II.

influence and efficacy. The sufficiency, and efficiency, and DISCOURSE productive power, was in his will itself; which he will not be brought to understand.

AN ANSWER TO HIS ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE REPLY ;

NUMBER II.

from acci

not from

Here is nothing of moment to detain the reader. He Chance is saith, "Whosoever chanceth to read Suarez his Opuscula, dental conshall find the greatest part, if not all, that” I “have urged in currence, this question." Said I not truly, give innovators "line ignorance. enough, and they will confute themselves?" "Whosoever chanceth," &c.-and why "chanceth?" By his doctrine, it was as necessary for him that readeth to read, as it is for the fire to burn. Doth the fire sometimes burn by 'chance?' He will say, that where the certain causes are not known, we attribute events to chance. But he sticks still in the same mire, without hope ever to be freed. Who knoweth the certain reason, why the needle touched with the loadstone pointeth always towards the north? Doth it therefore point by' chance? How many thousands are ignorant of the true causes of comets, and earthquakes, and eclipses? Do they therefore attribute them to 'chance?' Chance never hath place, but where the causes concur accidentally to produce some effect, which might have been produced otherwise. Though a man strive to "expel" these common notions "with a fork, yet now and then they will return." And though I could not "surprise" him, yet the truth can. likem, he hath undone that in the dark, which he hath been weaving all this while in the light. It were more ingenuous

to say, it was a slip of his pen.

Thus, Penelope

It is indifferent to me, whether the greatest part of what I [Suarez.] urge in this question, or all that I urge, or perhaps more than I urge, be contained in Suarez his Opuscula. So the truth

་ [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ii. p. 28.]

[Defence, Numb. i. above p. 24, Disc. i. Pt. iii.]

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. i. p. 27: and see above in the Defence, T. H. Numb. xx., p. 132.]

III.

PART may prevail, I care not who have the honour of the achievement. But Suarez understood himself better than to confound two such different questions; namely, that of the necessity or liberty of all events, natural and civil, which is our question, with the concurrence of grace and free will in moral and supernatural acts, which he saith is the subject of Suarez his discourse in that place". In all my life, that I do remember, I never read one line of Suarez his Opuscula, nor any of his works the sixteen years last past. I wish he had been versed in his greater works, as well as in his Opuscula, that he might not be so averse from the Schools. "Ignoti nulla cupido." Then he would have known the terms and arguments used in the Schools as well as others. It is no blemish to make advantage of other men's pains and experience. [Ps. xix. 2. "Dies diei eructat verbum, et nox nocti indicat scientiam.” Vulg.] But Mr. Hobbes, trusting over much to his own particular abilities, presumeth to stand upon his own bottom, without any dread of Solomon's " Væ soli”—" Wo to him that is alone when he falleth." He scrupleth not to remove the ancient landmarks which his fathers had set," nor to "stumble from the ancient paths, to walk in a way that was never cast up." It were mere folly to expect either a known ground or a received term from him. Other men are contented to learn to write after a copy, but he will be printed a philosopher and a divine of the first edition by himself; and, Icarus like, find out a new way with his waxen wings which mortals never knew, though he perish in the attempto. Such undigested fancies may please for a while, during the distemper and green-sickness fit of this present age; as maids infected with that malady, prefer chalk or coals in a corner before healthful food in their father's house; but when time hath cured their malady, and experience opened their eyes, they will abominate their former errors, and those who were their misleaders.

Eccles. iv.

10.

Prov. xxii.

II.

[Epictetus.]

He had slighted whatsoever I produced as common and DISCOURSE trivial, "having nothing new in it, either from Scripture or reason, which" he "had not often heard." I replied only, that then I might "expect a more mature answer," and advised him, under the similitude of Epictetus his sheep, rather to shew his reading in his works than to glory of it. And where I said, that "great recruits of reasons and authorities did offer themselves" to me in this cause, he threateneth, "before" he "have done with me, to make it appear to be very bragging, and nothing else;" adding, that "it is not likely, that Epictetus should take a metaphor from lamb and wool," because he was "not acquainted with paying of tithes." I could not suspect, that a poor similitude out of Epictetus should make him so passionate. But "tange montes, et fumi- [Ps. cxliv. 5.] gabunt”—“ touch the high mountains, and they will fume and smoke." It seemeth strange to me, that he should be so 756 ignorant in Epictetus (a Stoic, one of his principal friends, of so great fame, that his earthen lamp was preserved as a relic, and sold for three thousand drachmas", whom even Lucian, that great scoffer, calleth an "admirable old man"), as to say, that "it is not likely, that Epictetus should take a metaphor from lamb and wool." He meaneth, from sheep. To inform him better, let him hear his words ;-" For sheep do not bring their grass to their shepherd, to shew him how much they have eaten; but, concocting their meat inwardly, do bring forth wool and milk." This might be pardoned; but his scoffing at payment of "tithes," and particularly "lamb and wool," being an institution of God Himself, and established by the laws of our own realm, cannot be excused. I appeal to all those who have read anything upon this subject, whether I might not have added many more reasons, and produced the authority of the Christian world against him in this cause of liberty, with the suffrages of the Fathers

[In the Defence, T. H. Numb. ii. above p. 26.]

[Defence, Numb. ii. above p. 26.] $ [Epist. to the Marq. of Newcastle, prefixed to the Defence, above p. 17.] [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. ii.

p. 28.]

u [Lucian., Dial. adv. Indoctum, c. xiii; Op. tom. iii. p. 111. ed. Hems

terhus. Amst. 1743.]

* [“ Τῷ θαυμαστῷ ἐκείνῳ γέροντι.” Id. ibid.]

y Encheirid., c. xlvi. [§ 2; p. 222. ed. Schweigh.—Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ πρόβατα οὐ χόρτον φέροντα ποιμέσιν ἐπιδεικνύει πόσον ἔφαγεν ἀλλὰ, τὴν νομὴν ἔσω πέψαντα, ἔρια ἔξω φέρει καὶ γάλα.”]

PART in all successive ages. But I remember that of our Saviour, III. "Cast not your pearls before swine, lest they trample them

Matt. vii. 6.

under their feet."

Exact definitions not frequent.

What li

berty is.

AN ANSWER TO THE ANIMADVERSIONS UPON NUMBER III.

He is displeased, that I do not "set down the definitions" of necessity, spontaneity, and liberty," without which (he saith) "their difference cannot possibly appear"." Yet formerly, and again in this very chapter, he confesseth, that the question is truly and clearly stated by me ;-"The question which the Bishop stateth in this place, I have before set down verbatim, and allowed"." What a trifling humour is this! Many things are not capable of perfect definition; as (to pass by all others) accidents, and modes, or such terms as signify the manner of being. And in such things as are capable of definition, yet essentials (whereof a definition must consist,—“ὁρισμός ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας γνωρισμὸς”) are neither so obvious nor so useful to common capacities. I believe, that all the perfect definitions which T. H. hath made in his life in philosophy or theology, may be written in one little ring; whereof I shall be bold henceforth, now and then as I find occasion, to put him in mind. Nay, even in mathematics, which by reason of their abstraction from matter are less subject to error, he can miss the cushion as well as his neighbours, and be contented sometimes to acknowledge it; not because those errors are greater or so great as his errors in philosophy or theology, but because their conviction is more easy, and more evident. And therefore for the most part a plain description must serve the turn; sometimes from the etymological unfolding of the name, sometimes by the removing of what is opposite or contrary, sometimes by a periphrastical circumlocution, sometimes by instances and examples. And thus, by his own confession, the question is cleared between us.

Yet, to satisfy him, I will describe them more formally. To begin with liberty. Liberty is a power of the will (or free

[Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. iii.
[Ibid., Stat. of Quest., p. 3.]

p. 35.]

II.

agent), to choose or to refuse this or that indifferently after Discourse deliberation, free from all antecedent and extrinsecal determination to oned. Election is the proper act of the will; and without indifferency or indetermination, and deliberation, there can be no election, which is a "consultative appetition." And they, and they only, are free agents, who, supposing all things to be present that are requisite to action, can nevertheless either act or forbear to act, at their own choice: which description hath already been explained, and shall be further in due place.

sponta

Secondly, voluntary or spontaneous is that, which hath its What is beginning from an inward principle (that is, the will), with neity. some knowledge of the end. Such are the acts of children, fools, and madmen, whilst they want the use of reason; and the sudden acts of passionate persons, whensoever the violence of their passion doth prevent all deliberation. Such are many actions of brute beasts; as the spider's making of her webs to catch flies, the bird's building of her nest therein to lay her eggs; both which proceed " from an inward principle with some knowledge of the end." So then this is the difference between that which is free, and that which is voluntary or spontaneous;-that every free act is also a voluntary or spontaneous act, but every voluntary or spontaneous act is not a free act. The reason is evident ;-because no act is free, except it be done upon deliberation; but many voluntary or spontaneous acts are done without all deliberation, as the acts of brute beasts, fools, children, madmen, and some acts of passionate persons. Secondly, there is no 757 liberty but where there is a possibility towards more than one, and freedom to choose this or that indifferently. But in all those other kinds of voluntary or spontaneous acts, there is an antecedent determination to one, and no indifferency of election. So spontaneity is an appetite of some object, proceeding either from the rational or sensitive will, either antecedently determined or not determined to one,

d [See Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. Prima, Qu. lxxxiii. art. 1.]

e

[“Όντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ,” κ. T. λ. Aristot., Ethic., III. v. 19.]

agendum, potest agere et non agere."
Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arb., lib. iii.
c. 7; Op. tom. iii. p. 663. B.]