or the Trentino, and Trieste, was achieved. The tenth point accords nationality to the peoples of AustriaHungary and again was fulfilled in substance, if not in every detail, by the creation of Czecho-Slovakia. The establishment of Jugo-Slavia, the addition of trans-Sylvania to Rumania, and the consolidation of Poland, with access to the sea, which notable results also include a genial satisfaction of Points Eleven and Thirteen.

They who now complain that Europe is Balkanized are often the very idealists who, before the Armistice, cried out most lustily for the self-determination of Ireland and other small nations. Wilson's idea of nationality was not less definite but to it he applied certain saving conditions, for instance, that "the relations of the several Balkan states to one another" should be "determined by friendly counsel." Independence with co-operation was his policy for Europe the removal"-as he said in Point Two"'of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations"including Germany-which consented to the peace. Otherwise a map of Europe, subdivided by race, is impossible, as events have shown. Had Wilson's spirit been displayed by Italy, there would never have been a crisis over Fiume. And the same spirit would have solved all the local problems of which Silesia, Vilna,

Memel and Danzig are examples. No treaty-not the sermon on the mount itself-will work as it should in an atmosphere of tribal jealousy.

By Point One, there were to be "open covenants, openly arrived at" and "no private international understandings of any kind." There indeed you have what should have been the very talisman of Wilson's success. What upset him was secrecy. The world really wanted him to win and was ready to share his struggle. But the Big Four met behind closed doors and the case was not stated to the jury. Within the bureaum the bureaucrat rules, and it was in his interest alone that silence was enjoined. Wilson's wand snapped when the censorship was imposed.

Indeed, he was too courteous. For their countries' good, his colleagues among the Big Four needed rougher handling. At times, they should have been seized by the throat and the nonsense clean shaken out of them. Supported by his own condition-"open covenants openly arrived at" to which the Allies had become a party, Wilson had the right to say, "Very well; you think this-I advise the opposite. The world must know tomorrow morning and I shall tell the world.". Few of the old world tantrums would have survived such an ultimatum.

By his Fourteen Points, it is surely clear that the President had a right to insist upon the complete

cancellation of all secret treaties, as a condition precedent to the United States joining with the Allies in the negotiation of a general peace. In the spring of 1917, Balfour visited Washington and mentioned the secret treaties to Colonel House which perhaps was the moment when the United States could have made the above stipulation. No Ally at that critical instant would have dared to resist. Prior to August 1914, Edward Grey negotiated no secret treaty at all, save one of an entirely minor importance. He regarded these treaties, in his own words, as part of the poison gas of war. And while a treaty is not of necessity to be thought wicked in its aims, merely because it is undisclosed, it would have been well at Paris if the problem of peace could have been approached by Powers, not fettered in advance by debts of honor. To what extent, Woodrow Wilson knew of the Secret Treaties is a question of which various views are taken. To a question by Senator Borah, he answered that they came to his knowledge first in Paris. As the Treaties had been widely published prior to that date, and were familiar to students of foreign policy throughout the world, the disclaimer is, perhaps, technical in its application; in any event, President Wilson had every opportunity of knowing. What he depended upon, apparently, was the overwhelming equity of his own alternative. To challenge secret

treaties, already concluded, might have upset both Italy and Japan. The hope was that the peace would automatically liquidate these liabilities and prevent their recurrence in the future.

In Point Six, Wilson declared for the evacuation of Russia and her territorial integrity, assuring her also "of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing." The treatment of Russia was to be "the acid test."

After all, Russia had collapsed in the common cause. She was not a foe but a casualty. Her Bolshevism was more of a disease than a vice. And to hold her heritage, as it were, in trust for the Russia of tomorrow was the best answer to her Communists. Unfortunately, Japan wanted land and France wanted money, while Winston Churchill sometimes seems to have wanted war for its own sake. Instead of following that leadership by Woodrow Wilson to which, in this respect, Lloyd George's best judgment adhered, the Allies played with absurd but calamitous expeditions by adventurers like Kolchak, Denikin and Wrangel whose excesses only served to rivet the authority of Lenin yet more firmly over the people. It is characteristic of Woodrow Wilson's tenacity that to the end he declined to recognize the Baltic provinces of Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia, as to the future of which there have been many misgivings. He regarded

them as a dismemberment of Russia. For the same reason, he refused to be a party to the seizure of Bessarabia by Rumania. It is true that when the Czecho-Slovakians were retreating through Siberia, the President sent a small American force to join with the Japanese in assisting their escape. The significance of that diplomacy was, however, not an offensive against Russia but a restraint on Japan. To Russia, the President was loyal.

Had the Russians themselves been more courteous to him, they would have found him to be their best friend. But at the moment when he incurred censure in the United States for the sympathy which he expressed towards the Russian Republic, struggling to the birth, the Soviet Government retorted with insults not only to the President but to the United States.

By Point Ten, Woodrow Wilson enunciated his policy for the Ottoman Empire. For areas, still Turkish, there was to be "a secure sovereignty". To "other nationalities", the promise was "an absolutely unmolested development." And the Dardanelles were to be free for shipping. With Turkey, as we have seen, the United States was not at war nor was the President responsible for the Treaty of Sevres by which in a settlement was imposed on the Near East. But his view was simple and sane. He had too many