III.

causes in

PART Let us see the definition itself:-"A free agent is that, which, when all things are present that are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it." I acknowledge the old definition of liberty, with little variation: but I cannot see this "nonsense," nor discover this "contradiction;" for in these words, "all things needful," or "all things requisite," [Sufficient the actual determination of the will is not included. But clude not by "all things needful or requisite," all necessary power, the actual either operative or elective, all necessary instruments and tion of the adjuments extrinsecal and intrinsecal, and all conditions, are intended. As he that hath pen, and ink, and paper, a table, a desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his hand, hath all things requisite to write if he will, and yet he may forbear if he will. Or as he that hath men, and money, and arms, and munition, and ships, and a just cause, hath all things requisite for war, yet he may make peace if he will.

determina

will.]

4.

Matt. xxii. Or as the King proclaimed in the Gospel,-"I have prepared My dinner, My oxen and My fatlings are killed, all things are ready, come unto the marriage." According to T. H. his doctrine, the guests might have told him, that he said not truly, for their own wills were not ready. And indeed, if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated extrinsecally to every act of willing, if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will, nor to will what it doth not will, then, if the will were wanting, something requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting. But now, when science and conscience, reason and religion, our own and other men's experience, doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without extrinsecal necessitation; if the power to will be present in actu primo,' determinable by ourselves, then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect.

I.

Thus he takes away the subject of the question. The ques- DISCOURSE tion is, whether effects producible be free from necessity. He shuffles out 'effects producible,' and thrusts in their places effects produced,' or, 'which are in the act of production.' Wherefore I conclude, that it is neither "nonsense" nor "contradiction" to say, that a free agent, when all things requisite to produce the effect are present, may nevertheless not produce it.

PART

III.

a man cannot imagine anything to begin without a cause,— can no other way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he try, he shall find as much reason (if there be no cause of the thing) to conceive it should begin at one time as another; that is, he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible. And therefore he must think there was some special cause, why it began then rather than sooner or later, or else that it began never, but was eternal.

[Reply.]

vulgar

J. D.—Now at length he comes to his main proofs. He that hath so confidently censured the whole current of schoolmen and philosophers of "nonsense," had need to produce strong evidence for himself. So he calls his reasons (Numb. xxxvi) "demonstrative proofs." All demonstrations are either from the cause or the effect, not from private notions and conceptions, which we have in our minds. That which he calls a 'demonstration,' deserves not the name of an intimation. He argues thus :-'That which a man conceives in his mind by these words, spontaneity, deliberation, &c., that they are.' [Truth to This is his proposition, which I deny. The true natures of be sought in reason, things are not to be judged by the private ideas or conceptions not in of men, but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an notions.] ordinary person what "upwards" signifies, and whether our antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards; and he will not stick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, theirs must needs be downwards. And this is because he knows not the formal reason thereof;-that the heavens encircle the earth, and what is towards heaven is upwards. This same erroneous notion of "upwards" and " downwards," before the true reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary capacities; as appears by their arguments of "penduli homines" and "pendulæ arbores "." Again, what do men conceive ordinarily by this word "empty," as when they say an empty vessel; or by this word "body," as when they say, there is no body in that room? They intend not to exclude the air either out of the vessel or out of the room. Yet reason tells

[Below p. 189.]

a

a

[Lactant., Div. Inst., lib. iii. c. 24.

Aug., De Civ. Dei, lib. xvi. c. 9, Op. tom. v. p. 423. E, F.]

I.

us, that the vessel is not truly empty, and that the air is a DISCOURSE true body. I might give a hundred such like instances. He who leaves the conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar notions, shall plunge himself into a thousand errors: like him, who leaves a certain guide to follow an ignis fatuus, or a willwith-the-wisp. So his proposition is false. His reason,"that matter of fact is not verified by other men's arguments, but by every man's own sense and memory," is likewise maimed on both sides. Whether we hear such words or not, is matter of fact, and sense is the proper judge of it; but what these words do or ought truly to signify, is not to be judged by sense, but by reason. Secondly, reason may and doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its proper object. Sense tells us, that the sun is no bigger than a good ball; but reason demonstrates, that it is many times greater than the whole globe of the earth. As to his instance,-" How can it be proved, that to love a thing and to think it good is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by these words?"—I confess it cannot be proved, for it is not true. Beauty, and likeness, and love, do conciliate love as much as goodness. 'Cos amoris amor.' Love is a passion of the will, but to judge of goodness is an act of the understanding. A father may love an ungracious child, and yet not esteem him good. A man loves his own house better than another man's, yet he cannot but esteem many others better than his own. His other instance," How can it be proved, that eternity is not 'nunc stans,' to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind?"—is just like the former; not to be proved by reason, but by fancy, which is the way he takes. And it is not unlike the counsel, which one gave to a novice about the choice of his wife, to advise with the bells: as he fancied, so they sounded, either take her or leave her.

Then for his assumption, it is as defective as his proposition; [Men's experience -that by these words, spontaneity, &c., men do understand contrary to T.H.'s conas he conceives. No rational man doth conceive a sponclusions. ] taneous" action and an "indeliberate" action to be all one. Every "indeliberate" action is not "spontaneous." The fire 721 considers not whether it should burn, yet the burning of it is not "spontaneous." Neither is every "spontaneous" action

III.

PART "indeliberate;" a man may deliberate what he will eat, and yet eat it "spontaneously." Neither doth "deliberation" properly signify the "considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to come;" but the considering whether this be a good and fit means, or the best and fittest means, for obtaining such an end. The physician doth not deliberate whether he should cure his patient, but by what means he should cure himb. Deliberation is of the means, not of the ends. Much less doth any man conceive, with T. H., that deliberation is an "imagination," or an act of fancy, not of reason, common to men of discretion with madmen and natural fools and children and brute beasts. Thirdly, neither doth any understanding man conceive, or can conceive, either that the "will is an act of deliberation," the understanding and the will are two distinct faculties, or that "only the last appetite is to be called our will." So no man should be able to say, this is my will; because he knows not whether he shall persevere in it or not. Concerning the fourth point, we agree, that "he is a free agent, that can do if he will and forbear if he will.” But I wonder how this dropped from his pen. What is now become of his absolute necessity of all things? If a man be free to do and to forbear anything, will he make himself guilty of the "nonsense" of the Schoolmen, and run with them into "contradictions" for companyd? It may be he will say, he can do if he will, and forbear if he will, but he cannot will if he will. This will not serve his turn: for if the cause of a free action, that is, the will, be determined, then the effect, or the action itself, is likewise determined; a determined cause cannot produce an undetermined effect: either the agent can will, and forbear to will, or else he cannot do, and forbear to do. But we differ wholly about the fifth point. He who conceives "liberty" aright, conceives both a "liberty in the subject"-to will or not to will, and a "liberty to the object"--to will this or that, and a "liberty from impediments." T. H., by a new way of his own, cuts off the "liberty of the subject;" as if a stone was free to ascend or descend, because it hath no outward impediment: and the "liberty towards