As, for example, the Cardinals meet in the conclave to choose a Pope. Whom they choose, he is necessarily Pope. But it is not necessary, that they shall [Above Numb. xx. p. 138.]

X

I.

choose this or that day. Before they were assembled, they DISCOURSE might defer their assembling; when they are assembled, they may suspend their election for a day or a week. Lastly, for the person whom they will choose, it is freely in their own power; otherwise, if the election were not free, it were void, and no election at all. So that which takes its beginning from the will is necessarily voluntary, but it is not necessary that the will shall will this or that in particular; as it was necessary, that the person freely elected should be Pope, but it was not necessary, either that the election should be at this time, or that this man should be elected. And therefore voluntary acts in particular have not necessary causes, that is, they are not necessitated.

NUMBER XXXI.

actual event hath a suffi

therefore a

T. H.-Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to [vii. Every 718 which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect. The same is also a necessary cause; for if it be cient and possible that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the necessary cause.] effect, then there wanted somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient. But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause; for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced is produced necessarily; for whatsoever is produced, hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been. therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated.

And

PART it is not only required that the two horses be sufficient to draw it, but also that their conjunction be necessary, and their habitude such as they may draw it. If the owner of one of these horses will not suffer him to draw; if the smith have shod the other in the quick, and lamed him; if the horse have cast a shoe, or be a resty jade and will not draw but when he list; then the effect is not necessarily produced, but contingently, more or less, as the concurrence of the causes is more or less contingent.

2. [That cause pro

which pro

effect in

Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either beperly suffi- cause it produceth that effect which is intended, as in the cient generation of a man, or else because it is sufficient to produceth the duce that which is produced, as in the generation of a tended.] monster. The former is properly called a sufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the debility of the cause be not necessary but contingent, then the effect is not necessary but contingent. It is a rule in logic, that the conclusion always follows the weaker part. If the premisses be but probable, the conclusion cannot be demonstrative. It holds as well in causes as in propositions. No effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. If the ability or debility of the causes be contingent, the effect cannot be necessary.

3. [A cause

is sufficient in respect

of its abili

ty, not of

its will, to act.]

Thirdly, that which concerns this question of liberty from necessity most nearly is, that a cause is said to be sufficient in respect of the ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act. The concurrence of the will is needful to the production of a free effect; but the cause may be sufficient though the will do not concur: as God is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds, but it doth not follow from thence, either that He hath produced them, or that He will produce them. The Blood of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind; but it doth not follow, therefore, that all mankind shall be actually saved by virtue of His Blood. A man may be a sufficient tutor, though he will not teach every scholar; and a sufficient physician, though he will not administer to every patient. Forasmuch therefore as the concurrence of the will is needful to the production of every free effect, and yet the cause may be sufficient in sensu diviso,' although the will do not concur; it follows evidently, that the cause may be sufficient, and yet something which is needful to the produc

tion of the effect may be wanting, and that every sufficient DISCOURSE cause is not a necessary cause.

I.

cient cause inclusive

only hypo

Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear 4. [A suffilight, and say, that though the free agent be sufficient 'in sensu diviso,' yet he is not sufficient in sensu composito,' to of will, produce the effect without the concurrence of the will, he thetically necessary.] says true: but, first, he bewrays the weakness and the fallacy of the former argument, which is a mere trifling between sufficiency in a divided sense and sufficiency in a compounded sense and seeing the concurrence of the will is not predetermined, there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur; and when it hath concurred, the necessity is but hypothetical, which may consist with liberty.

NUMBER XXXII.

agency a

cause it im

T. H.-Lastly, I hold, that the ordinary definition of a free [viii. Free agent, namely, that a free agent is that, which, when all self-contrathings are present which are needful to produce the effect, diction, becan nevertheless not produce it,-implies a contradiction, and plies a suffiis nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be without an "sufficient," that is, "necessary," and yet the effect not follow. effect.]

cient cause

actual

719 J. D. This last point is but a corollary or an inference [Reply.] from the former, doctrine,-that "every sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily;" which pillar being taken away, the superstructure must needs fall to the ground, having nothing left to support it. "Lastly, I hold," saith he (what he―(what he is able to prove is something; so much reason, so much trust; but what he "holds," concerns himself not others; but what holds he?" I hold," saith he),-" that the ordinary definition of a free agent implies a contradiction, and is nonsense.' That which he calls the "ordinary definition" of liberty, is the very definition which is given by the much greater part of philosophers and schoolmen. And doth he think that all these spake "nonsense?" or had no more judgment than to 'contradict' themselves in a definition? He might much better suspect himself, than censure so many.

y["Illa est potentia libera, quæ, Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iii. omnibus positis quæ requiruntur ad c. 7; Op. tom. iii. p. 663. B.] agendum, potest agere et non agere."