III.

PART and a man cannot will any thing as good, but that which he judgeth in his understanding to be good. Nothing can affect that which it doth not know. And therefore reason must of necessity be "the root of liberty." This he taketh to be contradictory to what I say here, that "actions" and objects "may be so equally circumstantiated, or the case so intricate, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance"." "How then" (saith he) "can a man leave that to liberty when his reason can give no sentence? And if by 'chance'" I "mean that which hath no causes," I "destroy providence; if that which hath causes," I "leave it to necessity"." So, where I say, that "reason cannot give a positive sentence," he maketh me say, that "reason can give no sentence." There is a great difference between these two. The judges name three men to the sheriffwick of a county; here is a nomination or judgment, but not yet positive. The king picks one of these three; then the nomination or judgment is positive. So reason representeth to the free agent, or the free agent judgeth in his understanding, three means to obtain one end, either not examining or not determining any advantage which one mean hath above another. Here is an indefinite judgment for three good means, though it be not positive for any one more than the rest. In this case the will or the free agent chooseth one of these three means as good, without any further examination which is best. Reason is "the root of liberty" in representing what is good, even when it doth give no positive or determinate sentence what is best. I am neither so vain to think there is any thing that hath a being which hath not causes; nor so stupid, on the other side, as to think that all causes are necessary Chance proceedeth neither from the want, nor from the ignorance, but from the accidental concurrence of causes. His next charge is, that "it is false that actions may be so equally circumstantiated that reason cannot give a positive" (that is, a determinate) "sentence." Yet he confesseth, that "in the things elected there may be an exact equality"." If he did not confess it, it is most evident in itself: as ap

Actions may be

equally cir

cumstan

tiated.

causes.

II.

peareth in my former instance of two plasters of equal DISCOURSE virtue; or, if he please, in two pieces of gold of the same stamp, weight, and alloy, sent to one man upon condition to choose the one and leave the other. He judgeth them both to be good, and is not such a fool as they are who say, that he would hang in a perpetual equilibrium, and could choose neither, for want of determination which was best. Therefore he chooseth one of them, without more to do. But he saith, "there may be circumstances in him that is to elect," that he do not "spend time in vain," or lose both. It is true there are reasons to move him to elect, because they are both good; but there are no reasons to move him to elect the one rather than the other, this rather than that, or that rather than this, but only the will of him that electeth, all things being so equally circumstantiated, that reason can give sentence for them both as good, but not for the one positively and determinately as better than the other. Whatsoever is good, is the object of the will, though it be not always the best.

I said, that "reason doth not weigh every individual" object or "action to the uttermost graint." He pleadeth in answer, "True, but does it therefore follow a man gives no sentence? the will may follow the dictate of the judgment, whether the man weigh or not weigh all that might be weighed "." I acknowledge it, but he mistaketh the scope of my argument. The less exactly that reason doth weigh actions or objects, the less exactly it doth determine the free agent; but leaveth him, as in a case of indifferency, or having no considerable difference, to choose what he will, as being not much material, or not at all material, whether he choose the one part or the other.

often pre

"Passions and affections" (saith he) "prevail often against Passions wisdom, but not against the judgment" or "dictate of the vail against understanding; .. the will of a peevish passionate fool doth no reason. less follow the dictate of" his "understanding, than the will" of a wiser man. He must pardon me; passions prevail not only against wisdom, but against the dictates of reason. It

PART
III.

Jam. i. 14.

was Medea's passion which dictated to her, that to revenge herself upon her husband was more eligible than the lives of her children. Her reason dictated the contrary.

It was St. Peter's fear, not his judgment, which dictated to him to deny his Master. "Every man is tempted when he is drawn aside of his own lust," not of his intellectual judgment. Jacob did not curse the misunderstanding of [Gen. xlix. Simeon and Levi, but their passion;-"Cursed be their 7.] anger, for it was fierce; and their wrath, for it was cruel." As "the law is silent among arms," so is reason silent among passions. Passion is like an unruly passenger, which thrusts reason away from the rudder for the time. Therefore they use to say, that the dominion of reason, or of a reasonable man, over his sensitive appetite, is not despotical, like the government of a master over his slave, but political, like that of a magistrate over the people, which is often disturbed by seditious tumults and rebellions. Passion is an eclipse of reason, "a short madnessy" the metamorphosis of a man into a wild beast that is gored, which runneth upon every thing that comes in her way without consideration, or like a violent torrent descending down impetuously from a steep hill, which beareth down all respects before it, Divine and human. Whilst passion is at the height, there is no room for reason, nor any use of the dictates of the understanding, the mind for the time being like the Cyclopian cave2, where no man heard what another said.

Man was

be lord of the creatures.

The last part of this section is not concerning the fortunes created to of Asia, but the weighing of a horse-load of feathers, a light and trivial subject, wherein there is nothing but a contempt of School terms without any ground, bold affirmations without any proof, and a continued detraction from the dignity of the ⚫human nature, as if a reasonable man were not so considerable as a jackdaw. When God created man, He made him a mean lord under Himself, "to have dominion over all His

Ps. viii. 6. creatures," and "put all things in subjection under his feet."

826

11.

And to fit him for this command, He gave him an intel- DISCOURSE lectual soul. But T. H. maketh him to be in the disposition of the second causes: sometimes as a sword in a man's hand, a mere passive instrument; sometimes like "a top, that is lashed" hither and thither "by boys";" sometimes like "a footballd," which is kicked hither and thither by every one that comes nigh it; and here to a pair of scales, which are pressed down, now one way then another way, by the weight of the objects. Surely this is not that man that was created by God after His own image, to be the governor of the world, [Gen. i. 26. ] and lord and master of the creatures. This is some man that he hath borrowed out of the beginning of an almanac, who is placed immovable in the midst of the twelve signs, as so many second causes. If he offer to stir, Aries is over his head ready to push him, and Taurus to gore him in the neck, and Leo to tear out his heart, and Sagittarius to shoot an arrow in his thighs.

under

objects

proper

Yet he tells us boldly, that " no man can understand, that How the the understanding maketh any alteration of weight or light-standing ness in the object, or that reason lays objects upon the giveth to understanding." What poor trifling is this, in a thing so their plain and obvious to every man's capacity! There can be weight. no desire of that which is not known in some sort. Nothing can be willed but that which is apprehended to be good either by reason or sense, and that according to the degree of apprehension. Place a man in a dark room and all the rarest objects in the world besides him, he seeth them not, he distinguisheth them not, he willeth them not; but bring in a light, and he seeth them, and distinguisheth them, and willeth them, according to their distinct worths. That which light is to visible objects, making those things to be actually seen which were only potentially visible, that is the understanding to all intelligible objects, without which they are neither known nor willed. Wherefore men define the understanding to be "a faculty of the reasonable soul, understanding, knowing, and judging, all intelligible things." The

III.

PART understanding then doth not "alter the weight of objects;" no more than the light doth change the colours, which without the help of the light did lie hid in the dark: but the light makes the colours to be actually seen; so doth the understanding make the latent value of intelligible objects to be apprehended, and consequently maketh them to be desired and willed according to their distinct degrees of goodness. This judgment, which no man ever denied to intelligible 827 creatures, is the "weighing of objects," or attributing their just "weight" to them, and the trying of them as it were by the balance and by the touchstone. This is not "the laying of objects upon the understanding." The understanding is not the patient but the judge; but this is the representing of the goodness or badness of objects to the will, or to the free agent willing, which relatively to the will giveth them all their weight and efficacy.

There may be difference between these two propositions, 'Repentance is not voluntary and by consequence proceedeth from causes,' and, 'Repentance proceedeth from causes, and by consequence is not voluntaryh, if his consequence were well intelligible, as it is not. All acts both voluntary and involuntary do proceed from causes. He chargeth me to have "chopped in" these words, "and therefore." The truth is, his words were, "and by consequence," which I expressed thus," and therefore." "Therefore" and "by consequence" are the very same thing, neither more nor less. Is not this a doughty exception? But the other is his greater error,— that repentance is not voluntary). No Schoolman ever said, that the faculty of the will was voluntary, but that the agent was a voluntary agent and the act a voluntary act.

in the ab

in the con

CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;-NUMBER XXIV.

Blasphemy He accuseth me of "charging" him "with blasphemy and stract and atheism." If he be wronged in that kind, it is he who crete differ wrongeth himself by his suspicion. "Spreta exolescunt; si much. irascare, agnita videntur1." I accused him not either of blask [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiii. [Ibid., Animadv. upon Numb. xxiv. p. 255.] p. 262.] [Ibid.] [Tacit., Annal., iv. 34.] [Ibid.].