PART
III.

Lev. i. 3;

a man's "own will," and his " own voluntary will." If it be de

termined irresistibly by outward causes, it is rather their and xix. 5. own will" than his "own will." Nay, to let him see, that the very name of "free will" itself is not such a stranger in Ezra vii. 13. Scripture as he imagineth, it is called a man's "own free will." How often do we read in the books of Moses, Ezra, and the Psalms, of "free will offerings." This free will is Philem. 14. opposed not only to compulsion, but also to necessity;—"not of necessity but willingly ;"-and is inconsistent with extrinsecal determination to one, with which election of this or that Gen. xiii. 9. indifferently is incompatible. "Is not the whole land before thee?" said Abraham to Lot; "if thou wilt take the left hand, then I will go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, then I will go to the left." God said to David, "I offer thee three things, choose one of them;" and to Solomon, "because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked long life," or "riches." And Herod to his daughter, "Ask of me whatsoever thou wilt." And Pilate to the Jews, "Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you?" And St. Paul unto the Corinthians, "What will ye? shall I come unto you with a rod, or in love?" Both were in their choice. Yet T. H. doth tell us, that all these were free to do this or that indifferently, if they would, but not free to will. To choose and to elect, is, of all others, the most proper act of the will. But all these were free to choose and elect this or that indifferently, or else all this were mere mockery. And therefore they were free to will. The Scripture knoweth no extrinsecal determiners of the will, but itself. So it is said of Eli's sons, "Give flesh to roast for the priest, for he will not have sodden flesh of thee, but raw," and "if thou wilt not give it, I will take it by force."

II.

Jam. iv. 13

So St. James saith, "Go to now, ye that say, To-day or to- DISCOURSE
morrow we will go into such a city, and continue there a year,
and buy, and sell, and get gain; whereas ye know not what -[15.]
shall be to-morrow," &c.; "for that ye ought to say, If the
Lord will, we shall live, and do this or that." The defect was
not in their will to resolve, but in their power to perform. So
T. H. his necessity was their liberty, and their liberty was his
necessity. Lastly, the Scriptures teach us, that it is in the
power of a man to choose his own will for the future :-" All Josh. i. 16,
that thou commandest us, we will do; and whithersoever
thou sendest us, we will go: as we hearkened unto Moses in
all things, so will we hearken unto thee." So saith St.
Paul;—“ What I do, that I will do;"-and in another place, 2 Cor. xi.12.
[Phil. i. 18;
"I do rejoice, and I will rejoice ;"-and, "They that will be Tim. vi.
rich." When Christ inquired of His disciples, "Will ye also 9
go away," according to T. H. his principles, He should have 67.]
said, 'Must ye also go away.'

[17.)

[John vi.

al and ra

different.

We have viewed his distinction, but we have not answered The sensuhis comparison. "Will is an appetite:" and "it is one tional apquestion, whether he be free to eat that hath an appetite, and petite very another, whether he be free to have an appetite." Comparisons are but a poor kind of reasoning at the best, which may illustrate something, but prove nothing. And of all comparisons this is one of the worst; which is drawn from the sensual appetite to the rational appetite. The rational appetite and the sensual appetite are even as like one to another as an apple and an oyster. The one is a natural agent, the other is a free agent. The one acts necessarily, the other acts contingently (I take the word largely). The one is determined to one, the other is not determined to one. The one hath under God a dominion over itself, and its own acts; the other hath no dominion over itself, or its own acts. Even the will itself, when it acts after a natural manner (which is but rarely, in some extraordinary cases, as in the appetite of the chiefest good, being fully revealed, or in a panical terror, which admitteth no deliberation), acts not freely but necessarily. How much more must agents merely natural, which have neither reason to deliberate, nor dominion or liberty to elect, act necessarily and determinately? So, to answer a 740 comparison with a comparison, his argument is just such

PART

III.

another as this;-The galley-slave, which is chained to the oar, is a man, as well as the pilot that sits at the stern; therefore the galley-slave hath as much dominion in the ship as the pilot, and is as free to turn it hither and thither. So falls this dreadful engine all in pieces, which should have battered down the fort of liberty.

His gentle reprehension,-that "if" I "have not been able to distinguish between these two questions," I "have not done well to meddle with either, and if” I “have understood them," I "have dealt uningenuously and fraudulently," would better become me, who defend liberty, than him, who supposeth an irresistible necessity of all events. If he think I have not done well, yet, according to his own grounds, he may rather blame the causes that do necessitate me, than blame me, who am irresistibly necessitated to do what I do. Fraud and deceit have no place in necessary agents, who can do no otherwise than they do. He might as well accuse the sea to have dealt fraudulently with him, because he mistook the tide, and could not pass over the ford at a high water, as he purposed. Such is the power of truth, that it comes to light many times when it is not sought for. He doth see in part already, that I understand the vanity of his distinction; and shall see it better yet before this treatise be ended. Yet, if I would be so courteous as to forgive him all this, his distinction would not prejudice me. The places of Scripture alleged by me in my former Defence, do not only prove that a man is free to do if he will, but much more, that a man is free to choose and to elect; that is as much as to say, to "will," and determine itself.

Mr. Hobbes his flourish.

AN ANSWER TO HIS FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENTS IN

THIS QUESTION.

It is a certain rule, "contraries being placed one besides another, do appear much more clearly." He who desires to satisfy his judgment in this controversy, must compare our writings one with another without partiality, the arguments and answers and pretended absurdities on both sides. But T. H. seeketh to ingratiate himself and his cause beforehand; and if it be possible, to anticipate and pre-occupate

II.

the judgments of his readers, with a flourish or præludium, Discourse under the specious name of "fountains of arguments'." So, before a serious war, cities used to personate their adverse party, and feign mock-combats and skirmishes, to encourage their friends; wherein (you may be sure) their own side shall conquer: players make their little puppets prate and act what they please, and stand or fall as they lend them motion. Which brings to my mind, the lion's answer in the fable, when the picture of a man beating a lion was produced to him,—“ If a lion had made this picture, he would have made the lion above and the man beneath." It is a sufficient answer to this prologue, that Mr. Hobbes (that is, an adversary) made it.

“Quin malè narrando possit depravarier!."

What had he to do to urge arguments for me? or to give solutions for me? or to press the inconveniences and absurdities which flow from fatal destiny on my behalf? I gave him no commission. I need none of his help. Yet, by this personated conflict, he hoped to have stolen an easy victory, "without either blood or sweat."

I will not tire out myself and the reader with the superfluous repetition of those things, which we shall meet with again much more opportunely in their proper places. Some authors are like those people, who measuring all others by themselves, believe nothing is well understood until it be repeated over and over again,

"Qui nihil alios credunt intelligere, nisi idem dictum sit centies"." But whatsoever is new in this preface, if it have but any one grain of weight, I will not fail to examine and answer it, either here or there.

And, first, I cannot choose but wonder at his confidence; His presumption. that a single person, who never took degree in schools that I have heard of (except it were by chance in Malmesbury), should so much slight, not only all the scholars of this present age, but all "the fathers, schoolmen, and old philoso

i [Qu., p. 5. "The Fountains of Arguments in this Question."] [Avieni Fab. xxiv.]

I [Terent., Phorm., IV. iv. 15, 16.]

m

["Nisi illos tuo ex ingenio judicas, Ut nil credas intelligere, nisi idem dictum sit centies." Id., Heautontim., V. i. 7, 8.]

III.

PART phers," which I dare say he hath not studied much; and forget himself so far, as to deny all their authorities at once, if they give not him satisfaction; to make his private and crazy judgment to be the standard and seal of truth, and himself an universal dictator among scholars to plant and to pull up, to reform and new modulate, or rather turn upside 741 down, theology, philosophy, morality, and all other arts and sciences, which he is pleased to favour so much as not to eradicate them, or pluck them up root and branch;-as if he was one of Æsop's fellows, who could do all things and say all things. He is not the first man in the world who hath lost himself by grasping and engrossing too much. As the Athenians used to say of Metiochus ;-" Metiochus is captain, Metiochus is surveyor, Metiochus bakes the bread, Metiochus grinds the corn, Metiochus doth all; an evil year to Metiochusp." He mentioneth the Scriptures indeed; but his meaning is, to be the sole interpreter of them himself, without any respect to the perpetual and universal tradition of the Catholic Church, or the sense of all ancient expositors. Well, for once, I will forbear all the advantage which I have from the authority of councils, fathers, schoolmen, and philosophers; and meet him singly at his own weapon; yet, with this protestation, that if he value his own single judgment above all theirs, he comes within the compass of Solomon's censure,— [Prov.xxvi. "Seest thou a man wise in his own eyes; there is more hope of a fool than of him."

12.]

The attributes of

God argu

He telleth us, that "the attributes of God" are "oblations

given only for honour," but "no sufficient premisses to inmentative. fer truth or convince falsehood." Let them be "oblations," or sacrifices of praise, if he will; but are they not likewise truths? Hath not God given the same attributes to Himself every where in Holy Scripture? Doth God stand in need of a lie, to uphold His honour? It is true, they are not perfectly conceivable by mortal man. The goodness, and justice, and mercy, and truth of God are transcendent above the goodness, and justice, and mercy, and truth of