tion in both starts from distinct beginnings, and leads to distinct ends. Ex aliquo fit aliquid.

I therefore deny in the growth of language what Mr. Darwin himself, differing thereby from most Darwinians, denies in the growth of nature, namely one uniform beginning for all and everything-in other words, one primordial cell for all organic beings, one primordial root for all words.

From this admission of different beginnings it follows that each living cell can only become what, according to different philosophical points of view, it was fit or meant or willing to become, and that after it has fulfilled this purpose, it remains fixed and does not go beyond. This explains what I call the Broad Lines in nature, which alone enable us to know and understand nature, and to recognise in her a well-ordered kosmos, and not a mere mass of changes and chances. It also follows from this that no living being and no class of living beings should be derived from any other, if they possess a single property which their supposed ancestor does not possess, either actually or potentially.

So far I agree with Darwin in principle. I differ from him, however, when we come to the question of the descent of man from some unknown animal ancestor, because I look upon language as a property of man of which no trace, whether actual or potential, has ever been found in any other animal. I therefore contend, that Darwinians, if true to the principles enunciated by Darwin himself, ought to accept the conclusion that man cannot be descended from any other animal, provided always that I can establish my premise that language is really a proprium of man and of man only.

When we speak of genera, species, and individuals, let us remember what is really Individuals, Species, given us, and what is our own workman- Genera. ship in these names.

What is given us are individuals; genus and species are both of our own making, they are our concepts.

And here it is important to observe that the meaning of these technical terms was originally far more just and natural than what it has become since in the hands of later philosophers. We now call 'a class which is divided into two or smaller ones, the genus, and the smaller ones into which it is divided, the species1.' But the early thinkers who wanted and invented these terms meant by genus or kind a class of individuals held together by community of origin or birth, by species a class of individuals held together by similarity of form only (eidos). With that primitive nomenclature it might well happen that the species was larger than the genus, for a species, such as for instance a herd of cattle, consisting of oxen, sheep, and goats, might comprise several true genera, namely oxen, sheep, and goats. I mention this in order to show that classification both by genus and by species is our work and founded on our observation; in the case of genus, on the observation of a common birth, in the case of species, on the observation of a common form. The most modest form in which the whole question of the origin of species can be expressed is that adopted by Mill, By the naturalist, organised beings are not usually said to be of different species, if it is supposed that they have descended from the same stock.'

1 Mill, Logic, i. 7; Jevons, Logic, par. 37.

2

Logic, i. 7. 4.

Something, no doubt, must be given us, something Knowledge by which we can observe and afterwards

impossible

without

Individuals

arrange, and it may well be argued that, unless there were both uniformity and and Genera. variety to be observed in nature, the whole nature of our mind too would be different. If there were, for instance, no diversity in the objects of experience, and they were all like so many coins or counters, one undistinguishable from the other, we might possibly count, but what we now call thought would be impossible. We should be mere mathematicians. If, on the contrary, there were nothing but diversity in the objects of experience, and they were all so many monsters, sharing no single property in common, again we might possibly stare and wonder, but real thought would be impossible.

The term

Our very thought therefore is based on what the ancients called kind and form, i. e. comSpecies to be munity of origin and similarity of form, or discarded. on what we now call genealogical and morphological classification. I cannot help thinking, that much confusion of thought would be avoided if in all discussions on nature or on mind the term species were for the future altogether discarded. We have genus or kind, which has a definite meaning, namely a class of beings which have a common ancestor and produce offspring like themselves. Varieties observed in each genus should be called varieties, instead of species, while large classes of genera, such as aquatic, terrestrial, and aerial animals, might be called kingdoms or realms of nature, a name which would say nothing about their possible common origin, but only predicate their being included within the same limits or frontiers. Even for

logical purposes I believe that sub-genus would be far better than species.

The In

dividual.

Let us now see what we mean by an individual, for it is here that the whole secret of evolution lies. Each individual, if it belongs to a natural genus, shares its birth and all that follows from it in common with other individuals of the same genus. But in order to be an individual, it must also, however minutely, differ from all other members of the same genus. No sheep is exactly like all other sheep, no leaf exactly like all other leaves.

Each individual, therefore, in order to be an individual, possesses by necessity certain generic and certain individual qualities, and in this necessity, or at all events in this reality, lies the true secret of what we call variation and, in the end, of evolution.

It follows from this, and this is a point of the greatest importance, that variation can never be carried so far as to amount to a total obliteration of generic by individual qualities. If this were to happen, the individual would cease to be the individual of his genus, it would become the individual of another genus, or a mere straggler.

True Genera.

This brings us back to the old doctrine that true genera must be tested by descent and propagation, and this was no doubt the view which the old framers of our words and thoughts took. All that was born of sheep was called sheep, all that was born of man was called man. There might be different varieties, such as black sheep and white sheep, or black men and white men ; but as long as the black and white individuals could have offspring together, the black and white were

H

conceived as 'sorts of the same kind.' To call them species has been the cause of endless confusion. Here, however, we must again carefully distinguish between two theories which have divided the world from the earliest to the present

Reason

versus

Chance.

time.

Some philosophers hold that in the beginning there was Chaos, or, as we should say, the possibility of everything, and that out of this, certain realities were evolved.

Others, speaking more or less mythologically, admit either a great primeval ancestor, begetting everything out of himself, or a personal creator who made everything out of given materials or out of nothing.

Those who admit a personal ancestor or creator, generally ascribe to him the work of dividing all that exists by those Broad Lines which keep individuals of one kind separate from individuals of another. Whatever there is of rhyme or reason in the world is naturally referred to that first source.

Those on the contrary who begin with a given Chaos ascribe its change into a well-ordered Kosmos to an inherent fitness, or to what of late has been called by a number of names, such as Natural Selection, Survival of the Fittest, etc. Empedokles already used a very similar expression when he remarked that what is fit will always preponderate, because it is in the nature of the fit to preserve itself, whereas the unfit has vanished long ago1.

The fact is that everybody who has eyes to see, sees some kind of order, purpose, or reason in nature, and tries to account for it either mythologically or philosophically. The mythological explanation is

1

Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus, vol. i. p. 23.